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Abstract 
The tri-partite initiative in and for Africa has been accompanied by high levels of 
optimism since its political endorsement in 2008. It provides for an opportunity to 
resolve a host of problems with regards to regional integration in Eastern and 
Southern Africa. The overall aim of this study is to explore the prospects and 
challenges towards realising the Tri-partite Free Trade Area (T-FTA) in and for 
Africa. This study is pragmatic and implicitly seeks to uncover how the T-FTA could 
contribute to the African Regional Integration Project (ARIP), given the challenges 
that regional integration face in Africa. 
 
 
Regional integration has a long and rich history in Africa, which started at the 
?????????? ??? ?????????????? ??????????????? ????????? ????????? ??? ????????? ????????????
have been weak since the start and persist in its superficial nature with little 
developmental impact. The reasons for the lack of meaningful integration in Africa 
are wide-ranging and span national, regional and system level analytical viewpoints. 
They encompass areas such as developmental levels, political will, respect for 
regional architecture, overlapping membership and the Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs). These factors impact on the integration process in Africa and 
explain in varied ways why there has been little comprehensive economic integration.  
 
 
The starting point was to define the complex concept of regional integration. The 
dominant factors that define and affect regional integration in this study are that it is a 
state-based exercise, driven by economic integration, and influenced by the global 
political economy of the day. It was determined that Africa has adapted its regional 
integration strategies according to the shifts and influences in the global political 
economy on states, emanating from the post WWII period to the present day. The 
impact of the global economy on Africa since independence was great and is viewed 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
impact on the integration process. Regional integration is essentially a state to state 
???????? ?????? ????? ??????? ??????? ????? ???????????? ???? ????? ??? ???????? ??? ?????????
pursuit for integration. Essentially, regional integration is being pursued by states that 
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are still struggling to consolidate statehood, and this leaves little space to move 
towards a regional approach. However, given the dynamics of a globalised world, 
regional integration as a strategy is no longer questioned in Africa and is an important 
component of its developmental agenda.  
 
 
Clarifying the T-FTA was important, and this was done in order to highlight what the 
tri-partite initiative is and is not. This provided for an opportunity to investigate what 
the dominant areas are that have informed the emergence of the tri-partite process. 
The former was found to be largely economic in nature, focusing on harmonising the 
trade regimes of COMESA, EAC and SADC as a primary motivation. The tri-partite 
initiative will facilitate and encourage the harmonisation of trade regimes by stressing 
market integration, infrastructure development and industrialisation, coupled by a 
developmental approach. This is promising, as the tri-partite initiative seeks to 
simultaneously deal with many issues that have been commonly associated with the 
problems that regional integration face in Africa. When viewing the negotiating 
context, as well as the principles upon which it is to be based, indicate though, that 
Africa still favours individual state interest that will be hard to reconcile given that the 
tri-partite region currently has 26 participant states. In terms of economic integration, 
the T-FTA seeks to put new generation trade issues on the agenda by including 
services, movement of persons as well as trade facilitation, all of which have been 
found to be important in realising a trade in goods agenda that is the focus of regional 
integration in Africa. 
 
 
Analysing the grassroots realities of the market integration pillar offered some 
valuable insights towards the purposes of this study. The market integration pillar is 
inundated with challenges, with Rules of Origin (RoO) being the primary challenge 
towards consolidating the trade in goods agenda on a tri-partite level. New generation 
trade issues are going to be equally difficult to realise, given that they have no 
implementation record in the individual Regional Economic Communities (RECs). 
Promising though is that trade facilitation has already seen positive results by 
resolving non tariff barriers in the regions.  
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Infrastructure development is equally challenging, although it provides a significant 
opportunity to create better connectivity (physical integration) between states. In 
?????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????
lot of pan-African goals that directly feed into initiatives of the African Union (AU) 
???? ???????????????????? ????????????????????????? ????????????? ??????????????????
pillar has not as yet created any concrete tri-partite plans, so it remains to be seen 
what can be achieved. Ideally, industrialisation is viewed as the pillar that will solve 
the supply-side constraints of African economies hence, strengthening the trade in 
goods agenda in the regions. 
 
 
Even though the T-FTA has practical challenges to implementation, there are at least 
two underlying factors that indirectly affect the prospects of realising the tripartite 
initiative. The EPAs are an emergent threat in that they run parallel to tripartite 
negotiations; and respect for a rules based integration process, are issues that warrant 
consideration. 
  
 
Fundamentally, in order to achieve a successful T-FTA will require a shift in the way 
business is done in African integration. African states need to realise that their 
national interests are best served through cooperation, in meaningful ways. Inevitably 
this requires good faith as well as ceding some sovereignty towards regional goals. 
Thus, there is a risk that the T-???????????????????????????????????????????????????
not realised. The fundamentals of political will, economic polarisation and instability 
have to be resolved. This will lay an appropriate foundation for the tripartite initiative 
to be sustainable, with developmental impact. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Over the last two decades, states have demonstrated a growing interest in regional integration 
across the international system. A surge of regional initiatives have developed during this 
period, including, but not limited to the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), the 
Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Mercado Comun del Sur 
(MERCOSUR). The results of these regional exercises across the world have varied in 
accordance with the changing international environment for individual and groups of states 
(Trivedi, 2005, p. 5-9 and Buthulezi, 2006, p. 13-51). Successful regional integration 
initiatives are not the standard though. It is, however, widely recognised that the formation of 
the European Union (EU) in 1993 and its accomplishments regarding integrating Europe, is 
seen as the benchmark for regionalism across the world (Lee, 2003, p. 33 and Venter & 
Neuland, 2007, p. 39-47).  
 
As the above-mentioned examples of regional integration initiatives have gained momentum 
over the years, African states were encouraged to consider the issue of regional integration 
seriously in an attempt to avoid marginalisation in the international system and the global 
economy (Geda & Kibret, 2007. p. 3). Accordingly, African states over the last two decades 
made concerted efforts to integrate on various platforms, thus not entirely lagging behind the 
rest of the world in terms of regional integration. According to the African Development 
?????????????????????????????????tion of Africa into many nation states with scant economic 
coherence led African leaders, following political independence, to embrace regional 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
increased their efforts at political and economic integration through initiatives such as the 
Lagos Plan of Action in 1980 and the treaty establishing the African Economic Community 
(AEC), which was signed in 1991 and came into force three years later (Jakobeit, 
Hartzenberg and Charalambides, 2005, p. 5). The AEC aims to increase the capacity of 
African states to define, control, sustain and defend productive activity and social 
development within individual state borders (Buthelezi, 2006, p. 18). 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
The AEC operates as a separate legal instrument to the African Union (AU) and is supposed 
to guide economic integration of the eight recognised Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs) into an Africa wide continental economic unit. According to Ndomo (2009, p. 8-9), 
the afore-mentioned eight recognised RECs include the: 
? Arab Maghreb Union (UMA); 
? East African Community (EAC);  
? Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS);  
? Southern African Development Community (SADC);  
? Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); 
? Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD); 
? Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); and 
? Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). 
 
These recognised RECs interact alongside six sub-regional economic communities in Africa, 
namely the Central African Economic and Monitory Community (CEMAC); the Economic 
Community of Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL); the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC); the 
Manu River Union (MRU); the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), and the West 
African Economic and Monitory Union (UEMOA) (Selelo, 2010, p. 7). 
 
According to Article four of the AEC Treaty (1994, p. 7-8), a number of stages are to be 
completed if the goal of African economic integration is to be achieved. These stages include 
the following:  
? Strengthening of existing RECs;  
? Conclusion of agreements aimed at harmonising and coordinating policies among 
existing sub-regional communities and RECs;  
? Promotion and strengthening of joint investment programmes;  
? Liberalisation of trade through removing customs duties levied on imports and 
exports as well as removing non-tariff barriers in order to establish Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) at the level of each REC; and  
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? Harmonisation of national policies to promote joint cooperation in agriculture, 
industry, transport, communications, energy, natural resources, trade and finance. 
 
In principle, the AEC declaration offers a framework for underwriting economic policy 
reform through international agreements (Buthulezi, 2006, p. 20). This is labelled as the 
African Regional Integration Project (ARIP) and all African states and their RECs are 
attempting to achieve its terms of economic integration. 
 
The member states of the three RECs which span the Eastern and Southern African regions, 
namely COMESA, EAC and SADC, have acknowledged that significant challenges exist in 
their pursuit to achieve economic integration in these regions. In Africa, multiple 
memberships to RECs or more generally Regional Integration Agreements (RIAs) by African 
states are unrivalled in number, with more complex and dense configurations than other parts 
of the world. The most notable challenge to regional economic integration is the issue of 
overlapping membership which results from these complex and dense groupings. The 
Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-FTA) has been proposed as a strategy to combat the growing 
trend of overlapping membership of the three RECs and is endorsed by the Minimum 
Integration Plan of the AU as a viable solution to ending, or at least rationalising, current 
overlaps in membership, not just in the region, but in Africa as a whole (AUC, 2010, p. 11-
17).1  
 
However, the overlapping membership issue is not the sole area of contention when viewing 
the ARIP. Africa faces a number of challenges in enhancing its regional economic 
cooperation, including factors that reside at the national, regional and system (global) levels 
that might impact on the effectiveness of the T-FTA. This study aims to describe these 
challenges and analyse the prospects of success of the T-FTA to contribute to the ARIP and 
to enhance inter-REC cooperation in four key areas that were identified at the first Tri-partite 
Summit held in 2008. These key areas are: 
                                                             
1 The T-FTA refers broadly to the larger African geographic space. At this stage, it should be noted that within 
the context of this particular study, reference to T-FTA also encompasses reference to the Free Trade 
Agreement. 
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? Establishing trade arrangements among COMESA, EAC and SADC;  
? Enhancing inter-REC economic cooperation; 
? Free movement of business persons; and 
? Enhanced inter-REC cooperation on multilateral/bilateral trade negotiations.  
 
It should be stressed that the T-FTA is not as yet a reality and at the time of writing it was 
still being negotiated. Thus, it has not been finalised and/ or officially been operationalised. 
However, the conceptualisation of the T-FTA is quite advanced and the trajectory of what the 
T-FTA as a policy programme will look like is already discernible, making it an opportune 
time for this study. The latter is deemed to be viable and aims to ascertain whether the T-FTA 
as it currently is being conceptualised, will ultimately resolve the challenges pertaining to 
integration in Africa and/ or contribute to the ARIP. 
 
1.2. Problem statement 
The significance of the T-FTA and hence the research question pursued in this study is 
related to challenges to regional integration in Africa. These challenges are explored below at 
three levels of analysis, i.e. the national level (e.g. domestic factors, such as political will); 
regional level (e.g. varied integration levels and overlapping membership), and system level 
(e.g. negotiating EPAs with external actors). 
 
1.2.1 National level 
There are great disparities among African states. The most pertinent of these are evident in 
the varying levels of development, democracy, social cohesion and stability amongst these 
states. These are further exacerbated, on the one hand, by a general lack of infrastructure; 
transport; communications; and, on the other, not unrelated economic development, 
specifically export orientated industrial development. Leshaba (2002, p. 4-5) highlights that 
at the national level inappropriate economic policies, such as inward-looking development 
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strategies, emphasising import substitution behind high barriers to trade, lack of political will, 
local conflicts and civil strife, insufficient knowledge to implement integration measures and 
a lack of private sector involvement as  key factors explaining the low levels of intra-regional 
trade in Africa. According to Leshaba (2002, p. 3-5), Lee (2003, p. 2-28) and Buthulezi 
(2006, p. 77-78), the culmination of these afore-mentioned problems and weaknesses resides 
at the national level. Political will, stability, outward-looking development strategies and the 
know-how to implement integration measures with the aid of the private sector, are all 
prerequisites for trade in and between RECs and thus for effective regional economic 
integration. Regional integration is often an exercise initiated between weak African states 
that have not succeeded in consolidating the foundation of (their) statehood yet. As a result, if 
the states attempting to integrate are weak, so will their efforts at regional integration be.2 
  
The linkages and mandates of RECs to their member states are generally weak in Africa. This 
relates to the inability of regional bodies to enforce their mandates and protocols on member 
states. African states tends to protect  their sovereignty and most often are of the opinion that 
national policy should be the exclusive business of the state, thus creating further 
complications in aligning regional and national policy frameworks (Nyirabu, 2004, p. 25). 
This assertion has significantly stonewalled the cooperation arrangements and attempts of 
member states, especially in terms of economic integration. The lack of centrally coordinated 
mechanisms that can monitor and enforce agreed policies and principles is related to the 
power deficit in regional institutions across Africa (Nyirabu, 2004, p. 27). This gives rise to 
regional institutions lacking the power(s) to enforce collective decisions and protocols made 
collectively. Chingono and Nakara (2009, p. 2) note that Eastern and Southern Africa do not 
have an extensive history of common action and collective policy formulation. Nyirabu 
(2004, p. 26-27) adds that few countries in Southern Africa have mechanisms that are 
responsible for aligning national policy to regional plans through constructing separate 
departments or aligning current ones to the region. Trade driven integration may not be 
beneficial in weak institutional contexts and may further contribute to disparities among 
member states (Verdier, 2010, p. 6). This forms part of a much wider debate around the lack 
of a rules based dispensation at the regional level, which is critical for effective regional 
                                                             
2 Weak states have critical gaps in providing physical security, legitimate political institutions, economic 
management and/ or social welfare. They are legal entities that cannot exercise full claim over sovereignty 
(Patrick, 2006, p. 29). 
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integration (Hartzenberg, 2011b, p. 18-19; Erasmus, 2011, p. 86 and Erasmus, 2012, p. 7). 
Integration of any kind will not be possible in the absence of rules and law that strengthen 
predictability and builds trust between participating states. 
 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
integration.3 The problem with economic integration in the African context is that African 
states have historically addressed regional integration with an almost exclusive focus on a 
market integration model as prescribed and strengthened by the European model as an ideal 
type, rather than opting for a context-?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
logic and as such are viewed as shallow efforts at integration. On the one hand, the problem 
with a trade in goods agenda in Africa is that African states on the whole do not have the 
capacity to produce products which would be eligible for preferential trade. On the other 
hand, recent trends in PTAs indicate that trade in services are increasingly playing a more 
prominent role, implying the need for a deeper integration as opposed to a classically defined 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
two important problems at the national level: Following a classic integration strategy does not 
suit the particular economic realities of most African states and it is outdated when viewing 
other developing regions such as the ASEAN, which has managed to use their regional FTA 
to accrue immense economic growth in a globalised world. 
 
1.2.2 Regional level 
The process of regional integration within the three RECs is varied and is in itself a problem 
towards deepening economic integration among them. However, they have similarities in that 
the COMESA, EAC and SADC are pursuing market integration as a primary driver for 
regional integration (ECA, 2010, p. 4). The strategies which they are utilising in this regard 
are, however, unique to each economic community with different approaches, timeframes and 
                                                             
3 Reinert (2008, p. 151-164) discusses developing economies that are primary producers of commodities which 
trade on an export base, which in the medium to long term has diminishing returns in production, whilst also 
harbouring the short and medium to long term challenge of a locked in relationship, which favours stronger, 
more industrialised nations. Economies specialising in sectors with diminishing returns are referred to as 
Malthusian economies. These economies specialise in sectors that subordinate them to the lowest level of 
economic return; in actual fact, the returns diminish instead of increase over time. 
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goals (Lee, 2003, p. 1-3). The degree of integration of each of the RECs are at different 
levels, thus, as each REC moves to deeper integration, multiple membership of RECs will 
become legally and technically even harder to maintain.  
 
The EAC is already recognised as a Customs Union (CU); SADC has an FTA in place, and 
COMESA has established a CU in 2009 comprising a few commodities. There is no logical 
rationale for member states to engage in two CUs with different external tariffs, unless tariff 
regimes are harmonised (Jakobeit, et al, 2005, p. x and Buthulezi, 2006, p. 3). Also, member 
states with overlapping membership makes it even harder to facilitate inter regional trade 
through the adoption of different Rules of Origin (RoO), administrative duplication and 
fundamentally having different trade regimes with varying costs to engage in business (ECA, 
2006, p. 7). Essentially, the three RECs are presently in competition with each other, 
presenting opportunities for conflict instead of cooperation. This situation constitutes a direct 
contradiction of the overarching goal of African economic integration and the aims of ARIP, 
which relies heavily on the ability of RECs to cooperate with each other and not compete in 
order to facilitate the formation of the AEC. 
 
In comparison with other parts of Africa, overlapping membership is more prevalent in the 
Eastern and Southern African regions. While COMESA has 19 member states4, EAC5 and 
SADC have five and 156 member states, respectively (Mackie et al. 2010, p. 7-9). For 
example, the EACs member states are all part of either, COMESA and/ or SADC; over two 
thirds of SADCs membership overlap with COMESA; and almost all of COMESAs member 
states are part of the EAC or SADC (COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2008, p. 2). Therefore, 10 
members across SADC, COMESA and EAC are part of CUs when SACU is transplanted 
onto the overlapping membership landscape in the regions. All 10 members are negotiating 
alternative CUs to the ones they currently belong to. COMESA and SADC have seven 
members in common that is not part of a CU but is preparing ones with SADC and COMESA 
(COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2008, p. 2). This situation has culminated into the so called 
                                                             
4 Burundi, Comoros, Congo, DR Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
5 Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi. 
6 Angola, Botswana, DR Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to maintain and initiate and/ or implement programs of any of the regional bodies they belong 
to (Baldwin, 2006, p. 11-34 and Draper, Halleson and Alves, 2007, p. 25-29).  
 
1.2.3 System level: Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 
Africa is particularly reliant on relations with the developed world for its growth and 
development prospects. Unfortunately, there has been a trend where Africa has been 
marginalised in the global economy due largely to unstable states, chronic underdevelopment 
and small markets. The marginalisation of Africa has only until recently been stemmed by a 
???????? ????????? ??? ????????? ????? ???????? ??????? ??? ????????? ???????? ????? ??? ?????? ????
India, from the Global South.   This signifies a blossoming relationship between Africa and 
other Global South states, with China now being the continen?????????????????????????????????
2012, p. 158??? ????????? ????????? ?????????? ???? ????????? ????? ????? ??????? ???? ??? ??????
historical relationship, which is mainly manifested through colonialism, will take some time 
to disappear.  
 
When colonialism came to an end in Africa, Europe created a framework for cooperation 
between the former British, Dutch, Belgian and French colonies.7 In April 1976, the first 
Lomé Agreement came into force comprising the developing African Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) countries. The Agreement governed the relationship between the EU and ACP 
countries for 25 years, expiring in February 2000 (Venter & Neuland, 2007, p. 88). The 
institutionalisation of the WTO and the then European Community (EC), now known as the 
EU have influenced negotiations towards  new cooperation agreements between the ACP 
countries and the EU. These new cooperation arrangements are formally referred to as the 
Cotonou Partnership Agreements, but more commonly referred to as the Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs). The EPAs are meant to address the weaknesses of the Lomé 
conventions, by radically reforming the ACP-EU trade relationship (Bilal and Braun-
Munzinger, 2008, p. 3).  
 
                                                             
7 See chapter 3 for an elaborate discussion. 
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The idea behind this shift was to conform to WTO Article XXIV of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provisions that prescribes a neo-liberal agenda of opening up 
?????????????? ???????? ????? ?? ?????? ????????????? ?????? ?????? ???? ?????? ??? ???? ???????????
preferential access to EU markets, which contradicts the principle of non-discrimination in 
the global trade regime. The EPAs highlight four formation principles, namely development, 
reciprocity, regionalism and differentiation (Bilal & Braun-Munzinger, 2008, p. 3-4). At the 
time, Bilal and Braun-Munzinger noted that in order to retain preferential access, the ACP 
countries will have to start opening their markets on a reciprocal basis to the EU, and this is 
to be achieved by means of economic integration agreements across the six regions that span 
the ACP.  
 
Jakobeit, et al (2005, p. 20) note that in Eastern and Southern Africa there are two dominant 
EPA negotiations taking place, namely the SADC EPA and the Eastern and Southern African 
EPA. Some African states have not entered into them according to their REC configurations, 
in effect aligning themselves to new groupings. This has been criticised as unsustainable for 
the achievement of the developmental goals as set by African states, because the process 
effectively redefines current RECs (Yao, 2010). The implications of the EPAs for regional 
and continental economic integration in Africa are perceived as negative and do not bode 
well for African states uniting under a common vision and mobilising around common 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
rationale for regional bodies in Africa. Various member states of African RECs have failed in 
being cognisant of the potential long term threats in entering into negotiations with the EU, 
which is in almost all cases structured in such a manner that it is ultimately inconsistent with 
the current configuration of the RECs. 
 
The EU has drawn critique for its renewed efforts to fast track EPAs with Africa, despite 
existing, cross cutting RECs throughout the continent (Yao, 2010). Sustainable development 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the goals and objectives as encapsulated in continental and regional initiatives. The T-FTA 
negotiations are supposed to be concluded by 2016, and in this regard the EU announced that 
African states that have not signed or ratified EPAs by 1 January 2014, will lose duty free 
access to European markets (Atta & Gemma, 2011). Thus, African states stand to lose 
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preferential market access if negotiations are not concluded within the stipulated time-frame 
(i.e. 2014) (Atta & Gemma, 2011 and van den Bosch, 2011). These EPAs has the potential to 
re-configure REC terms of trade that would impact on the current T-FTA negotiations. 
 
1.3 Research question 
Keeping the above in mind, the study aims to address the following research question: How 
does the T-FTA propose to contribute to the ARIP, given the challenges that regional 
integration face in Africa? 
 
Sub-questions that will assist in answering the overarching research question include: 
? Why do states pursue regional integration, and how has this changed over time? 
? What are the generic challenges to regional integration in Africa? 
? What are the challenges which exist specifically in the COMESA, EAC and SADC in 
terms of regional economic integration? 
? How may the challenges facing the three RECs impact on the proposed T-FTA? 
? What are the goals of the T-FTA and are they attainable in terms of the challenges 
that the three RECs currently face?  
? Is the T-FTA a suitable alternative for the overlapping membership problem in the 
Eastern and Southern African region? 
? Will the T-FTA as it is currently envisioned, contribute to the ARIP? 
 
1.3.1 Hypothesis 
In order to answer how the T-FTA proposes to contribute to the ARIP will require a 
multidimensional approach. The challenges facing regional integration are part and parcel of 
why the ARIP exists as well as why Africa has pursued regional integration. Thus, the 
primary hypothesis of this thesis is that there are mixed outcomes; where the tripartite process 
will experience immense challenges on the one hand and yet, on the other hand, there are 
positive aspects associated with the progression of the T-FTA. The primary distinction in 
determining positive and negative connotations of the tripartite process is between the 
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economic and political aspirations of the continent. Following the distinction of an economic 
and political perspective will assist in viewing the T-FTA and ARIP as having a multitude of 
goals that operate within different environments. 
 
Thus, an important assumption in this hypothesis is that the T-FTA is not a zero-sum game 
with clearly defined indicators that prescribe success and failure. Regionalism has evolved 
????? ????? ????? ?????????? ???????????? ???? ????????? ??????????? ??????? ???? ??????? ?????????
regional integration experience has not followed the textbook European example; hence, 
market integration is not the primary element which is aspired within the African context. An 
important viewpoint in answering the research question is that prospects and challenges are 
determined by market integration factors as well as political and developmental factors, such 
as pan-African unity and infrastructure development. It is in the political and developmental 
aspects of integration that the T-FTA will make positive contributions to the ARIP. The 
market integration track, however, will have immense challenges due to grass root 
implementation realities. 
 
1.4 Research methodology 
1.4.1 Methodological approach: Qualitative analysis 
This study is qualitative in nature since it pursues an understanding into the attitudes, 
motivations and behaviour of actors (i.e. states and inter-governmental organisations) and 
given dynamics in COMESA, EAC and SADC. Applying qualitative research requires an 
understanding of given variables (Maxwell, 1992, p. 281). Denscombe (2010, p. 104) notes 
that a qualitative study is geared towards gaining depth in its analysis by interpreting words 
and images in order to attach meaning to them. He proceeds by stressing that the 
interpretation of data in this manner could assist researchers to understand norms, values and 
perceptions of risk. However, it should be underlined that this study also borrows, and 
consequently applies, some quantitative analysis in the form of, for instance, percentages of 
trade in various regions and more specifically, Africa and the three RECs in question. 
Qualitative analysis will guide data interpretation of quantitative sources, further assisting in 
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the depth of inquiry, and where necessary give the quantitative sources meaning beyond its 
intended scopes of study. 
 
1.4.2 Data resources 
1.4.2.1 Policy documents 
Policy documents proved to be a valuable primary source of data for the purposes of this 
study. The founding treaties establishing COMESA, EAC and SADC provided insights into 
what the three RECs might achieve within the T-FTA framework in terms of the various 
protocols which govern the workings of the RECs in question. Also, the Treaty establishing 
the AEC (Abuja Treaty), as well as the Minimum Integration Programme of the AU is 
essential for an understanding of the perception of the T-FTA in Africa and how the AU has 
for all intents and purposes supported the programme as a viable strategy to overcome the 
overlapping membership issue in Africa. Furthermore, the GATT/ WTO founding documents 
assisted in placing regional integration initiatives into the broader scheme of multilateral free 
trade. 
 
1.4.2.2 Speeches 
Speeches are a valuable source of data in that they can illuminate perceptions of the various 
role-players, which are important to the study. In this case, speeches and comments made by 
the heads of state of member countries of all three RECs are imperative in establishing what 
the perceptions of the T-FTA are. Key dignitaries of member states representing COMESA, 
EAC and SADC on the level of the secretariat, joint infrastructure and policy harmonisation 
arenas could further assist in terms of perception and progress of the T-FTA.  
 
1.4.2.3 Secondary sources 
Books, journal and newspaper articles enabled a firm understanding of regional integration 
and the dynamics of what it requires to successfully implement trade agreements. Reviewing 
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the literature highlighted different theories, concepts and debates on the topic at hand and  
provides the theoretical backdrop to the empirical research, namely how does the T-FTA 
propose to contribute to the ARIP, given the challenges that regional integration faces in 
Africa? In this regard, there exists a treasure trove of secondary data on regional integration 
in Africa. The Assessing Regional Integration in Africa series as supported by the United 
Nations (UN), as well as the Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa Programme, 
which has ten volumes dating back to the year 2000, assists in acquiring a sound 
?????????????? ??? ???? ???? ???????? ??? ????????? ??? ???? ??????? ????? ??????? ?????? ???? ?????
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has published copious amounts of data 
relating to regional integration in Africa.  
 
1.4.3 Data analysis 
In keeping with the chosen methodological approach (i.e. qualitative analysis), data will be 
analysed as follows: 
1.4.3.1 Content Analysis 
According to Weber (1990, p. 9-12), content analysis is a systematic research method for 
analysing textual information in a standardised way that allows evaluators to make inferences 
about that information. The large bodies of text related to this study required content analysis 
and specific themes were created in order to standardise the analysis. For the purposes of this 
study, an exploration into the preconditions for regional integration in Africa, COMESA, 
EAC and SADC were extremely helpful. In addition, an analysis of the T-FTA as proposed in 
the 2008 Tri-partite Summit were scrutinised in terms of the four areas, namely establishing 
trade arrangements among COMESA, EAC and SADC; enhancing inter-REC economic 
cooperation; free movement of business persons; and enhanced inter-REC cooperation on bi-
and multilateral trade negotiations (EPAs). These four areas were analysed in depth and 
outlined and superimposed onto the landscape which exists in the three RECs operating at 
national, regional and system levels. 
 
Attitudes and perception play a key role in establishing the nature and structure of the T-FTA. 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????, 
p. 12). In this regard content analysis allows for the exploration of the rationale of 
overlapping membership, i.e. how policy-makers perceive the costs and benefits of regional 
integration. Thus, how short and long term interests play themselves out within the goals set 
out in the regional bodies and how this relates to the likelihood of an effective outcome for 
the T-FTA can be analysed in this way. 
 
1.4.3.2 Interpretation 
???????? ??????? ??? ??????????? ????? ??? ????????????? ????????? ???????? ????? ???????? is socially 
constructed and the researcher becomes the vehicle by which this reality is revealed?. In 
order to question the norms by which states in Africa operate interpretation as a valuable tool 
has been employed in this study. Moving from multiple memberships of RECs in COMESA, 
EAC and SADC to an attempt to rationalise membership in the T-FTA begs the following 
question for interpretation: Why have the three RECs chosen this route amongst other 
alternatives which exist in this scenario? The norm has been to add more REC memberships, 
whereas the T-FTA eventually seeks to unite the three RECs into a CU. Possible answers to 
this issue could lie in the structures of the international environment and how African states 
perceive gains within it. 
 
The various challenges to regional integration in Africa are also analysed. Within the context 
of this study, the effect of the decision of COMESA, EAC and SADC to engage in terms of 
the T-FTA to facilitate a more meaningful push towards regional economic integration is 
crucial to consider. Perceptions of how challenges to regional integration are perceived by the 
three RECs in particular are important in gauging what constitutes the logic (or rationality) of 
the T-FTA. Thus, an interpretive paradigm is evidently also grounding the research approach 
of this study. 
 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????? ???? ?????????????? ???????????? ??? ???? ???????????? ??????? ????????? ?????? ??? ???? The 
theory of rational choice that assumes actors base their decisions on rational calculations to 
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respond to problems which can be objectively determined leads to the dominant assumptions 
of this study, namely that the member states of COMESA, EAC and SADC made the choice 
to form a T-FTA as a rational response to integration challenges in Africa based on a cost 
benefit analysis. However, closer interpretation of how rational choice and regional 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? , is 
?????? ??????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
therefore it will be necessary to understand a variety of factors that infuse what decision-
makers deem as rational behaviour in the African context when it comes to regional 
integration in order to answer the research question. 
 
1.5 Structure of the study 
The study consists of six chapters. This first chapter describes the aim, the context and the 
justification as well as the general structure of the study. Chapter two provides the conceptual 
and theoretical frameworks that anchor this study.  
 
An overview of regional integration in Africa is provided in chapter three. It includes a 
discussion of the ARIP and what it is African integration aspires to. It also configures RECs 
in Eastern and Southern Africa as well as the primary factors that give the RECs their own 
unique character in the regions, coupled with the challenges to regional integration in Africa, 
and more specifically Eastern and Southern Africa (including the overlapping membership 
issue), which helps to contextualise the T-FTA.  
 
Chapter four analyses the T-FTA: its progression since the 2008-Summit and its proposed 
working processes. This is followed by a detailed account of the prospects and challenges 
towards realising the T-FTA in its current configuration in chapter five. Chapter six 
concludes with a summary of the main findings discussed throughout the study by providing 
a response to the question: How does the T-FTA propose to contribute to the ARIP, given the 
challenges that regional integration face in Africa? 
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1.6 Conclusion 
This chapter provided the rationale for the study by briefly describing the issue of regional 
integration in Africa. It illustrated the importance of regional integration in the international 
system and the subsequent aim of the study is to identify and gauge how, given the 
challenges that regional integration face in Africa, does the T-FTA propose to contribute to 
the ARIP?  
 
Born out of the growing contradictions of regional integration in the COMESA-EAC-SADC, 
the T-FTA has emerged. However, regional integration in Africa is not solely concerned with 
trade integration though as there exist a much wider set of challenges that informs the 
tripartite initiative. Therefore, it is necessary to understand exactly what regional integration 
means in the context of this study as well as why and how states integrate. This is the subject 
of the following chapter. 
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Chapter 2: Regional Integration: Conceptual and Contextual Underpinnings 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the conceptual framework as well as the broader 
historical context of the T-FTA as a step towards the ARIP. In doing so, the chapter 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????? ???? ??? ??????? ??????? ?? ??????? ????????????? ???? ???????? ????? ???????? ????? ????
vocabulary employed to describe regional integration and tries to clarify concepts and 
theories associated with regional integration amidst an historical narrative that traces the 
evolution of regional integration as it manifested in the 20th Century to today.8 This chapter 
commences with a definition of regional integration, also commonly referred to as 
regionalism.9  
 
Regional integration in its classical conception encompasses functional and market driven 
prescriptions towards integration. These will be outlined in order to highlight what the 
processes are through which integration between states are ideally achieved. It is important to 
note that these classical political (i.e. functional) and economic (i.e. market) processes were 
created within a specific international context. This approach implies a look at what has 
become known as the old and new regionalisms. These different regionalisms are said to be 
qualitatively different from each other because of the different world orders that encapsulated 
the shift in regionalisms (Hettne, 1997). The chapter as such incorporates the concept of 
world order to understand its effect on the political and economic dynamics which are at 
work in the process of integration.  
 
2.2 Regionalism 
Defining regionalism is not an easy task. This is especially true if one considers that scholars 
have long been struggling to reach consensus in their attempts to determine what the term in 
actual fact should constitute. As early as the 1930s it has been difficult to analyse the 
                                                             
8 Although this narrative could easily be expanded further into history, the focus on this period is deemed 
sufficient, given the word limitations of a Master thesis to provide a background understanding from which to 
explore the T-FTA.  
9 Regionalism is often used in the literature, and will also be in this study, as interchangeable with the concept 
regional integration.   
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dominant forms of regionalism, because putting an approach into practice encounters 
problems (Tylor, 1938, p. 379). This is due to the fact that regions come in all kinds of forms, 
for instance it could imply a geographical space, but also economic interaction; an 
institutional or governmental jurisdiction, as well as social or cultural characteristics (van 
Langenhove, 2011, p. 63). Hence, regional integration is dependent on how the idea of a 
region is viewed by the writer, and what the purpose of inquiry is (Hurrell, 2005, p. 41). 
 
 The complexity associated with defining regional integration is accurately captured below: 
 
????????????? ??? ????????? ???????????? ???? ???????????????? ????? ???????????????
difficulties to scholars. The terms are not fixed, and have been subject to 
multiple interpretations. History is useful here, not only in charting a course 
for regional projects but in showing how the vocabulary has changed and 
evolved. Older ideas of geographically defined regions and state-based 
regionalisms have given way to a more fluid and expansive understandings, 
which aim to capture the nature and extent of regional domains... 
Understanding regions and regionalism today demands a degree of definitional 
flexibility... A certain amount of both definitional and theoretical elasticity is 
required: there is no ideal region, or any single agenda to which all regions 
aspire. Regions like states are of varying compositions, capabilities and 
??????????????????????????????????-26). 
 
At this stage of the study it is imperative to clarify the distinction between regionalism and 
regionalisation. Regionalism, on the one hand, refers specifically to the idea, ideology, 
policies and goals that seek to transform a geographic area into a clearly identified social 
space (Bach, 2003, p. 22; Hveem, 2006, p. 296 and Akokpari, 2008, p. 87). Thus, regionalism 
reflects a constructivist notion inasmuch as it implies the ideational dimension of regional 
integration, and can apply to a number of areas such as social; cultural; political, and 
economic spaces. It postulates the implementation of a program and the definition of a 
strategy. For this reason, it is generally associated with formal arrangements and institution-
building by state actors (Bach, 2003, p. 22 and Hveem, 2006, p. 296). Regional integration 
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and regionalism are in the context of this definition interrelated and will be used as such in 
this study. 
 
Regionalisation, on the other hand, does not solely focus on the nature and extent of state 
driven initiatives. In fact, regionalisation could occur irrespective of state policies and even at 
times in opposition to their stated purpose (Bach, 2003, p. 22 and Hveem, 2006, p. 296-297). 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
interactions between formal and informal ??????????? ??? ?? ???????? ??????????? ?????? ??? ?????
These are linked to so-?????????????????????????-????????????????????????????????????????????
in immediate regions, and this could help to explain informal regional networks that go 
beyond state driven initiatives and create their own forms of regional integration. The EAC is 
considered to be a highly homogenous geographic space, with social and cultural similarity 
that can partly explain their success in economic integration. However, regionalism in this 
thesis will not include an investigation of these trans-state attributes as factors that will 
influence the process of the T-FTA, mainly as it goes beyond the scope of the thesis. 
 
This study views the state as the primary unit of analysis. Regional integration encompasses a 
basic tenet, which is integration between respective nation states (Balassa, 1961, p. 1; Haas, 
1964, p. 4-12 and Lee, 2002, p. 1) and this will be the key actor that affects the process of 
integration in the thesis. Tylor (1938, p. 379 ?380) and Heron (1985, p. 3)  observes that it is 
possible for any group of states, by means of an inter-state compact, to setup a regional 
authority to deal with their common problems; and this is widely regarded as a means of 
addressing  a variety of problems at the regional level. The rationale for regional integration 
is that states within a given geographic area can more easily and effectively address common 
problems because they are closer to the issues and presumed to share some common 
background; hence, regional integration assumes geographical proximity and a degree of 
mutual inter-dependence (Karns & Mingst, 2004, p. 148). Thus, in its basic form, regional 
integration is viewed as an exercise between contiguous states promoted through cooperation 
of some sort.  
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2.2.1 How states integrate and/ or cooperate 
The term regional integration is sometimes used in a confusing manner because in everyday 
language or theorising it is used to describe both a process as well as an end state of the 
process (Heinonen, 2006, p. 4). In other words, it is used to describe how states choose to 
cooperate, and this can be interpreted through the process involved in cooperating or what the 
end goal of cooperation is. As a result, there is no universal prescription towards the study of 
regional integration as it can be viewed from a variety of reference points.  
 
Haas (1970, p. 621-622) highlights that the key problem with regional integration theories is 
that they focus on the end state without putting enough emphasis on the processes, which 
underlie reaching that end state. Integration theory has therefore never been able to accurately 
predict the likely outcomes of an integration exercise. For example, will it be viewed in terms 
of goals and objectives (i.e. end state), or what has to be done to achieve them (i.e. process), 
or both? As such, regional integration in this study is that exercise carried out between states 
in order to create forms of cooperation which can be interpreted through political and 
economic justifications, but usually underpinned by a process of economic integration that 
has evolved over time. In Africa, as is the case elsewhere in the world, it is pursued alongside 
cooperative arrangements (functional), which are all designed to reach an end state. The 
likelihood of reaching that end state (as set by the ARIP) through the processes is a core point 
from which the prospects and challenges of realising the T-FTA will be viewed and 
evaluated.  
 
Nye (1968, p. 858) establishes that the concept of integration as defined as forming parts into 
a whole or creating inter-dependence, could be broken down into economic; social, and 
political integration. This basic definition of integration is useful in that it illuminates the 
scope of what is known as regional integration between states. Lee (2003, p. 8) highlights that 
regionalism can occur as a political initiative, which is all-encompassing concerning the 
ideas; identities, and ideologies related to a regional initiative. Alternatively, it could be 
strictly economic, concerning a group of countries that implement a set of preferential 
policies designed to enhance the exchange of goods and services amongst them (Trivedi, 
2005, p. 2 and Buthulezi, 2006, p. 1). Therefore, the process of integration could have 
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political and economic imperatives, which motivate what the regional agenda will be, as well 
as the form it takes. 
 
2.2.2 Factors that influence regional integration 
It is important to describe regional integration as it is presently conceptualised. Doing so 
assists in understanding the influences that affect the degree and motivations for states to 
pursue the regional alternative. Accordingly, below follows a description of contemporary 
regional integration: 
 
?????????? ???????????? ??? ?? ????????????????? ???????????? ?????? ???? ?????
different forms. It can be functional cooperation in some field of inter-state 
relations (for example economic or political integration). It can also take a 
broader form when participating states try to incorporate convergence of their 
policies with different sectors under a single framework... This is also the type 
of regional integration that is dominant in the present - day world ? regional 
integration today involves integration processes in several sectors (for 
example, the economy, security or environ??????????????????????????????. 
 
Regional integration is an exercise between states where the constraints and opportunities for 
them to pursue such integration are determined by the factors that comprise their particular 
?????? ??? ??????? ??????????? ????? ??? ??? ????????? ??? ????????? ???????? ????? ??????e from the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in an unstable system cooperation is likely to be sporadic and superficial, limited to one or 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????, 2005, p. 34). This presents a need 
to analyse the integration process from the national, regional and international levels as 
explained in the introductory chapter.  
 
The opportunities and constraints placed upon states vis-á-vis the international system have 
an influence on the perceived benefits that they can accrue from establishing integration 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
exercises. Further, these accumulate from specific contexts wherein regional integration is 
pursued. For example, Hettne (1997, p. 92) mentions that whereas core regions are politically 
stable and economically dynamic and organised to be better in control of the world economy, 
peripheral regions are defined as being politically more turbulent and economically more 
stagnant, which might imply that they pursue integration to arrest a process of 
marginalisation. Hocker and Jerosch (2008, p. 8) note that there is no one size fits all 
approach to regional integration, but there will be different solutions for different historical 
situations and different objectives to be achieved with it; thus, regional integration is a means, 
and not an end in itself. The idea that regional integration is a means, is of paramount 
importance towards understanding exactly what the influences behind establishing regional 
initiatives are, and of which T-FTA is an example of.  
 
The advantage of viewing regional integration in this way is that it offers an insight into the 
push-and-pull factors that influence regional integration and how it is approached. This 
highlights bottom-up and top-down factors that emanate from the specific context of states at 
the national, regional and international level. These factors influence the motivations and 
strategies pursued when devising regional integration. More importantly, these factors 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
2.3 Classical conceptions of Regional Integration 
The classical conceptions of regional integration include two dominant strands of thought, 
namely the functional and market driven paths towards integration between respective states. 
Regional integration in its classical conception of functional and market driven paths is 
viewed as a process to be followed in order to incrementally integrate states. These classical 
conceptions of integration prescribe different paths towards achieving inter-dependence. For 
example, functional integration prescribes cooperation between respective states to achieve a 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of rules that discriminate against trade or movement of factors of production (Haas, 1964, p. 
27). The key point to draw from these views are that functional cooperation seeks to integrate 
through cooperation, implying a much looser grouping, whereas market integration creates 
groupings that are held together by formal and technical agreements. Following from this, 
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one could observe that even in its classical sense the move towards integrating states have 
had two contrasting tendencies. In the one case, cooperation leads to agreements between 
states, while in the other, an agreement (which precedes cooperation) binds the member states 
into cooperation. 
 
2.3.1 Functionalism  
?????????????? ??? ?? ???????? ???????? ???????????? ??????????? ??????? ???? ??????? ??? ?????
?????????????????????????????????-212) notes that functionalism is an approach rather than a 
tight knit theory; therefore, it is a recommendation, and not an explanation of approaching the 
study of society. This classical conception of integration follows from the post-war world 
order that strongly followed the logic of state strength and that it should remain the sole 
guarantor of international relations.  Scholars that have been influential in the growth of its 
prominence include, amongst others, Ernst Haas and David Mitrany.10  
 
During the post-World War II (WWII) era, the supremacy of sovereignty was considered to 
be the ultimate form of consolidating the needs of human welfare and the international 
system as a whole. Indeed, this was acknowledged by the fact that functionalism essentially 
promoted cooperation between sovereign states as a path towards integration in its initial 
orientation. Mitrany (1948, p. 358) highlights that the functional approach is not a matter of 
surrendering sovereignty, but merely of pooling it to such an extent as might be required  for 
the joint performance of a particular task. It is for this reason that functionalism was 
considered to be a better alternative as opposed to other integration theories such as 
federalism that presupposed eventual full political integration as was the case in the United 
States of America (USA). Functionally orientated integration takes a weighted approach to 
the process of integration by linking particular activities and interests according to need and 
acceptability with limited policy space to just the issue area (Mitrany, 1965, p. 139 and 
Mitrany, 1975, p. x-xi????????????? ???????????? ???????????? ????? ?????? ????????? ??????????
where it is viewed that cooperation can only work if it is focused on specific activities 
                                                             
10In 1975, David Mitrany wrote an influential paper called ?T????????????????????????????????? where he proposed 
a new international order based on trans-state cooperation, and in doing so, he effectively redefined 
functionalism to consider regional integration and not just international integration through international 
organisations. 
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(functions) that would be performed more effectively if collective action was pursued. This 
would lead to the creation of institutional structures (form) that facilitate cooperation 
(Heywood, 2011, p. 486). In this process of integration, gradual steps at cooperation to 
pursue common goals, such as securing joint public goods, lay the foundation for increased 
integration, and this inevitably adopts an institutional form. 
 
The primary factor which would make integration through cooperation possible, was the idea 
???????????-???????????????????????????????????????????????????????, p. 47-50) as cooperation 
in specific sectors that would pave the way for cooperation in other sectors, thereby creating 
inter-dependence and eventually integration. Proponents of functionalism have been 
???????????? ???????? ???? ???????? ?????????? ??????-?????? ??????? ??????? ????????? in reality. 
However, functional theorists provided an important perspective for the prospects of 
integration, which was that the state is not necessarily the most capable form in which human 
welfare can be protected and preserved (Haas, 1964, p. 6 and Mitrany, 1975, p. x). This 
notion that the state is incapable of coping with all issues concerning human welfare was 
more evident in the domains of security and economic cooperation. The international 
environment became increasingly difficult for states to manage alone in the context of global 
recessions and the implications of a bipolar configuration of the international system that 
created security concerns beyond the control of individual states.  
 
The traditional functional approach was reworked by its leading theorists into what has 
become known as neo-functionalism. Ernst Haas, in his 1964 book Beyond the Nation State: 
Functionalism and International Organisations, mentions that the foundation of neo-
functionalism is that cooperation among sovereign states would eventually entail moving 
towards a new centre of authority located at the regional and international level. Therefore, 
neo-functionalists focus their attention on international organisations of varied sorts, be they 
political, security or economic entities. This is significant, because during the 1970s the 
superiority of the state was perceived to be in decline and the likely outcomes of multi-
lateralism were unknown due to its embryonic stage. The work of functional theorists such as 
Haas and Mitrany essentially presented the subject field of International Relations (IR) with 
the regional level of analysis. Notwithstanding, their comparative studies do exaggerate the 
?????????????? ??? ???? ??? ????? ??? ???????????? ??? ???? ????? ??? ???? ???????? ????????? ????cises 
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(Hurrell, 2005, p. 348 and Heywood, 2011, p. 486). Due to their focus on the integration 
process in Europe, Haas and Mitrany tend to advocate the importance of economic 
integration as a regional exercise.  
 
By the time that neo-functional theorists were gaining ground in the 1970s there was also 
consensus that full political integration between sovereign states would not be a viable or 
realistic outcome of integration. Nye (1970, p. 803) commented on the neo-functionalist 
approach in the formation of economic integration agreements, highlighting that they 
assumed process mechanisms that would ultimately realise the goal of economic integration. 
In other words, a move towards integration that is based on agreements requires fundamental 
cooperation. This effectively linked functional cooperation to the process of economic 
integration. Nye (1970, p. 803-804) mentions that there needs to be inherent functional 
linkages between tasks as precursors for integration agreements, for example increasing flows 
of transactions; deliberate linkages and coalitions; economic pressure groups; involvement of 
external actors; a regional ideology, and intensification of a regional identity and elite 
socialisation. Some have regarded neo-functionalism more as a description of the European 
exercise, rather than a theory dealing with international organisations (Heywood, 2011, p. 
486). 
 
Hence, neo-functionalists presuppose the idea of cooperation in many sectors seemingly not 
connected to the economic dimension, but would eventually create sustainable economic 
integration regardless of its degree. This is perhaps why functionalism is viewed by Davies 
(1996) as the approach that would best suit any group of states to integrate incrementally, 
especially in the context of developing countries in a globalised world. 
 
2.3.1.1 Functional Cooperation 
Economic integration (agreements) effectively commits member states to certain political 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
derive greater benefits from the extra regional / functional cooperation aspects of regionalism 
vis-à-vis the intra-regional / e???????? ???????????? ????????? ??????n, 2002, p. 3). Ideally, 
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????????? ??????????????????????? ????????????? ?????????????????????????tment to political 
objectives of common interest. Further, they are likely to promote regional dialogue that 
could assist in diffusing potential regional disputes and create mutual political support and a 
common agenda as well approach (Radelet, 1999, p. 7). According to Girvan (2002, p. 3-4), 
extra regional aspects also come into play and would often be concerned with regional 
functional cooperation where a strategy of pooling resources in an area such as international 
negotiations would result in stronger positions. Pursuing regional initiatives could assist in 
institutionalising domestic reforms such as macro-economic convergence and prescribing to 
democratic practices in individual states (Schiff & Winters, 2003, p. 19-21). Following from 
this, one could argue that even economic integration has the potential to accrue benefits for 
states that are not necessarily economic in nature, but in fact more functional in nature. 
 
It should be stressed that cooperation agreements differ from the market driven economic 
integration principle. Radelet (1999, p. 3) points out that a distinction has to be made between 
the two as cooperation agreements do not necessarily have a direct impact on trade and 
factors of production. Not all economic integration initiatives follow the linear model of 
integration, nor is it (always) economically or formally necessary to do so (Hocker & Jerosch, 
2008, p. 4). Jakobeit et al. (2005, p. 7) highlight that states in the Eastern and Southern 
African regions have embraced trade integration, however it has become clear that other areas 
beside trade are critical for deeper integration and economic development in these regions. 
The economic context of Eastern and Southern Africa has prompted functional cooperation 
agreements to be pursued alongside market integration attempts. 
 
African states face a number of challenges, including a lack of coordination; infrastructure, 
and economic development. Chacha (2008, p. 4) explains that regional cooperation 
encompasses joint development projects and policy harmonisation that is ideal in laying the 
foundation for market integration (i.e. trade and production). They include selected policy 
harmonisation such as adopting common standards and regulations; equal tax treatment of 
foreign investors; mutual defence and security approaches, and coordinated voting patterns in 
international organisations as well as joint production of public goods encompassing 
infrastructure development such as railroads; energy, and telecommunications (Radelet, 1999, 
p. 3). The afore-mentioned are all crucial for states in Africa to grow their economic base, 
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compete on a global scale and extract gains from market integration globally. These are 
??????????????? ??? ?????? ??????? ????? ????? ??????????? ??????????? ?????? ???? ?????????? ??? ????
sustainability of economic integration agreements. 
 
Market integration in itself creates distortions and challenges towards attaining economic 
development by all member states who are signatories of economic integration agreements. 
Chacha (2008, p. 3-4) elaborates on what is known as development integration (an element of 
cooperation agreements) explaining that it seeks to change the integration process, timing and 
commitment levels of member states as well as equitably distributing the costs and benefits of 
integration not only economically but socially and politically as well. Development 
integration seeks to put mechanisms in place that will equitably distribute the gains and losses 
amongst member states of a particular agreement. Moreover, it seeks to address the 
fundamental issue of who benefits from economic integration, as some states in the Eastern 
and Southern African regions stand to benefit more than others; hence this approach to 
integration seeks to address issues that are in part inherent in the political economy of the 
states in these regions. 
 
2.3.2The linear model and economic integration 
The theoretical and conceptual notions of regional integration have dealt in large parts with 
economic integration in its contemporary context. This is due to the fact that regionalism at 
the turn of the twenty-first century entails increased regionalisation of foreign investment, 
production and other economic activities (Heywood, 2011, p. 481-483). Market integration as 
a path towards economic integration has flourished within this international context. As a 
result, it could sometimes appear to be the only important aspect when economic integration 
is pursued between states in its most contemporary form. However, this is of course a fallacy, 
as regional integration today seeks to attain much more than just the economic integration of 
respective states.11  
 
                                                             
11 These other areas of focus pertaining to integration will be explored later in this chapter. See section 2.6.1 for 
an elaborate discussion on new regionalism). 
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It is often argued by economic integration theorists that economic integration was advocated 
first by Viner (1950) and Balassa (1961). It is argued that economic integration is the easiest 
and most viable strategy to bring states closer together through inter-dependence. They 
(Balassa and Viner) highlight certain steps are required in order to integrate economies, thus 
implying different levels of integration that in theory should follow on from each other. 
These levels include a Preferential Trade Area (PTA); Free Trade Area (FTA); Customs 
Union (CU); Common Market (CM), and economic union (Balassa, 1961, p. 2). This process 
is now commonly referred to as ?????????????????????????????????????????????ifferent states 
is integrated. States that pursue economic integration have to follow these pre-determined 
steps that imply incremental shifts from shallow to deeper aspects of economic unification.  
 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? towards closer economic union, 
seems to be a choice rather than a predetermined sequence especially in the context of 
choosing to form FTAs or CUs (Pomfret, 2005, p. 7). Nevertheless, the linear model of 
economic integration as prescribed by Viner (1950) and Balassa (1961) is regarded as an 
important model to comprehend the process of market integration and its corresponding 
?????????? ??? ???????? ??? ?????????????? ????????? ??? ????????? ????????????? ????????????? ??? ?????-
creating and trade-diverting CUs as well as on the static and dynamic benefits of regional 
integration, has become the theoretical foundation for regional economic integration 
(Rathumbu, 2008, p. 166). 
 
Traditionally, PTAs range from low levels of integration in the forms of FTAs and CUs to 
higher levels of integration in forms of a CM and economic and monetary union (Mwanza, 
2010, p. 7). Buthelezi (2006, p. 2-8) observes that modern day economic cooperation between 
states includes at least an FTA; CU, and a CM as well as an  economic union, and this 
represent a higher degree of integration, with the ultimate objective to attain free trade among 
the member states. These are the formal stages of market integration and provide a 
framework for analysing challenges to attaining regional economic integration in Eastern and 
Southern Africa as well as the implications of a T-FTA for individual RECs. Exploring the 
factors that encompass FTAs, CUs, CMs and economic unions is an essential starting point 
from which to view the process of economic integration in order to better understand its 
implications and changes over time. 
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2.3.2.1 Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) 
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are seen as the shallowest form of regional economic 
integration. The focus of an FTA is to remove both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade 
amongst member states. Mwanza (2010, p. 9) notes that FTAs could be limited to a number 
of sectors, thus affording member states with a high level of control at the national level, and, 
consequently preventing exposure to competition in sectors where they are more vulnerable. 
The high level of control at the national level is a desired incentive for states as they still seek 
to maintain their autonomy despite the integration exercise.  
 
It should be highlighted though that the autonomy of states in relation to third parties requires 
RoO. In this regard Jawoodien (2008, p. 5) mentions that RoO are able (and necessary) to 
prove that goods are indeed manufactured in the applicable FTA by monitoring inputs and 
sources of value adding. This is done to ensure that external actors do not simply enter the 
FTA through the member state with the lowest external tariff, and in turn exposing other 
member states to unfair competition. An example of the latter would be if, in a bid to avoid 
paying the applicable tariffs if entering directly through South Africa; Chinese companies opt 
to enter the SACU via Malawi. In doing so, Chinese products would unfairly benefit from a 
regional agreement that it is not even part of. Applying RoO is a cumbersome exercise that 
creates incentives for protectionism within individual states (Mwanza, 2010, p. 11). It is often 
utilised to impede the free movement of goods by means of stringent criteria to determine 
origin (see chapter five for an elaborate discussion in this regard). 
 
2.3.2.2 Custom Union (CU) 
A Custom Union (CU) encompasses all the characteristics of an FTA, including a Common 
External Tariff (CET). According to Jawodeen (2008, p. 7), this requires a common trade 
policy and regional competition policy. This type of economic integration requires more 
commitment and a deeper sense of political will by member states. For instance, they are 
obliged to forfeit their autonomy regarding their trade policy in favour of the CET and are 
required to cooperate closely to form a competition policy favourable to all concerned. 
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Buthulezi (2006, p. 2-8) argues that a CU member cannot have preferential tariffs for 
countries outside the bloc unless the entire Union agrees thereto. This prohibition strengthens 
the negotiating power of the member states in a CU. The formation of a CU also requires 
increased political will of member states as they would surrender some elements of 
sovereignty in terms of their trade policy. This is an important feature of a CU because it 
favours regional policies as opposed to national policy, implying a supra-national shift 
towards regional commitment and regional authorities. States then have little room to 
negotiate bi-lateral trade agreements that are a favoured form of facilitating strategic interests 
for individual states in the international system.   
 
2.3.2.3 Common market and economic union 
The natural progression of the levels or degrees of economic integration (market integration) 
move towards the deepest forms of integration in the formation of a CM and economic union. 
In a CM one finds free internal trade; a CET, and free movement of capital as well as labour 
amongst members in the bloc (Venter & Neuland, 2007, p. 36). Balassa (1961, p. 2) 
underlines that an economic union is distinct from a CM in that it pre-supposes the 
unification of monetary; social, and fiscal policies of member states and setting up a supra-
national authority whose decisions are binding on them. Finding RTAs that reach these levels 
of deeper economic integration are extremely limited with the EU currently being the only 
credible example of such a stage in economic integration. This is primarily attributed to the 
supra-national nature of such an agreement wherein states give up significant independence 
concerning their policies. The formation of a CM and economic union has never been a likely 
outcome of market integration as states are expected to surrender significant elements of their 
sovereignty. FTAs and CUs, where states accrue economic benefits vis-à-vis RECs and inter-
REC trade agreements, will be the focus in this study. 
 
2.3.2.4 Assumptions, welfare gains and implications of economic integration 
States utilising the progression from an FTA, CU, CM and economic union towards 
economic integration are expectant of increased welfare amongst the member states. The 
welfare generating effects of economic integration is assumed to occur under certain pre-
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requisites amongst states that form FTAs and CUs. For Maruping (2005, p. 132), the 
following needs to be in place in order to ensure effective economic convergence: 
? Efficient and non-discriminatory markets for products and factors of production, 
including freer movement of labour;  
? Effective compensatory mechanisms to make the cost of adjustment affordable and 
equitably in order to share the costs and benefits of integration;  
? Proper timing and sequencing as well as consensus based choice of convergence 
(integration);  
? Enabling policies that reduce risk; development and retention of expertise; and 
? Focus on smaller sub-groups for greater success with a provision of variable geometry 
and variable/ multi speed arrangements.  
 
The classical conceptions of welfare gains that are often expected in the linear model of 
economic integration are rigid. Viner (1950) notes that states enter into PTAs to increase 
economic welfare amongst them, and that the primary motivation is trade creation. This is 
echoed by Schiff and Winters (2003, p. 34-35), who pointed out that if partner country 
production displaces higher-cost domestic production there will be gains, i.e. trade creation. 
However, they highlight that it is also possible that partner country production displaces 
lower cost imports from the rest of the world, resulting in trade diversion. Trade diversion 
can be pervasive, impacting on net welfare effects of member state economies at a macro-
economic level. Trade diversion is tolerated under the assumption that increased trade within 
the bloc generates economic development. This model of analysing gains are what is known 
as static effects and does not take into account the dynamic effects of regional integration that 
follow a market integration trajectory (McCarthy, 2010, p. 12-16). The static effects are the 
initial gains or losses made when the integration agreement takes effect, such as the 
relocation of factors of production towards stronger economic centres. The static effects of 
economic integration reflect the initial unequal nature of integration exercises as there will be 
winners and losers in the short to medium term when factors of production are reallocated.  
 
Enhancing the economic inter-dependence of states within an FTA or CU creates a bigger 
regional market that can assist developing countries to be more attractive for Foreign Direct 
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Investment (FDI). The linear model of integration, and/ or more specifically an FTA and CU 
could increase internal economic efficiency within this enlarged market, prompting dynamic 
effects. Economic integration has the potential to foster competition; subsidiarity; access to 
wider markets (via trade); larger and diversified investment and production; socio-economic 
and political stability, and bargaining power for member states (Maruping, 2005, p. 131). 
This process would create trade through the reallocation in factors of production that 
displaces non-competitive local industry in member states; and in this way local businesses 
and firms achieve economies of scale that would maximise their efficiency within the 
regional market (Schiff & Winters, 2003, p. 33). States, through this process of dynamic 
gains, effectively utilise the integration process to build competitiveness at the regional level 
as a stepping stone towards global trade, which is commonly the assumed long term gain. 
The East Asian nations have utilised economic integration in a similar manner by creating 
regional value chains that have significantly increased their competitiveness vis-á-vis their 
share of global trade. 
 
The move towards the various forms of PTAs among any group of states has classically been 
viewed as exclusionary. FTAs and CUs are by nature strategies of protectionism because they 
discriminate against third party non-member states (Lee, 2003, p. 19-22; Trivedi, 2005, p. 
and Buthulezi, 2006, p. 2-7). Fundamentally, this has been described as either being the 
building blocks towards multi-lateral free trade or stumbling blocks towards the same end. 
Sideri (nd, p. 50) posits that RIAs in the 1930s were aimed at withdrawing from the world 
economy, and those of the second wave among Least Developed Countries (LDCs) were 
closely linked to import substitution strategies, whereas the present wave is driven by the 
desire to facilitate fully and effective participation in the global economy. 
 
????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ?????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
rationale of old regionalism) was a stumbling block by being too protectionist. The new 
reg????????? ???? ????? ????????? ????????? ????????????? ????????? ??? ??? ???????? ????????????
indicating a rapid shift in the approach to the process of economic integration. This is 
characteristic of regional arrangements in a globalised world; they appear to be stepping 
stones towards global trade, rather than being stumbling blocks, which was their classical 
???????????????????????????? ?????? ??????????????? ????? ??????????????????????????????????????
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still have some way to go to shed its inward looking orientation and to adjust to the deeper 
elements of integration. 
 
2.4 Relating classical conceptions with old and new regionalism 
The classical conceptions of regionalism include prescriptions for states embarking on the 
process of integration. This integrative process follows from one of two dominant schools of 
thought centred around functional and market driven prescriptions (Balassa, 1961 and Haas, 
1964). These schools of thought highlighted a distinction between so-called looser forms of 
integration (i.e. functional) and more binding arrangements that utilise agreements to 
integrate (i.e. market driven). Presently, the literature on regional integration has favoured 
almost an exclusively market driven process. The perceived success of the European 
economic integration process is largely the reason for this biased view and approach. Hence, 
the rules based, institutionalised form of economic integration in the form of the EU is 
regarded as how regional integration ideally should be like. Bach (2012) argues that Africa 
still lacks the proper institutionalised arrangements to be considered as conventionally 
????????? ???????????? ??????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????
help to explain what forms of regionalism currently exist vis-á-vis functional and market 
driven cooperative elements. 
 
The old regionalism period (1950-1980) was the birthplace of functional and market driven 
processes. The realist worldview, which was consistent with the prevailing world order of old 
regionalism, favoured a functional approach to integration. Functional cooperation was 
understood to be the pre-requisite for market driven integration. Thus, basic cooperation 
would in theory lead to effective economic integration. The EU has reached its supra-national 
character by first cooperating in European Steel and Coal Industries. The Treaty of Paris was 
signed in 1951 between six European countries that had a narrow economic focus.12 More 
significantly, an ambitious political goal of the treaty was to achieve a peace settlement 
between France and Germany (Dinan, 2005, p. 2). Six years later the Maastricht Treaty was 
signed between the European Steal and Coal Industry states. This Treaty had a stronger 
economic focus and steered the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC), but 
                                                             
12 The states included France; Germany; Italy; Belgium; the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. 
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the political motivations was no less significant (Dinan, 2005, p. 2). The formation of the EU 
was a result of fundamental political cooperation that gave rise to comprehensive market 
integration ultimately in the form of the EU. Thus, functionalism (i.e. political cooperation) 
was required to lay a foundation for market integration to occur. 
 
??????????????????????? ?????????????? ????????????????????????urity concerns use to elevate 
political factors into a form of high politics. This environment has been replaced with a much 
more liberal international system since the end of the Cold War in 1989. Due to intricate 
mechanisms of inter-dependence amongst states, the power of the state has diminished 
immensely over the last three decades; a process that is commonly referred to as 
globalisation. Diminishing state power and relatively relaxed security concerns (than before) 
have increased the importance of economic factors into a form of high politics. It will be 
argued in the remaining sections of this chapter that developing countries have responded to 
the changed world order by adopting PTAs (economic power is high politics) thereby 
neglecting the important aspect of functional cooperation first as was the case of Europe. 
Thus, where it was often assumed that functionalism occurs before market integration (i.e. 
old regionalism), new regionalism follows a different logic. Market integration is pursued 
first in ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
The following sections will elaborate on this shift and highlight the effect that this has had on 
the motivation for and use of regional integration in its present form. Regional integration 
and how it has been employed as a strategy for states to accrue benefits have changed over 
time. This is attributed to the changing international context wherein regionalism operates. 
The old regionalism was highly political, and a product of the Westphalia state system, and 
Bretton Woods monetary system as well as bi-polarity. New regionalism is driven by 
economic forces and occurs in a much altered international political environment that has 
given states increased motivation to employ the regional alternative. Hence, the factors 
responsible for this change, such as the end of bi-polarity, a post-Westphalian state system 
and globalisation, amongst others, will be explored. The purpose of highlighting this change 
is to show that regional integration today diverges from its classical prescriptions and thus 
conceptions of regional integration have to adapt to the changing contexts in which they are 
applied. African regional integration is no exception to this. 
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2.5 Old Regionalism 
Regional integ??????? ???? ???????? ??? ??????????????? ??? ???? ??????????? ??????? ????????
characterising successive periods in the history of the international system. Within the ambit 
of what is known as old regionalism, are the post-war period and emerging ideological 
paradigmatic divide between Capitalism and Communism. The old regionalism occurred 
between the 1950s and the 1980s, and was inspired by the Cold War and other ideological 
factors that were influenced by the need for economic security of states (Akokpari, 2008, p. 
88). The bi-polar world order affected the nature of the interplay between political and 
economic forces in the international system and its corresponding effect on individual states 
as well as the perceived benefits of regional integration for them within this environment.  
 
Following from the above, factors that influenced the global economy and emerging security 
concerns leading up to the end of the Cold War, and how they related to regional integration, 
are imperative to discuss within the realm of this study. Such discussion follows below. 
 
2.5.1 Context of Old Regionalism 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????
of the state was viewed as the essential feature of the international system. As noted before, 
this was known as the Westphalian order. Hettne (1997, p. 84) emphasises that Westphalian 
implied an inter-state system with the following characteristics:  
? The sovereign independence of states;  
? Each state motivated in its international behaviour by a consistent national interest; 
and  
? An inter-state system regulated by a balance of power among principal powers. 
 
Hettne (1997, p. 84) mentions that a specific political rationality motivated the Westphalian 
system wherein the state was the sole guarantor of security and welfare. This state-centric 
approach implied that governments had to be active participants in the areas that were 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
deemed to be important in preserving and protecting the national interest of their respective 
nation-states, including playing a major role in the economic realm.   
 
???? ??????????????????? ????????????????????????? ????? ??????????????????????? ???????????????
that was actively involved in its economy and all aspects thereof. Ruggie (1982, p. 389) 
observed that by virtue of the supremacy of gold and its relation to the balance of payments 
of the major developed states, there were clear roles and assumptions concerning the 
fundamental purpose of domestic monetary policy. Likewise, these roles were also clear cut 
pertaining to the role of the state in adjusting imbalances in the level of external and internal 
economic activity during the pre-World War I (WWI) international economy. This view of 
the relevance of the state in the economy emphasises that developed states at the time always 
???? ??? ?? ?????? ??? ?????????? ???? ??????? ???????????? ??? ?? ???????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ????
development. More importantly, it indicates the overriding power that political forces had 
over economic processes both within and outside the state. The post-WWII world economy 
still had elements of the strong state; in fact, it was a historic compromise between economic 
laissez-faire and a certain level of domestic control by governments (Hettne, 1997, p. 89). 
This was known as embedded liberalism where the state played an active role in regulating 
the economy.  
 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????d once the world 
???????? ???????????? ???? ??????????????????? ??????????? ?????????? ??????? started when the 
?????????????? ????? ????????????? ???????? ???????? ??? ???????????? ?????? ??? ????????????????
(Doak, 2008, p. 10). States almost immediately adopted protectionist trade regimes in their 
attempts to insulate themselves from the chaotic economic climate that ensued. Woods (2006, 
p. 326) highlights that in the late 1920s to early 1930s, governments all over the world tried 
to protect themselves from economic crises by putting up trade barriers and deflating their 
currencies, which in turn just worsened the Great Depression and its consequences.  
 
Towards the end of WWII in 1944, developed states????????-makers met at Bretton Woods in 
the USA to shape the global economy in a manner that would ensure a disaster such as the 
Great Depression never occurs again. All the states present committed themselves to work 
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towards creating a stable global economy underpinned by an open world trade system as well 
as to rebuild war torn Europe (Woods, 2006, p. 326-328). The idea of open world trade was 
intended to create economic inter-dependence amongst states in a concerted effort to mitigate 
the possibility of another world war. Accordingly, Bretton Woods and its resolutions 
established the foundations for the contemporary global economy. 
 
At this point it should be stressed that those present at Bretton Woods realised the need to 
create international institutions and organisations to forward the resolutions made at Bretton 
Woods. Consequently, three such structures, focusing on monetary policy; development 
finance, and trade were established, and they included the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF); the initial International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), now 
known as the World Bank (WB), and the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
The IMF initially f???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
assisted with development finance. These two institutions were put into effect in 1946 
(Woods, 2006, p. 327 and Kegley, 2009, p. 173-177). For its part, the GATT, as enacted in 
1947, was a culmination of loose agreements on trade matters between states, and in 1995 
became institutionalised in a more permanent guise. It is now known as the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) (Woods, 2006, p. 329). The Bretton Woods decision-makers envisaged 
that these institutions would assist with post-war economic recovery and to rebuild Europe 
(Kegley, 2009, p. 267-268).  
 
The Bretton Woods type of monetary system had specific elements attached to it in its efforts 
to realise a stable global economy. Woods (2006, p. 326) notes that these elements consisted 
of a:  
? Stable exchange rate system; 
? Reserve asset or unit of account (such as the gold standard);  
? Controlled international capital flow;  
? Availability of short term loans to countries facing temporary balance of payments 
crisis; and  
? Systems of rules to keep economies open to trade.  
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The Bretton Woods regime ultimately required a measure of government intervention 
(Kegley, 2009, p. 268). Indeed, the emergence of economic inter-dependence through the 
Bretton Woods regime was made possible by the relative political stability and healthy 
economy of the USA (Hettne, 1997, p. 91). The American government had assumed the 
position of custodian of the global economy by pegging gold at 35 US Dollar to the ounce 
and exchanging gold for dollars at any time. The former was referred to as the gold standard 
(Kegley, 2009, p. 268). This allowed for a fixed and stable exchange rate that facilitated 20 
years of increased, but yet incremental economic inter-dependence between states. Gilpin 
(2001, p. 235-238) views this period as the beginning of the first great age of capitalism and 
???? ?????????? ??? ?? ?????? ????????? ????????? ???? ?????? ??? ???? ????? ??? ????????? ????????? ?????
system only lasted until the early 1970s, when former US President Nixon unilaterally 
announced the end of the gold standard. This created an international economy engrossed in 
chaos due to becoming accustomed to growing inter-dependence under the logic of fixed 
exchange rates. The global economy has never been able to, since the end of fixed exchange 
rates, stabilise in a manner that was created by the gold standard.  
 
Since the era of Bretton Woods in the 1940s, the global capitalist political economy has been 
plagued with reoccurring incidences of economic crises during every decade since the 1970s 
(Gökay & Whitman, 2009, p. 3). These were especially due to the emergence of floating 
exchange rates13 because of the absence of a strong and/ or willing custodian to manage this 
cross-border interaction. 
 
2.5.2 Influences on Old Regionalism 
The changing global economic landscape through the pre-WWI; WWII, and ultimately Cold 
War era needs to be viewed against the backdrop of powerful political influences that 
superseded economic forces and turned them into some form of low politics. Essentially, the 
post-war rivalry between the Soviet Union and the USA had a major effect on the nature and 
                                                             
13 Floating exchange rates is an exchange rate regime where the value of a currency is determined by the foreign 
exchange market, floating exchange rates automatically adjust to global economic conditions. Thus, they are not 
fixed, which decreases certainty and is less stable than a fixed exchange rate regime. 
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shape of the global economy between 1945 and 1990. This was primarily based on the 
competing ideologies of Capitalism and Communism and the ensuing strategic rivalries in 
both Europe and Africa (Leysens & Thompson, 2006, p. 86). Since the end of WWII, the 
USA and Soviet Union imposed a bi-polar order that had widespread repercussions for the 
world system (Nijman, 1992, p. 681-686). Booth (1998, p. 29-30) regards the Cold War as a 
dual that ultimately became global, and as a consequence, created conflict in every sector, 
including economic, ideological and military, of society. Bi-polarity and the growing threat 
of nuclear war under the prescriptions of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) created an 
understanding by the superpowers (i.e. the USA and Soviet Union) that war and open military 
confrontation was to be avoided at all costs. This superpower struggle immensely affected 
international affairs and created a particular logic to state interaction.  
 
Inevitably, the Cold War also played itself out in other areas, for example in the form of 
strategic alliances across the international system. The emergence of bi-polarity after WWII 
led to the formation of a number of treaties, pacts and regional integration schemes in both 
the developed and developing world (Trivedi, 2005, p. 4). These arrangements were 
functional in nature and were limited to specific sectors in order to bolster economic and 
security areas of cooperation according to the influences of the superpowers. According to 
the Western powers (more specifically the USA), the Soviet Union posed at least two 
dominant threats that were essentially centred around actual war and communist ideological 
expansion into Eastern Europe and the developing world (Gaddis, 1997, p. 154 and Scott, 
2006, p 97-103). In response to the immediate Soviet military threat following WWII, the 
USA announced the Marshall Plan in 1947. This Plan aimed to fast track development 
finance to rebuild Western Europe and Japan, and in doing so, the USA wanted to create an 
essential buffer between itself and the Soviet Union (Woods, 2006, p. 326-327 and Scott, 
2006, p. 99).  
 
The two superpowers wielded considerable power in the international system. Throughout the 
Cold War they were involved in regional conflicts around the world. As a result, they had 
significant influence in regions across the globe (Nijman, 1992, p. 686-692). This influence 
manifested in proxy wars, such as in Africa, and more particularly Southern Africa. 
Essentially, these various forms of cooperation, based on a patron-client relationship, were 
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induced by the ideological rivalry between the USA and Soviet Union that had its most 
practical expression in the Vietnam War, and more closer to home in, for instance, 
Mozambique and Angola (Leysens & Thompson, 2006, p. 86). These were ultimately battles 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
based on ideology, a situation described by Gaddis (1997, p. 152) as equal to like winning by 
entering through the backdoor. This meant that ideological division within regions and states 
themselves were common place. The conflicts were often of a violent nature and Southern 
Africa saw numerous incidences of violence between rival factions within states (as was the 
case in Mozambique) and between countries such as South Africa and Angola, as well as the 
destabilisation attempts by SA on the frontline states.  
 
2.6 New Regionalism 
The Cold War resulted in at least one important trend in the international system, namely the 
growth of regional economic integration as a strategy pursued by states. Marchand, Boas and 
Shaw (1999, p. 898) shed light on this trend by situating regionalism in the context of a 
changing global political economy. According to them: 
 
????? ???????? ?????????? ??? ???????????????? ??????? ??? ????? ???????? ????
background of important transformations of the global political economy. As 
we enter the new millennium our world is becoming increasingly globalised 
and regionalised. During the past decade Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
grew three times faster than trade and four times more than world output 
annually. We have witnessed a similar expansion of cross border alliances and 
strategic management arrangements which have resulted in an increasingly 
interconnected or networked global economy. The globalisation of production 
as well as the liberalisation of markets ? facilitated by (neo-liberal) 
privatisation of state enterprises and deregulation of public control over the 
economy ? poses an entire new set of challenges to public authorities, 
economic agents and social actors in both the developed and developing parts 
??????????????? 
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This is a significantly altered international system as opposed to the one within the context of 
the Cold War, and more specifically as related to security; economic protectionism, and the 
notion of the strong state. Hettne (1997, p. 83-86) is correct when he asserts that the new 
regionalism is qualitatively different from the old regionalism, by virtue of a changed 
international order. States now have to consider factors that were not around during the era of 
old regionalism and this has affected the route; depth, and scale that regional integration has 
taken in its present wave. New regionalism is essentially economic in character, and it largely 
takes the form of the creation of trade blocs. These blocs operate as regional spaces through 
which states can interact, rather than being EU style supra-national experiments (Heywood, 
2011, p. 487-488). The end of the Cold War and collapse of Communism are commonly 
viewed as the key events that altered the world order. For this reason, it is explored below as 
the starting point from which to view the progression of economic integration as it relates to 
new regionalism and in later chapters to the T-FTA. 
 
2.6.1 Context of New Regionalism 
The most striking feature of the end of the Cold War was that few scholars were able to 
predict its demise. Cox (2006, p. 133-134) notes that there are competing accounts of why it 
ended in 1989. These include, amongst others, that it was a result of American pressure; 
Soviet economic decline; imperial overstretch; Communism simply could not compete with 
Capitalism, while quite a number of scholars argue that it was agency and choice on behalf of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????
study, the reasons for why the Cold War ended are less important than the resulting 
international environment, and more specifically the demise of bi-polarity.  
 
With the disintegration of the former Soviet Union in 1990, only the USA could lay claim to 
superpower status. This uni-polar international system composing of the remaining 
superpower, i.e. the USA, has been contested though. International relations scholars are 
increasingly arguing that the notion of the USA as the last and/ or only remaining superpower 
is becoming outdated. Thus, the hegemonic status of the USA in the world order is no longer 
a given or even accepted since it is challenged by other upcoming superpowers such as 
China; Japan, and even the European Union. However, this can be misleading. In terms of 
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military strength, the USA remains the most powerful in the international system with no 
other country coming close to their military might. Notwithstanding, the current international 
system has more to do with economic power as opposed to military strength. It is in the 
economic sphere where the USA hegemony is declining and given the importance of 
????????? ???????? ??? ?? ??????????? ??????? ??? ?????? ????? ??? ??????? ????? ???? ?????? ?????? ???
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
status since superpower states are supposed to lay full claim to both military and economic 
strength; and without either, their ability to dominate world affairs are thrown in doubt. 
 
Thus, the key consequence of the end of the Cold War is a multi-polar world where one state 
no longer has the resources and/or ability to govern the entire international system in both 
economic and political terms. Also, the end of the Cold War led to a decline in interest in the 
??????????? ??????? ?????????? ???????? ????? ?????? ????? ???? ????-?????? ??????? ??? ??????? ???
present during the old regionalism no longer existed with such urgency and has led states to 
pursue their own strategies in terms of cooperation and development. According to Iheduru 
(2003, p. 50), the afore-mentioned decline is one of the key factors that has re-defined 
regionalism. He observes that ?????? ??? ?????????? ?????????? ????? ???????? ?????? ??????????
cooperation between states have promoted the region as a viable economic, cultural and 
ecological unit that is born out of the peace/ security/ development nexus created after the 
cold war and emergence of globalisation. Thus, a primary reason for the surge in regional 
groupings globally is a result of the multi-polar international system and the corresponding 
regionalism from below, where smaller powers have the autonomy to construct their own 
RIAs (Trivedi, 2005, p. 10). 
 
However, the renewed space to articulate autonomous strategies has been influenced by new 
phenomena such as neo-liberalism and globalisation. These new phenomena have increased 
the motivation for pursuing regional economic integration (i.e. neo-liberalism). The new 
phenomena influences why economic integration has become such an important and widely 
used strategy in the context of an unfavourable global trading regime for developing 
countries. Extracting gains from the current global economy is thus expected by developing 
states through the use of economic integration agreements, and this is informed by 
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globalisation dynamics. These factors inform regionalism as the tenets to understand regional 
integration in its contemporary manifestation. 
 
2.6.2 The Liberal International Economic Order  
Fundamental to understanding why states pursue regional economic integration is the current 
logic of the global economy that is based on neo-liberalism. Since the end of the Cold War, 
neo-liberal development paradigms have achieved significant growth in the international 
system as an unquestionable path to economic growth and development. Jackson (2010, p. 
134) mentions that historically neo-liberals argued that it was necessary to articulate a new, 
positive vision of economic liberalism that would offer not just a critique of harmful forms of 
state intervention in the economy, but also a full agenda of liberal reforms that would reshape 
economic disorder into the basis for a prosperous; harmonious, and free society. Essentially, 
neo-liberal prescriptions have since the end of WWII achieved incremental growth in its 
classical sense. Hettne (1997, p. 91) argues that the change occurred when embedded 
liberalism (i.e. state intervention in the economy) broke down and political control of the 
world economy faded (i.e. the end of the Bretton Woods monetary system), and this gave rise 
to neo-liberalism. Neo-liberalism was intensified at the end of the Cold War when the term 
??????????????????????????????????14  
 
?????????-Bretton Woods history of global political economy can be divided 
into three distinct periods: a first period that runs roughly from 1945 through 
???????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????? ???????
period that runs roughly from 1970 to 1993, which we interpret as an on-going 
period of crises that never fully managed to stabilise the Bretton Woods 
                                                             
14 The Washington Consensus reflects how neo-liberal economic thinking penetrated the intellectual minds of 
the Western world. Keynesian economics followed the post war era (i.e. 1945 onward), and encouraged state 
intervention and management in the economic realm as a norm (Payne, 2005, p. 74 ? 78). Thus, the ideal of 
Keynesian economics was that international institutions would be capitalist in nature but controlled by a central 
authority, hence requiring state intervention in the global economy. The market friendly approach of neo-
liberalism got the buy-in of the USA and United Kingdom (UK) development thinking, which filtered to the 
IMF and WB under the Thatcher and Reagan Administrations. These international institutions promoted neo-
liberal development paths, with the most important element being privatisation and deregulation of state assets, 
and this was radically different from previous understandings of how the global economy should be managed 
(Payne, 2005, p. 74 ? 78). ???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????
discipline; altered public expenditure priorities; tax reform; financial liberalisation; exchange rate adjustment; 
trade liberalisation; privatisation; deregulation, and support for property rights (Pretorius, 2008, p. 9). 
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system; and a last period that began with the collapse of the Soviet Union... 
which allowed for rapid expansion of global capitalism that transformed it into 
??????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????-17). 
 
???????????????? ??????????? ???????? ???????????????? ????????? ??? ???????????????????????????? ???
the international system. The most prominent feature of the global economy in the immediate 
post-war era was that no norm for open trade existed. The Bretton Woods institutions have 
since the early 1970s been instituted as important custodians to govern the global monetary 
and trade system since the end of the gold standard. When the international institutions 
assumed this role, it was regarded as the creation of a Liberal International Economic Order 
(LIEO) (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1993, p. 33). The LIEO is not a commonly used term anymore, 
but still offers an important starting point to when neo-liberal doctrines began to take hold 
and shape the economic interactions of and between states. Kegley and Wittkopf (1993, p. 
33-34) observe that the LIEO was essentially Western control of the global economy through 
other means, namely the multi-lateral level, to consolidate power and order in favour of 
Western nations, more specifically the USA. The LIEO grew amidst the world order 
characteristic of old regionalism, essentially illustrating the power of top-down forces on 
states economically. 
 
Neo-liberalism is a set of prescribed policies that promotes trade liberalisation; privatisation, 
and deregulation of the economy (Pieper & Taylor, 1998, p. 6-8). In essence, this approach to 
economic development is market friendly and seeks ???? ????????? ??? ???? ??????? ??? ???? ????
economic affairs. It basically seeks to liberalise all areas of the economy under the 
assumption that the private sector can increase efficiency and effectiveness more so than 
public entities. Adam Smith called this the invisible hand of the market where the free market 
is self-regulating. As a policy prescription for trade, allowing states to produce the products 
in which they have a comparative advantage and trade freely amongst one another, would 
increase global wealth. Free trade would have a positive effect for countries in that increased 
trade promotes growth and development, which would trickle down and decrease poverty (as 
proposed by David Ricardo, another classic theorist of liberal economics).  
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Leftwich (2000, p. 48-49) views the growth of neo-liberalism through international 
institutions in the 1980s as a radical shift in development theory because development under 
neo-liberalism links growth with development whereas there has always been an 
understanding that social development and social justice were the main goals of development. 
In other words, social development and social justice and a decrease in poverty were viewed 
as pre-cursors to growth; under neo-liberalism this rationality is turned on its head where 
economic growth and development, i.e. an increase in the Growth Domestic Product (GDP) 
somehow equates to social development and social justice as well as a decrease in poverty. 
 
Mittelman (2000, p. 919) emphasises that neo-liberal orthodoxy as globally expressed 
through the ideal of the free market and a set of policies, has been propounded and monitored 
by some states; public intellectuals, and especially international agencies such as the IMF and 
WB that prescribe more autonomy for markets in states. In a globalised world where trade 
??????? ??? ?? ??????? ?????? ???? ????? ???????? ????????? ??? ?????????????? ?????? ???? ??????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????? implication for the developing world is that foreign 
assistance; loans; credit ratings, and foreign investment are provided and made available on 
conditions such as the implementation of neo-liberal policies, including deregulation; 
liberalisation, and privatisation (Mittelman, 2000, p. 919). Based on the former, it could be 
argued that within the context of the developing world that neo-liberal doctrine has (often) 
been imposed on states.  
 
?????????????? ?????????? ??????????? ??? ??????? ???????????????????? ?????????? ????? ??? ?????????
the development thinking of the 1960s and 1970s that advocated for state involvement 
(Leftwich, 2000, p. 22-51). One could thus argue that the growth of neo-liberalism was 
largely due to the needs and interest of developed states. Developing nations thus viewed the 
LIEO as an instrument of their continued oppression of developing countries and began to 
advocate in 1974 for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) (Kegley & Wittkopf, 
1993, p. 146). The current development model advocated for by International Financial 
Institutions does not give developing countries a chance to steer development through state 
interference. The point to be made here is that developing countries were aware; frustrated, 
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and searching for new alternatives to the multi-lateral/ uni-lateral, top-down approach of 
trade liberalisation (i.e. economic forces). 
 
Given the reality of an international economy that actively advocates and has been successful 
in instilling neo-liberal development doctrines in the global economy, the fundamental 
question has been how to liberalise trade in the developing world and simultaneously attain 
an increase in welfare in individual states. As there is no longer any credible alternative (e.g. 
socialism or communism as was the case during the Cold War), Africa has experienced trade 
liberalisation by adopting WB and IMF Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), which 
will be elaborated on in chapter three. These programmes could be viewed as uni-lateral 
attempts to trade liberalisation and have been more successful in liberalising trade in 
individual African states in comparison with RECs. However, Reinert (2008, p. 165-202) 
underlines that SAPs have been less than satisfactory in achieving meaningful growth and 
development. In fact, he argues that SAPs have been associated with economic decline in 
developing countries when their domestic markets were opened to more competitive 
international firms and unequal terms of trade. This has created scepticism in the developing 
world vis-á-vis uni-lateral trade liberalisation under conditions as prescribed by international 
institutions.  
 
The effect of a lack of meaningful development prospects in the developing world has in 
essence strengthened the appeal of regional trade liberalisation. The call for a NIEO has not 
resulted in a more equitable global economy. As such, growing discontent in the developing 
world has been directed against the LIEO and its advocates, which in this case are the Bretton 
Woods institutions that have been around since the 1970s. It makes sense that Communism 
(i.e. state control) had appeal in the developing world under a bi-polar order. The reason for 
this is that at the time that the Cold War ended, interest in the developing world and Africa 
slowed down, creating space for developing countries to articulate their own economic 
strategies that was directed away from the prescriptions of the Bretton Woods institutions 
under the LIEO, where and if possible. Regional trade liberalisation is a strategy that could be 
utilised to create new economic partnerships that can move developing countries towards the 
ideal of an NIEO. The figure below illustrates the growth in interest by developing countries 
in PTAs over a period of 60 years spanning 1950 - 2010. 
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Figure 1.2: PTAs notified according to country groups 
 
Source: WTO, 2011, p. 55 
 
The above figure illustrates that out of all PTAs under negotiation or in effect globally today, 
developing countries are the largest group to use them. It is also evident from the figure that 
since the end of the Cold War circa 1990s that developing countries started to engage more in 
PTAs as in the past. This move towards PTAs could be attributed to so-???????????????????????
???????????????????-polar patron-client order no longer existed once the Cold War was over. 
This increased space for developing countries to articulate their own agendas and have 
created increased interest in finding new, more favourable terms of trade prescribed under the 
call for a NIEO. The multi-lateral route to opening up markets (covered in greater detail in 
chapter three) has since the 1990s lost its appeal in the developing world if viewed against the 
backdrop of the sheer number of developing countries pursuing PTAs. 
 
Thus, two contrasting points emerge in relation to new regionalism. Firstly, neo-liberal 
development philosophy is the dominant approach to economic growth in the current global 
economy, and has been promoted by the Bretton Woods institutions as a norm. However, the 
outcomes of the LIEO have not been favourable to the developing world. Therefore, the 
growth of neo-liberalism has led developing states to accept neo-liberal norms and find the 
means to liberalise trade on their own terms within such an international environment. Neo-
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liberalism has thus strengthened the appeal of utilising PTAs regionally, in an attempt to 
manage at the regional level what individual states have struggled to do on their own. 
 
Woods (2006, p. 342) stresses that international institutions affect international politics 
because they open up new reasons to cooperate; they permit states to define their interests in 
a more cooperative way; they foster negotiations amongst states as well as compliance with 
mutually agreed rules and standards. When the GATT was institutionalised into the WTO in 
1995, it was assumed by Western states that multi-lateral trade would increasingly become 
the norm. Nevertheless, since then, states in the international system have not followed this 
route as illustrated by the quote below: 
 
????????????????????of a world of states into a regionalised world is driven by 
two main factors. On the one hand there are the diminishing capabilities of 
??????? ??? ???????? ????? ?????? ??????????? ??? ???????? ??????? ????? ??? ???? ??????
hand there are growing limitations of multilateral organisations to deliver good 
global governance with regard to global threats. In other words both the pillars 
of the Westphalian world order ? the state ? and the pillar of multilateralism ? 
the global international organisations ? ???? ?????? ?????? (van Langenhove, 
2011, p. 5). 
 
The international influences characteristic of a globalised world have encouraged states to 
pursue economic integration at the regional level, and to manage the dynamics of a global 
economy whose foundations - the state and international institutions - have lost the ability to 
monopolise international relations. Economic integration is one of the sectors of cooperation 
where the immediate benefits are easily achieved. It therefore, holds the greatest attraction for 
states especially when national economies are increasingly inter-dependent and influenced by 
the global economy (Heinonen, 2006, p. 21). As mentioned before, the system of multi-lateral 
trade in the current global system is governed by the WTO; a system that is in decline if one 
considers the figure below.  
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Figure1.3: Regional Trading Agreements Notified to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade and the WTO 
 
Source: ECA, 2006, p. 4 
 
The above figure illustrates the growth in PTAs from 1948 to 2002. It highlights that states 
are increasingly rather seeking preferential trade arrangements as opposed to multi-lateral 
ones, a phenomenon that will be dealt with in greater detail in the following chapter. The 
surge in PTAs indicates that the multi-lateral trading regime is losing steam and started to 
erode rapidly during the mid-1990s, which are just a few years after the end of the Cold War. 
?????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
variety of agreements to a more formal institution, interest in it declined in the developing 
world. In similar vein, when the LIEO institutionalised itself through the WTO, developing 
countries indicated their disapproval thereof by finding new ways to move towards a NIEO at 
a regional level. 
 
2.6.3 Globalisation 
?????? ???? ???????????? ??? ???? ??????? ?????????????? ???? ????????????? ???????? ???? ?????? ???
individual states through intricate mechanisms of inter-dependence (Leysens & Thompson, 
2002, p. 87-90). Tickell & Peck (as cited in Peck & Heung, 2003, p. 1) view globalisation as 
the downsizing of states that enlarges the space for private accumulation, individual liberties 
and market forces. States today have less influence over their own development due to the 
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phenomena of globalisation because what happens in one state influence any given number of 
other states. 
 
Economic globalization and the emergence of a complementary set of 
principles, norms, and institutions for managing the expansion of cross border 
economic activity affects authority and capacity of states. It is claimed that the 
structural features of globalization ? i.e. its hierarchical ordering of the global 
system, the patterns of interaction between these parts, and the norms that 
legitimize and regulate these interactions ? all combine to constrain 
macroeconomic decision-??????? ????????????? ??? ???????? ???????? ???????? ??????
2006, p 108-109). 
 
???????????????? ??????? ??? ??????????? ??????? ??? ??????????? ??? ??? rapid advances in 
technology. These advances over especially the last two decades have resulted in world-wide 
instantaneous communication; with people around the world coming closer together in what 
resembles a global village (Little, 2006, p. 374).  
 
More importantly, the globalisation of trade and finance as manifested in increasing cross-
border transactions has created inter-dependence and an unavoidable need for states to 
cooperate. Increasingly what happens in one state affects what happens in others, as was the 
case with the global financial crisis in 2009. For Scholte (2006, p. 602-612), a number of 
factors gave rise to the globalisation of trade and finance. These factors include: 
? Cross-border transactions;  
? Open-border transactions;  
? Trans-border transactions;  
? Trans-border production;  
? Trans-border products;  
? Trans-world money; and  
? Trans-world banking.  
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Kegley (2009, p. 260-280) maintains that the culmination of the above-mentioned factors 
created what is now known as economic globalisation, or just globalisation. The latter is 
characterised by incidences where vast amounts of capital could cross borders in a matter of 
seconds. These fundamental changes in the way economic forces could shift capital and 
production centres to any state have significantly lowered the power of individual states.  
 
The decline of the nation state within a globalised world has prompted both developed and 
developing countries to pursue cooperation as a means to survive in the international system. 
Nonetheless, Sideri (nd, p. 49-50) emphasises that the constraints imposed by the process of 
globalisation matter much more for medium and smaller countries in comparison to the major 
powers. Gilpin (2000, p. 21) mentions that the spread of globalisation (especially its 
economic form) have been exaggerated and that it is restricted to a limited number of sectors 
and its participants are largely the triad of industrialised countries, namely the USA; Western 
Europe and to a lesser extent Japan and the emerging markets of East Asia. Hettne (2002, p. 
30) expresses this reality by outlining that the fundamental problem with market-driven 
economic globalisation is selectiveness. As a result, not everybody can join the globalised 
world because of the conditions of competition in the world market. Sandbrook (2000, p. 
1079) asks the question of how free is free trade, if one considers that more than a third of the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Gibb 
(1996, p. 447) observes that the globalisation of business appears to have promoted 
international regionalism and reinforced the spatial criteria as states try to control at the 
regional scale what they have increasingly failed to manage at the national and multi-lateral 
levels. As a result, the rapid expansion of globalisation following the Cold War could be seen 
as a primary contributing factor to the growth of regionalism worldwide (Hveem, 2006, p. 
298). 
 
It is within this context that states in Africa interact with each other and pursue their national 
interest within the post-Cold War (i.e. new regionalism) world. Growing importance has thus 
been assigned to international organisations/ institutions, regions and fostering more co-
operative behaviour. Cooperation has become ?????????????????????????????????????????????????
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in economic and security terms (Stubbs & Reed. 2006, p. 289). Africa as part of the 
developing world and attempting to develop economically actively pursues co-operative 
means, especially considering how the ??????????????? ??????????? ?????????? ????? ??? ?????????
international affairs through their international institutions and IGOs (Kegley, 2009, p. 173-
176). Regional groupings; multi-lateral collaborations and international law and norms have 
increasingly become crucial factors to take into account when managing the international 
environment for individual states. 
 
2.6.4 Economic integration agreements: new trends 
The traditional conception of forming PTAs in the form of FTAs and CUs has changed 
considerably in a globalised world. Global trade agreements today are more about linking 
production chains between countries and continents, while Africa remains locked in a 
struggle to overcome the legacy of fragmentation (van den Bosch, 2011). The global features 
of regional integration currently include the development of comprehensive FTA agendas, 
extending well beyond trade in goods, with strong emphasis on deeper integration 
(Hartzenberg, 2011a, p. iii).  
 
???????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????nly 70 PTAs in 
force. Subsequently, PTA activity increased noticeably with almost 300 PTAs 
in force in 2010. The coverage of policy areas in PTAs, particularly those of a 
regulatory nature, has also been widening in recent years. Recent agreements 
go beyond the tariff liberalisation and include disciplines such as the 
movement of capital, investment, intellectual property, competition policy, 
services trade and technical barriers to trade... the expansion of international 
production networks is related with the proliferation of deep agreements going 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????? 
 
Keeping the above in mind, it becomes clear that to generate economic growth through PTAs 
requires an approach that is cognisant of the fact that global trade patterns have changed 
towards fragmented economic activities. PTAs, which have seen an increase in production 
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sharing activities, increasingly deals with intermediary and unfinished goods as well as 
services to link these fragments of the production process (Cattaneo, 2008). As such, PTAs 
that create an enabling environment for such economic activities are more likely to generate 
economic growth and in turn development.  
 
The ASEAN is leading the way in utilising RTAs to link production centres; harmonising 
regulatory frameworks, and creating competitive advantages that have seen this region grow 
economically in a substantial manner over the three decades. The ASEAN focused itself on 
strengthening its soft infrastructure, resulting in a more homogenous economic space. The 
reason why ASEAN is so important in this regard is that it is exclusively made up of 
developing countries and it has been able to reap massive economic benefits for member 
states from using their PTAs to increase production sharing and fragmented trade. In doing 
so, the ASEAN has gone beyond the traditional conception of FTAs of such FTAs being 
regarded as merely shallow efforts at integration (WTO world trade report, 2011, p. 146-
148). This is particularly important in the developing country context where the traditional 
static and dynamic benefits to be expected from market integration are not easy to realise. In 
this regard, the following is worth noting, i.e. that allowing for production sharing and 
fragmented trade in the static trade creation/ diversion framework increases the opportunities 
for welfare enhancing FTAs (Cattaneo, 2008, p. 12).  
 
The ASEAN used their PTAs to foster aspects of deeper integration. From this it is clear that 
they have not blindly followed a linear process of economic integration. In fact, the ASEAN 
have been pro-active in creating a more homogenous environment to facilitate trade, and 
more importantly, with a goal in mind, namely production sharing and extracting gains from 
the dynamics of economic globalisation. The ASEAN has responded to the changing forces 
of globalisation. Based on this, it could be deduced that globalisation has resulted in deeper 
PTAs. This required concerted efforts in trade facilitation and harmonising regulatory 
frameworks within individual states to create an environment that promotes fragmented trade 
more efficiently. The ASEAN has dealt with soft infrastructure constraints and in turn 
members have willingly ceded some aspects of their sovereignty for a regional goal that has 
benefited individual states (WTO World Trade Report, 2011, p. 148).  
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Upon perusing the WTO 2011 World Trade Report (2011, p. 151-153), it becomes clear that 
Africa has not followed this trend and as such lags behind the ASEAN and other regions with 
respect to fragmented trade. RoO, for example, are so restrictive in the SADC that production 
sharing and fragmented trade are almost impossible to achieve in its current configurations 
within the FTA (Cattaneo, 2008, p. 26). The next chapter will provide a more focused 
account of the problems Africa faces by using the linear model with an exclusive focus on 
market access factors (i.e. shallow integration) that have marginalised the important role of 
soft infrastructure; services, and fragmented trade.  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter grappled with the term regional integration and its changing nature across the 
old and new regionalism. Regional integration was defined in the context of this study as an 
exercise carried out between states and influenced by different world orders. It was found that 
functional cooperation and market integration, as classical integration concepts, have changed 
in relevance and use across the old and new regionalisms. The old regionalism occurred 
during an era of state strength and security concerns; whereas the new regionalism occurs in a 
more liberal world order governed by economic fundamentals. Thus, as economics have 
become closely associated to the national interest of states, so has market integration as a 
strategy for regional integration. Globalisation was found to be the factor that has most 
impacted on the growth of PTAs. So strong has been the influence of globalisation that PTAs 
have changed in depth and scale to accommodate the new world order. To understand 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and market integration strategies as they are vital in understanding what regional integration 
aspires to in the African context. The shifts articulated across the old and new regionalism 
???????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????? ?????????????????????????
following chapter has been grounded on the foundations laid in this chapter.  
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Chapter 3: Regional Integration in Africa 
3.1 Introduction 
Since the 1960s, regional integration in Africa has been viewed as an indispensable strategy 
to overcome the legacies of colonialism as well as to attain sustainable development. 
However, overtime, African regionalism has become synonymous with shallow efforts at 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in which regional integration occurs today. Viewing regional integration against the backdrop 
of historical; political, and economic forces that continue ??? ?????? ????????? ?????????? ????
effective integration will be an important outcome of this chapter. This will assist in 
identifying the challenges to regional integration in Africa and outline the elements that 
ultimately assisted in the push for a T-FTA.   
 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of regional integration.15 Regional integration is closely associated with pan-African political 
ideals in Africa. This was evident in the emergence of the former Organisation for African 
Unity (OAU), now the AU. The AU provides the framework in which regional integration is 
to occur that would ideally unite Africa.  
 
RECs are viewed as the building blocks to achieve the goals of economic and political 
integrati??? ??? ???? ???? ???????? ????????? ??????? ????? ??? ????????? ???????????? ???? ???????????
followed a path towards economic integration within the various sub-regions that would 
eventually realise an economically united continent through the goals of the Treaty of Abuja 
in 1991??????????????????????????????????????????-regions is envisaged to lay the foundation 
for pan-African political integration.  
 
This chapter will highlight the following issues that are all paramount in discussing and 
exploring regional integration in Africa, namely: 
                                                             
15The first wave of regional integration in Africa occurred post-colonialism ???????????????????????????????????
historical challenges such as dependence on its former colonial powers. The second wave of regional integration 
occurred post Cold War with economic integration and outward orientation as key strategies to overcome 
?????????????????????????????????? 
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? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
why they continue to struggle with issues of sovereignty post-independence; 
? The first wave of regional integration, including the influence of pan-Africanism, 
Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) and Structural Adjustment Programs 
(SAPs) in Africa; and  
? A brief overview of COMESA, EAC and SADC and this will be followed by 
contextualising the problems that regional integration face in broader terms. It is 
necessary to outline the bigger picture of integration in Africa as it provides a base 
from which to view the emergence of the T-FTA. 
 
3.2 Africa’s Heritage 
Africa faces severe challenges to stem growing under-development and marginalisation in the 
international system. Nunn (2005, p. 13-24) argues that a number of recent studies provide 
?????????????????? ???????????????????????????? ???????????? ??? ???? ??????????????? ??????th 
century could either be attributed to colonialism or the slave trade. The inherited legacies of 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? more like post?colonial 
Africa than most could have imagined and colonial dynamics will continue to shape the post?
colonial African society (Ranger, 1996, p. 271-280). Both the slave trade and colonialism had 
major impacts on Africa in terms of state formation; societal cohesion, and economic 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the international system and its ability to pursue regional integration since the advent of 
independence. It should also be stressed that, as will be highlighted below, that the impact of 
colonialism  on the formation of a European identity was major, so much so that it also 
played a crucial part in the disintegration of African society. 
 
3.2.1 The Slave Trade 
The slave trade has had a profound influence on African development. Osaghae and 
McGowan (2006, p. 209) highlight that the slave trade exacerbated internal violence, inter-
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state conflicts, social turbulence and insecurity of life. Because of the large number of women 
and children taken from Africa, it decimated production and economic development. They go 
on to say that outside Africa the slave trade was a major factor in the rise of plantation 
economies and the process of capital accumulation that made the industrial revolution in 
Europe possible. Africa was put into an inverted relationship where underdevelopment had a 
direct impact on the development of Europe and the United States of America (USA) 
(Murithi, 2005, p. 2-3). Slavery negatively impacted African heritage and because much of 
African history had not been written down on paper at the time, it gave colonial powers the 
ability to rewrite Africa through European biased lenses. This led to the foundation for 
????????? ??? ???????????? ???????? ?????????? ??? ???????????? ????reignty on already defined 
geographies characteristic of chiefdoms, ethnic groups and historically linked regions in pre-
colonial Africa. 
 
3.2.2 Colonialism 
The Thirty years war and eventual birth of the modern international system through the Peace 
of Westphalia confirmed the state system in Europe. Jaffe (1985, p. 45) explains that a 
European identity was firmly established when the Portuguese, Spanish, French, Italian, 
Dutch, English, German, Danish and Swedish clashed with Africa, the Americas and Asia. 
Only then, did the need arise for European powers to consider themselves as a set, a whole, 
different from, hostile to, and eventually superior to Africans. It gave Europe a common 
interest. Colonialism was key in the formation of a collective European identity and it created 
avenues and opportunities for co-operation among European states and a form of collective 
unifying superiority vis-á-vis the rest of the world at an early stage in consolidating statehood 
(Jaffe, 1985, p. 45).  
 
Colonialism was the end result of what has become known as the first scramble for Africa. 
The Berlin Conference as facilitated between 1884 and 1885, and which was attended by 
every western nation except Switzerland and the USA, laid the foundation for partitioning 
Africa (Boahen, 1987, p. 33). The Berlin Act was ratified on 26 February 1885, and it 
embodied four principles. The most important was that signing of treaties with African rulers 
was to be considered as legitimate titles to sovereignty, and these treaties could only be 
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considered to be valid under effective occupation, and with European powers agreeing to a 
??????????? ???????????? ???????? ???? ????????? ??? ?????? ??????????? ????? ????????? ?????????
1987, p. 33-34). This laid the foundation for rapid colonisation in Africa and within a period 
of 20 years partitioned the entire African continent (Boahen, 1987, p. 33). The political 
boundaries drawn up in Africa was largely inaccurate maps that separated ethnic groups, 
kingdoms and historically linked regions in ways that continue to cause conflict in Africa 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
for European nations (Jones, 1993). Erecting colonies in Africa was a result of strategic 
decisions made within an environment of European circumstance, and these decisions left 
little consideration for the welfare of indigenous African people. 
 
Europe at this stage had infant industries and an evolving capitalist system that strengthened 
their rationale for pursuing colonies in order to guarantee the legitimacy of European 
industrial development. The emerging industrial capitalist system left large numbers of 
people unemployed and they could be settled in the colonies without losing any affiliation 
with the mother country (Boahen, 1987, p. 31). Due to the need to re-settle poor Europeans 
and to become more prosperous in the colonies; a collective identity was formed and this was 
held together by racial discourse. This effectively laid the foundation for exclusion and 
marginalisation of indigenous communities in the colonies based on the perception that 
Europeans were superior and Africans had to be enlightened and brought to modernity in the 
mould of European society. Wherever and whenever colonial rule was established it was 
essentiall?? ?? ?????????????? ???? ????????????? ????????????? ?????????? ????, p. 47). Indigenous 
societal development in Africa was through coercive means and intentionally neglected and 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
The economic need for colonies is viewed as the strongest driver that contributed to the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
capitalism had spread to parts of Europe and this led to an increasingly competitive 
international trade environment. Emergent from this was nations disregarding the notion of 
free trade by establishing mercantilist states that encouraged and implemented tariff barriers 
to protect the young industries of both Europe and America (Boahen, 1987, p. 30). 
Throughout the 19th century, as many European nations underwent rapid industrialisation, 
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they increasingly looked to Africa as a market for their manufactured goods and as a 
potentially rich source of raw materials (Jones, 1993). Colonies were viewed as an essential 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
manufactured goods and a dedicated source of raw materials to fuel European industrial 
development (Boahen, 1987, p. 30). In addition, colonies had mono-cultural economies, and 
this made it reliant on a few cash crops e.g. (cocoa, oil palm, cotton and rubber) or minerals 
(e.g. copper, tin, diamonds and gold) that were exported to the colonial power. For the just 
more than 70 years that European countries ruled Africa, the economies of African countries 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????, p. 48). The structures of the 
colonial state were developed only so far as to ensure sufficient enforcement of law and order 
(i.e. army, police, judiciary and prisons) and develop infrastructure (i.e. railways, roads, ports 
and communication facilities), which facilitated the penetration of capital and extraction of 
resources (Osaghae & McGowan, 2006, p. 213).  
 
The key outcome of the slave trade and colonial rule in Africa is the inheritance of weak 
states that find themselves in a structural division of labour that feature for the most part at 
the bottom of the world economy. Inherited state structures and institutions were not 
????????????? ?????????? ??? ??????????? ??? ???????????? ???????? ??????? ??? ?????????? ??? ????????
grossly marginalised indigenous people. The physical infrastructure was similarly 
underdeveloped in that it was only developed to facilitate narrow interests in mining, 
commodities and cash crops that were destined to be exported to urban centres and 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
be able to consolidate statehood amidst the historical  legacies that have constantly re-
shaped and disintegrated African society. 
 
3.2.3 Africa’s Independence 
The Atlantic Charter was proclaimed by the United Nations (UN) in 1942 and the ideal of 
self-determination therein contributed to the vision of the right to freedom from colonial rule. 
????????????????????????????????????????? colonialised states (Gordon, 1996, p. 49). During 
WWII, dramatic changes began to occur in the international system as a key foundation of the 
war was the principle of the right to self-determination. After the war, Africans no longer 
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accepted that their right to self-determination was second best (Southall, 2006, p. 224-227). 
Thus, following WWII, the right to self-determination became a growing norm leaving 
colonial territories with little legitimacy. However, colonies with settler populations in Africa 
were unwilling to give up their advantaged position in their colonial societies (Osaghae & 
McGowan, 2006, p. 214-216). Keeping this in mind, it is clear that the international pressure 
placed on colonial states was not always enough to guarantee independence for African 
states. 
 
Growing tension in all colonies became evident, with native populations becoming more and 
more resistant to the colonial state. Hodgkin (1957, p. 71) note that growing African 
nationalism began to take hold of what was commonly viewed by African people as the road 
to freedom because it would lead native populations to mobilise around a common enemy, 
namely European imperialism. Violence was characteristic of almost all liberation struggles 
in Africa due to the staunch resistance by colonial regimes. Fanon (1961) argues that using 
violence as a road to freedom was inevitably going to create instability in post-colonial 
societies. More significantly, African elites did not change the colonial state since the advent 
??? ?????????? ??? ???????? ???? ????? ?????????? ????????????? ??? ???????????? ??????? ?????
authoritarian structures, an accompanying political structure and politically relevant 
circumstances that were linked to colonial rule (Gordon, 1996, p. 57). Jackson and Rosberg 
(1982, p. 2-16????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
factors: domestic authority, the apparatus of power (government) and economic 
?????????????????? ?????????????????????? independence none of the newly liberated African 
states could lay full claim to exercising effective control over their people in these areas. 
 
As noted above, Africa states were colonised for a period spanning just over 70 years. 
Nonetheless, once the colonial period ended, the pace at which African countries gained their 
independence was quite quick. For instance, the majority of these states became independent 
spanning the period between 1958 and 196616 (Gordon, 1996, p. 56-58). This rapid 
decolonisation left the indigenous people with inadequate time to properly prepare and 
                                                             
16 It is acknowledged that Portuguese colonies (Angola e.g.) only got independence in the 1970s. ???????????
white population proclaimed unilateral independence from Britain, with SA??? ?????????? ??????? ??????? ???
inherently racist and not prescriptive to the notions of Pan-Africanism. ?????????????????????????????????????????
1980 when Zimbabwe gained independence from settler rule.  
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???????? ??????????? ??? ??????????? ?? ??????????? ??????? ?????? ??? ?????????????? ?????????
economies were geared towards extraction; as a result their development did not aim at 
internal growth and self-reliance or at the creation of an indigenous industrial and 
technological base (Mistry, 2000, p. 554). The economic weaknesses of the post-colonial 
state, especially the poor export performance (except for oil) meant that regimes were heavily 
reliant on external aid and a limited range of commodity exports for foreign exchange and 
state revenues (Bromley, 1995, p. 343-346). As a result, state institutions and organisations 
are less developed in the sub-Saharan region than almost anywhere else where political 
instability (coups, internal wars and similar forms of violence) have been common 
occurrences in the two and a half decades following independence (Jackson & Rosberg, 
1982, p. 1). Therefore, independence did not usher in a golden era. In fact, in almost all 
African countries democratic regimes degenerated into authoritarianism and economic 
decline (Gordon, 1996, p. 58-80?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
rationale behind pursuing regional integration in Africa, as integration is pursued by these 
states struggling to consolidate statehood. What can be achieved at the regional level is 
relative to the strengths and weaknesses at the national level.  
 
3.3 Africa’s First Wave of Regional Integration 
The first wave of regional integration in Africa occurred at the inception of independence. 
????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????
cooperation and integration, namely (i) strict adherence to the colonial borders as drawn up 
by the colonial powers, and (ii) from the outset of independence, African states have 
highlighted the indispensability of economic integration across sub-regions and the continent 
as a whole (Mistry, 2000, p. 553). According to Kiel (1977, p. 257), Afr?????? ??????????????
regional integration was synonymous with numerous cooperation and integration efforts, but 
these efforts were hampered by major shortcomings and disappointments. 
 
It became evident in the previous chapter that the top-down forces on especially developing 
states during old regionalism did not provide the appropriate international environment for 
regional integration. For this reason, all economic integration attempts failed, not just in 
Africa but almost the entire third world in their initial orientation (Lawrence, 1999, p. 29-30). 
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Despite this, the European integration process still managed to be the only successful regional 
integration project during the time of old regionalism. 
 
During the first wave of regional integration, three dominant factors were present that related 
to the actual integration process in Africa. These factors, which will be discussed separately 
below, included: 
? Using pan-Africanism as an ideological driver;  
? State-driven regional integration in pursuit of Import Substitution Industrialisation 
(ISI); and 
? The implementation of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs).  
 
3.3.1 Pan-Africanism and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
The consciousness that Pan-Africanism brought about was a crucial element in the pursuit of 
???????????? ????????????????????????????????? ??? ????????????????????????????????????????????
and geo-political realities, regionalisation is the sine qua non for meaningful progress 
(Olivier, nd).  The importance of regional integration to pursue the goals of growth and 
development was acknowledged as far back as when African states started to gain 
independence from their colonial masters. At the time, the notion of Pan-Africanism was 
prevalent and provided a much needed, unifying ideological centre. 
 
The growth of African nationalism coincided with the notion of Pan-Africanism, which was 
developed by Africans in the Diaspora. Pan-Africanism originated in the early 1900s as a 
movement of people of African descent living outside Africa (Makinda & Okumu, 2008, p. 
18). A culmination of congresses occurred during the period spanning 1919 to 1945 by the 
Diaspora, with the 1945-Congress in Manchester being the most significant. The majority of 
delegates at this Congress were from the African continent and Kwame Nkrumah (the then 
president of Ghana) acted as its Secretary-General (Osaghae & McGowan, 2006, p. 215). 
Nkrumah effectively linked the liberation struggles of African nationalism to that of Pan-
Africanism that sought to tie all African struggles for independence together. The idea was 
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??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
sense of the word.  
 
The role of Pan-Africanism was mainly three-fold, namely to reconstruct an African identity; 
to assist in the search for human dignity, and global equality for all Africans (Makinda & 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
looked to Pan-Africanism as an ideology to unite states that have historically been divided by 
their colonial past.  
 
The most important development in this regard was the creation of the Organisation of 
???????? ?????? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ???????????? ????????? ?????? ????? ???????????? ????????????
attempt. In addition, it sought to provide a platform for African states to cooperate and be 
self-reliant through realising independence of all African colonies in political and economic 
terms (Makinda & Okumu, 2008, p. 18-24). Thompson and Bissell (1972, p. 19-20) mention 
that establishing the OAU led to a more united Africa that was no longer separated by old 
loyalties, and in many ways the continent could start afresh. That said, it later became clear 
that reaching consensus on how to start afresh would be complex. For instance: 
 
?????? ???? ????? ?????? ???? Africa Conference to the 1963 Addis Ababa 
founding summit of the OAU, there was a serious ideological struggle 
throughout the continent centred on whether full political unity should be 
established immediately ? at the founding of the OAU, or whether it should be 
achieved gradually through a building block approach, by first strengthening 
the new states and establishing sub-regional economic blocks  and whether 
development should be carried through social and economic planning driven 
by the state, or whether it should be based and driven by free and open market 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-3). 
 
The OAU in its Charter actively articulated the notion of self-reliance through strict 
adherence of already defined colonial borders. In Articles 2 and 3 of its Charter, the OAU 
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(1963, p. 3-4) expresses  its aim to promote unity; enhance cooperation in economic and 
other related affairs, and to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the member 
states as well as to eradicate all forms of colonialism on the continent. In essence, the 
overarching organising principle was inter-governmental in nature and consensus was 
required to make decisions (Gottschalk & Schmidt, 2004, p. 142). This re-enforced the 
autonomy of the nation-state in Africa and the OAU actively protected the sovereignty of all 
member states.  
 
Unfortunately, the initial 32 members of the OAU became known as a bureaucratic talking 
shop with little power to enforce its decisions on constituent states (Aguilar, Watson and 
Verge, 2008, p. 5). Even worse, it actively defended African states even though their regimes 
were undemocratic and seemed to resemble predatory states that actively threatened the 
welfare of their own citizens. Nevertheless, consensus was reached to strengthen individual 
countries first and utilising the building blocks approach through sub-regional economic 
groupings to achieve African unity. However, the most critical element of how the newly 
independent states would approach economic development proved to be a harder issue to 
reach regional and continental consensus on. 
 
3.3.2 Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) 
Pan-Africanism was influenced by the growing discourse internationally around development 
in the developing world that was almost universally applied to all states within this grouping. 
Euraque and Niemann (1994, p. 3) highlight that the implied realities behind these states are 
that they are mired in poverty; neglect; exploitation; backwardness, and underdevelopment. 
The legacy of colonialism is often evident in the fact that the former colonial powers are now 
representing the core states, while their former colonies make out the periphery (Euraque and 
Niemann, 1994, p. 3-4). As a result, the periphery, also known as developing countries are 
quite dependent on the core countries for their own development.  
 
Upon gaining their independence, several African states rejected the market system as 
promoted and forced on them during old regionalism (Akokpari, 2008, p. 92). This rejection 
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of a dependency on industrialised powers gained prominence during the 1960s and 1970s. It 
advocated disengagement from the international system and rather supported the pursuit of 
state driven development paradigms in most of these developing countries, especially those in 
Africa (Akokpari, 2008, p. 92). In turn, this prompted most African leaders to opt for some 
variant of African Socialism that was encapsulated by economic nationalism and brought to 
fruition through ISI (Shaw, 1985, p. 10-15). This drive for state driven development in Africa 
was made possible by the relative stability of the global economy emanating from the gold 
standard, in turn leading to stable commodity prices that facilitated constant export revenue 
for African states.  
 
This gave African states a sense of economic stability which articulated state driven agendas 
in grand plans of self-reliance. At the policy level, economic integration plans were not only 
viewed as a strategy to modernise and develop, but to also confront the economic and even 
political might of the colonisers. More specifically, economic integration plans assumed that 
deepening and diversifying industrialisation via ISI was the way to acquire developed status 
(Euraque & Niemann, 1994, p 2). Practically, all regional projects during this period were 
premised on the notion of the Westphalian state system that served to promote economic 
growth and security motives to consolidate state-building goals that allowed them to impose 
barriers vis-á-vis non-members (i.e. old regionalism) (Hveem, 2006, p. 295). Larger protected 
markets, brought about by regional integration, were envisaged to be able to extend the scope 
for viable ISI in Africa (McCarthy, 2010, p. 5). During this period, African states utilised 
interventionist and protectionist trade regimes to meet fiscal considerations as well as to 
protect domestic industries. However, it became clear that African countries did not have 
large enough markets, nor the sufficient human; social, and material capital, as well as the 
physical or institutional infrastructure for industrialisation and development to be facilitated 
effectively (Mistry, 2000, p. 554).  
 
3.3.2.1 The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) 
Sub-regional inter-governmental economic co-operation organisations were established in 
Africa spanning the period from the 1960s to the 1980s to promote technical and economic 
integration of states. First generation integration arrangements in Africa were either the 
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legacy of the past or new arrangements that were born out of the dominant development 
state-centric theories of the day (ISI) (Mistry, 2000, p. 557). They included, amongst others, 
the East African Community (EAC); Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS); the Southern African Development Coordination Committee (SADCC); the 
Inter-governmental Authority and Development (IGAD), and the Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU) (Makinda & Okumu, 2008, p. 25). Each of these differed depending on the 
specific and unique environment of the region it represented.  
 
The first continental policy framework under the auspices of the OAU for economic 
integration in Africa was established in 1980 with the signing of the Lagos Plan of Action 
(LPA). This was in response to the call in 1976 by the OAU Council of Ministers for 
harmonisation and rationalising of the sub-regional initiatives mentioned above. At the time, 
they proposed a regional framework that encapsulated five regions, namely the Eastern; 
Southern; Central; Western, and North African regions (Makinda & Okumu, 2008, p. 53). It 
was an attempt to create a framework that all regional initiatives could follow as a guideline 
to economic integration in the various sub-regions and it was supported by the United 
????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
Moreover, the LPA was created to rationalise the growing differences between the regional 
arrangements at the time and to put them in line with the ideals of the OAU. Consistent with 
the prevailing ideology of Pan-Africanism, the LPA projected an introverted, state led 
approach to integration that would lead to the establishment of an African common market 
(Akokpari, 2008, p. 93). The LPA summarised the development thinking of the day and 
????????? ??????? ?????????????????? ??? ?? ??? ???? ????????? ??? ????????? ????????? ?????????s by 
means of effective integration. At the time that the LPA was constituted, economic co-
operation organisations such as ECOWAS, and others similar to it, were formally known as 
RECs.  
 
The ideal of the LPA was to be achieved through the following strategies. Regional 
agreements generally sought to:  
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? Expand intra-regional trade through the reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers; 
? Strengthen regional development by promoting economic sectors and regional 
infrastructure to facilitate large scale manufacturing projects;  
? Remove barriers to encourage free movement of production factors; and  
? Promote monetary cooperation (UNCTAD, 2009, p. 8-9).  
 
Kiel (1977, p. 261) explains that most African states followed similar patterns of 
industrialisation by focusing on import substitution with regards to light consumer industries 
such as food; tobacco; beverages, and textiles within highly protected domestic markets. 
During this period all regional arrangements in Africa followed an inward orientation. Also, 
it openly pursued the goal of industrialisation with little coherence amongst the various 
strategies as adopted by individual states and which were still characterised by inherited 
colonial economic activities. The result was an Africa where attempts to promote economic 
development continued to deteriorate, leaving few successful instances of meaningful 
developmental outcomes through state driven programs and more specifically ISI. Bruton 
(1998, p. 917-919) notes that Import Substitution did not fail in Africa; rather it was never 
really tried. Regardless of how one view ISI, all early economic integration attempts, coupled 
with the LPA, had failed to realise any meaningful economic growth and was abandoned 
towards the end of the 1980s. Nevertheless, the LPA could be considered as one of the first 
meaningful attempts of continental commitment towards economic integration. 
 
3.3.3 Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the global economy experienced instability due to stalling 
growth rates and a recession, coupled with the implications of the Cold War. The debt crisis 
of the 1970s which had its roots in the oil price crisis in 1973 and 1979 were primarily 
attributable to the balance of payments deficits in many developing countries (Woodward, 
1992, p. 22-23). Woodward (1992) highlights that between 1980 and 1986 the commodity 
exports of developing countries continued to fall till around a fifth of its original value. 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????n par with 
the rest of the developing world between 1960 and 1970, but after the oil price shock in 1973 
growth faltered with only a few African economies managing to recover from it. 
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Furthermore, Africa lacked capacity in terms of political and economic development to 
adequately manage the turbulent global economy, and as a result was hit hard by the debt 
crisis in both the 1970s and 1980s.  
 
During this period increased tension between the USA and the Soviet Union occurred amidst 
global economic turmoil. The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 signalled the end of the cold war 
and created little opposition to the neo-liberal development philosophy which was promoted 
by IFIs especially in the context of developing countries and Africa. The collapse of 
communism as an alternative mode of production left most developing countries facing a 
donor community that was increasingly intolerant of state driven development strategies. 
Thus, the adoption of neo-liberal SAPs in Africa reflects the lack of alternatives at the time 
(Mulaudzi, 2006, p. 9). The global recession towards the end of the 1980s and early 1990s 
left African states with few alternatives other than to seek development financing from IFIs. 
For African states, this development financing were manifested in the adoption of IMF and 
WB SAPs to stem growing under-development, coupled with shortfalls in the balance of 
payments of individual economies. 
 
???????????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ???? ?????? ????? ???? ????????? ???????
management policies of African countries in the late 1970s, spreading rapidly 
thereafter until virtually all African countries with the exception of South 
Africa (SA), Botswana and Namibia, embraced it by concluding formal 
agreements with the IMF and WB. But even those countries that did formally 
adopt an IMF/WB programme were propelled into the implementation of 
???????? ???????????? ????????? ?????? ??????? ???? ?????????? ???????????? ???-
liberal thrust of the orthodox adjustment programmes. Among those countries 
which formally embraced the programme, some have implemented two or 
three rounds of adjustment reforms under different agreements with the IMF 
and WB. For about two decades, therefore, structural adjustment has been an 
integral part of the African policy environment, a highly ironic outcome given 
that in conception it was initially seen as a temporary diversion from the actual 
business of development, albeit it one necessitated by the economic 
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disequilibria that had become a threat to the growth and development 
????????????????????????????????????kushi, 2000, p. 1). 
 
The implementation of the SAPs led to radical trade and investment liberalisation 
programmes within African states (Keet, 2007, p. 263). The SAPs aimed inter alia to 
minimise the role of the state apparatus in economic development and to implement 
economic reforms that orient the economies of these states toward export led growth and the 
return of economic forces (Buthulezi, 2006, p. 62). The conditionalities imposed on African 
states in order to acquire development finance is viewed by Kofi (2005) as yet a new form of 
colonialism, especially due to the fact that the Western powers yet again imposed their 
models of development thinking on Africa through the SAPs. Mistry (2000, p. 554) 
highlights that doubt remains about whether IMF and WB SAPs adopted since the mid-1980s 
will ever pay off in terms of sustained, durable and self-sustaining growth in the range of 5 to 
7 percent annually. It seems that dependency was the end result of SAPs in Africa with states 
facing massive debt repayments. According to Tsie (1996, p. 76) SAPs have left few grounds 
for optimism especially when you consider that from 1986 to 1990, African countries paid 
back more (i.e. a total of $1.8 billion) to the IMF than what they received in new loans. Thus, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
has made African states vulnerable to external influence with less control over their own 
economic development. Finally, the basic tenet of the earliest form of economic integration in 
Africa in the form of the LPA was self-reliance, but this principle has been significantly 
eroded by the legacy of the SAPs.   
 
3.3.4 Cumulative Effect of Import Substitution Industrialisation and Structural 
Adjustment Programs on regional integration in Africa 
?????????????????????????? ?????????????????? ?????? ???????? ?????????????????????????????? ???
pursue regional integration, especially in economic terms. During this period (old 
regionalism)??????????? ????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????? ????
contrasting tendencies; Collectively, African states embarked on an inward-looking regional 
strategy encapsulated by ISI, while at the individual country level they started rationalising 
and liberalising their trade regime in the framework of the IMF and WB programs that 
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implied closer integration with the world economy (UNCTAD, 2009, p. 9). For example, 
those states in Africa who were classified as least developed of the Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs), optimistically opted for economic nationalism strategies whereas states 
such as Egypt; Nigeria, and Zimbabwe that had growing manufacturing and communications 
sectors wanted to extract more gains by aligning themselves to a more outward orientation 
(Shaw, 1985, p. 15-19). Thus, the different economic approaches which existed between 
protecting and opening economies to international trade gave rise to an incoherent and 
divergent integration agenda with differing development paths pursued by respective African 
???????? ??????? ???????? ???????? ????????? ???????????? ???? ?????? ??? ???????? ?????????? ??? ????
global economy which was not followed by all countries. The divergent economic paths 
created a situation that left little room for states to move towards common economic goals as 
prescribed in the LPA.  
 
African unity was merely an ideological abstract notion with very little grounding in the 
practical actions of states. In fact, African integration at this staged stalled while individual 
states pursued uni-lateral liberalisation. During the 1970s and 1980s, the attention of African 
policy-makers shifted from regional integration to the implementation of SAPs (UNCTAD, 
2009, p. 9). In terms of regional integration, a key outcome of the SAPs was that they focused 
on national development priorities and left little coherence or convergence towards a regional 
approach in Africa. The cumulative effect of SAPs has been the reduction of power of the 
nation state and loss of capacity and legitimacy of its institutions in dealing with the 
development needs of the African masses (Buthulezi, 2006, p. 62-65). As a result, basic 
elements such as infrastructure links that would assist economic growth amongst African 
states after a quarter of a century of post-independence initiatives still hampered trade and 
wider forms of cooperation in a variety of fields, including post; telecommunications; 
transport, and banking (Robson, 1985, p. 619). Therefore, development strategies such as ISI 
and SAPs have failed to r????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????
continued to affect the prospects for sustainable regional integration in its contemporary 
form. African states remain under-developed with weak institutions at the national level due 
to deteriorating development prospects.  
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3.4 Drivers for Africa’s Contemporary Integration Agenda 
States all over the world are confronted with a rapidly changing international economy that 
provides challenges and opportunities for developing states to grow and take advantage of 
increased global trade. The reality, though, is that Africa has experienced a steady decline in 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
at 20 percent in the 1980s, but today it is only approximately between two and three percent 
(Buthulezi, 2006, p. 67 and ECA, 2010, p. 3). One could argue that this steady decline in 
????????? ?????? ??? ???? ??????? ?????? ?????? ??? ??????????? ??? ?? ????? ??? ?????????? ???????? ????????
regional ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
Nonetheless, as pointed out before, Africa is indeed attempting to forge meaningful regional 
integration agreements. This positive step towards regional integration is incited by four 
factors, namely: 
? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
? The WTO and changing world trading system;  
? The changing economic order and new scramble for Africa; and  
? ???????????????????-apartheid regional policies. 
 
3.4.1 Africa’s Lack of Growth and Marginalisation in the Global Economy 
Africa remains the most under-developed region in the world. Leftwich (2000, p. 86) argues 
that this is manifested through an array of factors, including, but not limited to, pervasive and 
deepening poverty; immense inequalities; infrastructural decay and inadequacy; widespread 
unemployment and corruption, and chronic political instability. The UN listed 48 Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs), and at least 33 of them were situated on the African continent 
(Buthulezi, 2006, p. 56). This is exacerbated due to the fact that African countries generally 
have low per capita income with 40 to 60 percent of its population earning less than $2 a day, 
coupled with high inflation and unemployment (Akokpari, 2008, p. 95).  
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????????????? ????????? ?????????????????? ??????????????????? ??????? ????????? ??? ??? ????????
?????????? ??? ????????????? ???? ??? ????????? ????? ????????? ??????? ???? ??????? ?????? ??? ????
nature of African economies and their corresponding exports to the rest of the world. Ilorah 
(2008, p. 86-87) explains that the type of goods (i.e. commodities) Africa exports vis-á-vis 
what they import (i.e. manufactured goods), creates negative terms of trade. He proceeds by 
arguing that this is due to the gradual decline of prices of commodities in the global economy 
relative to that of manufactured goods. This gives rise to a negative trade off where African 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
Kofi (2005, p. 51) maintains that the commodity focused economies of African states are not 
the result of their needs, but due to the dynamics as promoted and maintained by the richer, 
industrialised nations. More importantly, African economies are still earmarked by a situation 
where their primary resources are destined for the wealthier nations through typical neo-
colonial and transnational links (Buthulezi, 2006, p. 59-69). Akinkugbe (2010, p. 120) 
mentions that the often narrow band of commodities which African states export leaves them 
extremely vulnerable to commodity terms of trade and foreign demand shocks. The prices of 
commodities have always been vulnerable to fluctuations in the global economy, and this was 
even more evident during the global financial crisis in both 2008 to 2009. The result of these 
crises was a drastic drop in commodity prices, which in turn slowed down economic growth 
in Africa substantially (McCarthy, 2010, p. 28-39). On average, only between 10 to 20 
percent of African trade transpires between African nations (ECA, 2010, p. 3). This above-
mentioned over-reliance on commodities as well as their particularly strong peripheral links 
with the global economy has made African states heavily reliant on Official Development 
Assistance (ODA), plus other concessions of debt relief from developed states (Ilorah, 2008, 
p. 89-91). Taking all of this into account, it is clear that the economies of African states are 
not geared internally (i.e. towards the continent itself), but rather towards external actors. 
This makes them particularly vulnerable on the global economic stage, and even more so 
during times of global economic uncertainty.  
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Its reliance on commodities has prompted calls for the diversification of the economic base of 
Africa.17 ????????? ??????????? ????????????????? ???????????????????????? ????????? ????????? ???
mining and quarrying are excluded from this figure, then manufacturing as a proportion of 
industry in Africa only accounts for 12.1 percent of GDP (ECA, 2007, p. 49). Putting this 
into perspective, the ECA (2006, p. 129) highlights that ??????????????????????????????????
10 percent between 1970 to 1974 and 20 percent between 2000 to 2003 whereas in 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? percent to 80 percent during the 
same period. Africa is not performing as well as it could in terms of manufacturing if 
compared developing states on other continents that are capitalising from globalisation.  
 
Within the realm of this discussion, it should be noted that at lea??????????????????????????????
are indeed diversified in nature. These economies include those of Egypt; Morocco; South 
Africa, and Tunisia. In the first decade of the 21st ??????????????????????? ?????????????????
(growing) GDP emanated from the service sectors, such as construction; banking; telecoms, 
and retailing. The abovementioned economies though compare badly in terms of labour unit 
costs if compared with both China and India (Roxburg et al, 2010, p. 4). In this regarded, it is 
suggested that they opt to rather move towards the so-called higher value added industries.18 
Such a move might hold the promise in improving their economic effectiveness. From this it 
could be de?????? ????? ????? ?????? ?????????????? ???????? ?????????? ???? ??????????? ??? ???
competitive in the international system.  
 
Despite all the problems associated with and experienced by African economies, it should be 
stated that they have recently shown improved economic statistics. For instance, a report by 
the Mckinsey Institute entitled Lions on the move: The Progress and Potential of African 
Economies shows that Africa has experienced an estimated GDP growth of 4.9 percent per 
annum between 2000 and 2008. In addition, GDP grew on average 1.9 percent despite the 
global recession, making Africa one of only two regions to do so. This trend is expected to 
continue in the future. The report goes on to stress this growth appeared across all sectors, 
                                                             
17 It is acknowledged that generalising about Africa as whole and not in terms of 54 sovereign states is 
contentious. However, for the purposes of this study, such a generalisation is reasonable because Africa as a 
collective is often faced with the same challenges of under-development and marginalisation. The purpose of 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????se collective challenges facing the continent. 
18 Examples of value-added industries include the automobile and auto parts, and aircraft as well as consumer 
electronics industries. 
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thus indicating that it was not just a specific and/or single resource boom. This positive 
performance could be attributed to increased political and macro-economic stability as well 
as micro level reforms that have oriented African states to be more business friendly. It 
??????? ????? ??? ????? ????? ????????? ????? ??????? ?????? ??? ????????? ??????? ??? ?? ??????????
development; it came from a low economic base. The point is that there exists significant 
scope for Africa to diversify its economic base and, consequently address issues related to 
supply side constraints that persist and hamper intra-regional trade. 
 
Few developing countries have managed as yet to gain from globalisation and its dynamics. 
Only the emerging powers, i.e. Brazil; China, and India as well as the East Asian nations, for 
example South Korea and Malaysia, have seen strong economic growth since the advent of 
globalisation. The general trend for Brazil and China is a growing manufacturing sector, 
whereas East Asian nations have specialised in the technological sector that is also regarded 
as the most recent version of the (an) industrial revolution. Drawing on this, it could be 
argued that those developing states that have gained from the phenomena of globalisation are 
typically specialising in value added goods and services.  
 
Recently, states tend to move towards production sharing initiatives in order to produce 
finished goods at a competitive level internationally. Intra-regional trade allows a region to 
foster competitiveness despite fragmented manufacturing activities. It has the potential to 
create links that foster economic growth as well as enlarge the domestic market of a specific 
???????? ??? ????? ??? ?? ????????? ??????????? ??????? ?????? ?????????? ?????-industry trade is 
considered to be the key contributor to this process and enhances regional integration as well 
as the integration of individual states into the global economy. Notwithstanding, it should be 
underlined that intra-industry trade is unfortunately not the norm in Africa, and the continent 
lacks majorly in this instance if compared with other regions of the world (Simuyemba, 2000, 
p. 8; Kofi, 2005).The reason for this absence of intra-industry trade in Africa could be linked 
to its poor value added sectors. Moreover, often the so-called commodity economies of 
Africa are in (direct and indirect) competition with each other instead of being 
complementary in nature and/or in dealing with each other on a global scale. Essentially, 
African states do not produce what is required for their development, and this has led to little 
incentive to foster trade amongst them; let alone them capitalising on the dynamics of 
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globalised manufacturing activities. In order to do so in a sustainable manner, states require 
large enough regional markets and value chains. 
 
Likewise, Africa still requires significantly more investment and it is becoming more 
pressing in the current global economy. The most important outcome of all of the above 
factors is that Africa is (despite recent positive trends) still unattractive for investment, more 
specifically the kind of labour absorbing economic activity that is required for sustainable 
development. Primary to this is that FDI over the last few years to most developing countries 
was substantially lower in comparison to other periods. Only major emerging regions, such as 
East and South-East Asia and Latin America experienced strong growth in FDI over the last 
few years (WTO: World Investment Report, 2011, p. 1). Despite growing fears over the 
global economy, these emerging regions are able to attract more investment because of their 
large enough markets, and growing economies as well as infrastructure connectivity.  
 
3.4.2 The World Trade Organisation and changing world trade system 
Since the end of WWII, the world has steadily embarked on a path towards global free trade 
in order to capture the benefits of specialisation as promised by the principle of comparative 
advantage. Mwanza (2010, p. 5-6) notes that this is occurring on two fronts, namely the 
multi-lateral level in the form of the WTO and on the regional and bi-lateral levels between 
states. 
 
????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
integration agenda. The global trading system has evolved significantly in the 
last 20 years, with the general consensus that free trade is good for growth. 
The GATT created more than 50 years ago, transformed into the WTO, which 
has significantly reduced tariff and non-tariff barriers. Rich economies now 
pursue bilateral trade liberalisation with poor ones. The changes have resulted 
in greater integration of world markets and increased world trade. Since the 
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations in 1995 world trade increased 25%, 
twice as fast as production. This rapid expansion has been facilitated by 
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developments in Information and Communications Technology, liberalisation 
of financial markets, and factor movements across national and regional 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
some degree determined their share of the benefits???????????????????? 
 
The integration agenda of African countries have become especially important within this 
international environment. Virtually all rounds of multi-lateral trade negotiations through the 
WTO, especially the Doha development rounds, have continuously disadvantaged Africa, 
especially sub-Saharan Africa (Ilorah, 2008, p. 94). Through the multilateral liberalisation as 
proposed by the WTO, it is estimated that Africa could lose $2 billion annually in revenue 
(Lee, 2002, p. 7). This is associated with the considerably high adjustment costs imposed on 
African countries as they try to implement the trade liberalisation obligations arising from 
various multi-lateral trade agreements, especially those that require radical reforms of their 
domestic regulatory systems (UNCTAD, 2006, p. 41). Therefore, Africa and other parts of 
the developing world have become particularly vocal in the Doha development round 
concerning the unequal nature of global economic interaction and the stipulations of the 
various multi-lateral trade programs that they argue seek to lock developing countries into 
terms of trade that continue to be to their detriment (UNCTAD, 2006). This is perceived as a 
manifestation of the LIEO (as discussed in chapter two) amongst developing countries, not 
just Africa, and as a result developing states pursue the regional and bi-lateral alternative in 
moving towards world trade and breaking free from dependency on the wealthier states. 
 
3.4.3 The Changing Economic Order and a New Scramble for Africa 
Over the past two decades the emergence of Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) from the 
developing world has received growing attention in the global economy. Over recent years, 
countries such as China, India, Brazil and several East Asian nations have been engaging in 
more trade globally, thus industrialising more rapidly and as a result became important actors 
in the world economy. For example, half of global economic growth over the last few years 
has been primarily attributable to (these) emerging economies. In fact, estimates show that 70 
percent of world growth over the next few years will emanate from these and other similar 
emerging markets (Ernst and Young, 2011, p. 4). 
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Based on the above, South ? South cooperation has been receiving particular interest as 
developing countries continue increase the economic linkages between and amongst 
themselves into an ever denser web of activity that would ideally relinquish the power that 
developed countries historically exercised over them (Le Pere & Shelton, 2007, p. 67). 
According to the WTO World Trade Report ????????????????????????????????????????????????
slower in 2010 if compared to those of developing countries. Of these, Asia, driven mainly by 
China and India, showed the fastest growth at 8.8 percent.  In addition, South and Central 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
years stood at 4.7 percent.  
 
Africa is increasingly exposed to the dynamics of world trade, making emerging and more 
developed economies important role players in its economic landscape. This has been a 
particularly promising development for Africa as these emerging economies, in particular, are 
increasingly trading, investing and forming strategic partnerships with the continent. The 
result is a positive impact on economic growth and breaking the political and economic hold 
that former colonial powers enjoyed over the continent. 
 
Africa has been particularly important for these emerging economies and more specifically 
China and to a lesser extent India, Brazil and others. For instance, over the last decade China 
has grown into a significant trade partner for sub-Saharan Africa by increasing its imports to 
Africa from 4.8 percent in 2000 to just over 11 (i.e. 11.2) percent in 2008 (McCarthy, 2010, 
p. 14). Through this relationship, Africa has experienced an increase in global trade due to the 
strong demand for their commodities, especially before the 2008 financial crisis.  
 
It should be stressed that emerging economies19 are driven by the same interests as their more 
developed counterparts, namely securing resources and markets. According to UNCTAD 
(2010, p. 20-30), the composition of increased trade between Africa and non-African 
                                                             
19 Emerging economies are developing countries that are experiencing rapid economic growth and 
industrialisation.  
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???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
deficit with non-African developing countries grew from $1-billion to $37.2 billion, 
?????????????? ????? ??? ??????? ??? ???? ?????????? ????? ????????? ??????? ?????? ????? ??????????
economies have been characterised by faster growth in exports and currently shows a trade 
surplus with them (UNCTAD, 2010).  
 
Essentially, the increased economic interaction between Africa and other emerging 
economies are diminishing the economic influence of developed countries. It is creating more 
avenues for Africa to capitalise on mutually beneficial partnerships that subscribe to their 
goals for development. However, this needs to be approached in manners that lessen the 
impact of deteriorating terms of trade between developing country partners and Africa, and 
this must transpire even though Africa does not have the economic base to fully manage its 
balance of payments deficit. Beneficial to Africa is that the two dominant trading partners to 
Africa, namely the EU and China are increasingly in competition with each other to capture 
????????? ???????? ???? ?????????? ???? ????? ????????? ???????? ??????ies with the leverage to 
negotiate better terms of trade; to put it in layman terms: to clinch a better deal for themselves 
(Mugumya, 2008, p. 5-8). 
 
Europe is still the largest trading partner to Africa but is losing ground in this regard and it is 
drawing a lot of criticism regarding the way it does business with Africa, as evident in the 
EPAs offered to the SADC by the EU that has been criticized, and especially by South 
African diplomats. The then South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nkosazana Dlamini-
?????????? ??????? ???????? ?????? ???? ?????? ????? ??????? ??? ??????? ??????? ????? ?????? ?????
????? ????? ??? ?????? ?????? ???? ????????? ??????????? ?Le Roux, 2008???????? ???????? ??? ????????
???????? ???? ???????? ???? ??? ????????? ?????????? ?????????? ????? ?????, India and South 
American countries (Pretorius, 2009). The attempt to fast track EPAs in Africa (this will be 
covered in greater detail in chapter five) has offered terms of trade that might lock Africa into 
commodity production and re-align already established RECs (Yao, 2010). As a result, EPAs 
need to be given more thought by African leaders. However, the EPAs highlight that Europe 
is willing to negotiate on a regional basis, implying a shift towards regional goals and a rules 
based approach to regional integration.   
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In contrast, developing country partners have strategic frameworks for Africa at the regional 
level, but their actual interaction and implementation of programmes are on the national level 
with often no link between these projects and regional priorities (UNCTAD, 2010, p. 26). 
These are often offered with no subscription to a rules based process of interaction as is the 
case with the principle of non-interference, characteristic of the Beijing Consensus.20 The 
interplay between the changing economic orders has certainly provided Africa with more 
options, but these need to be approached pragmatically and with a regional and continental 
focus at its core to fully extract sustainable development goals, and mitigate the legacies of 
the past and not fall victim to a potential second scramble for Africa.   
 
3.4.4 South Africa 
SA initially focused much of its attention on promoting business and political relations with 
developed countries to aid post-Apartheid economic recovery. However, under the 
????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????? ??????? ???????????nd this 
was made more pragmatic under the consequent Mbeki administration. Both Mandela and 
Mbeki have played instrumental roles in re-invigorating the African agenda, and this is 
??????????? ???????? ???????? ?????? ???????? ??????? ??? ??? ???????? ????????????? ?emocratic 
South Africa actively branded and positioned itself as a development partner in; for and of 
Africa. As Barber (2004) reflects: South Africa has certainly given the African continent a 
new aura and hope.  
 
????? ?? ?? ?????? ????????? ???????? ??????? ?as evolved towards a pragmatic and realist 
orientation that stands in stark contrast to the idealistic days of Nelson Mandela. South Africa 
has a GDP twice the size of Egypt; and three; eight, and thirteen times that of Nigeria; 
                                                             
20 The Beijing Consensus is viewed as an alternative development model than that offered by the Bretton Woods 
institutions, such as the IMF and WB. The idea behind an alternative development model is predicated on the 
fact that China did not need to be a democracy to economically develop, as propounded by Western nations. 
Importantly, the Beijing Consensus in Africa is predicated on the principle of non-interference and offering aid 
without conditionality. Joshua Cooper Ramo coined the term Beijin???????????? ??? ????? ??? ?????????????????
approach to development (McGarvy, 2011). The Beijing Consensus fundamentally challenges the Western 
conception of development in that democracy was not a prerequisite for China to develop. China has given 
developing countries more options globally to challenge the current development philosophy (Pretorius, 2008, p. 
21).  
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Ethiopia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, respectively (Megalomattis, 2007, p. 9). 
This is almost equal to that of Norway, one of the smallest economies in Europe (Akokpari, 
2008, p. 95). In addition, at number 54 out of 139, the country was the highest ranked sub-
Saharan Afri???? ??????????? ??????????????????? ??????????????? ???????????????? ??????
(CGI) at 54 (out of 139 economies) in 2010-2011. Conversely, this represents a global drop 
from 45 in previous years (Hartzenberg, 2011b, p. 13). However, on the African continent it 
is a regional powerhouse that boasts a stable democracy. It is viewed as an emerging pivotal 
power because of its profound influence in Africa and the Southern African region in 
particular, and it has become clear that its development is connected to the whole region 
(Schoeman, 2000). 
 
South Africa has increasingly been placing emphasis on Africa and regional integration in its 
foreign policy and more specifically through its so-?????????????????????????Rapoo, 2007, p. 
1). Soko (2008, p. 3-29) asserts that by ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
continent, it has to fulfill the leadership role in regional integration, and especially in 
Southern Africa, if there is to be any hope of meaningful integration. Since the advent of the 
democratic dispensation in 1994, South Africa has made its mark in the African economic 
landscape through its private sector, which has expanded rapidly throughout the continent, so 
????? ??? ????? ???? ??????????????? ??? ?????????????? ??????? ???????? ???????????????????????eless, 
many regard this rapid expansion as an example of an imperialist South Africa conducting 
business in much the same way as developed countries (Taylor, 2006, p. 166). This is 
illustrated through the fact that out of 150 tariff changes in the recent past in South Africa, 
137 have been tariff increases that mostly affects clothing and textiles industries (Helmo, 
2012). Thus, South Africa often engages in uni-lateral action and negotiated a separate EPA 
(SA-EPA), which indicates that their commitment to the regional agenda is conditioned on 
national interest that has to be balanced against its domestic constraints and challenges. South 
Africa often stands to benefit the most from any meaningful integration, whether it is at the 
continental, regional or sub-????????? ??????????????????????????? ??? ???????????? ?????????????????
be explored in greater detail in chapter five). 
 
Having explored the drivers of the contemporary regional integration agenda, the next section 
will describe the form of this second wave of regional integration. 
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3.5 Africa’s Second Wave of Regional Integration 
Gereffi and Fonda (1992, p. 435) emphasise that sub-Saharan Africa is less stable than other 
regions of the developing world. The cultures; geography, and political systems of the 54 
states and territories are exceptionally diverse which make it difficult to generalise about 
problems and prescribing policy to change them. However, for African leaders, the 
imperatives for regional cooperation to address these issues are stronger now than ever 
before, given the multiple socio-economic and political impacts of globalisation on the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
regional integration is that states on the continent have increasingly realised that regional 
integration is necessary to overcome the wide-ranging challenges facing them. 
 
???????????????????? ??????????? ??? ???????????? ???? ????? ???????? ?????????? ?????????? ???
than in the first wave of regional integration in Africa, with comprehensive institutions; 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
integration is that neo-liberal development strategies have been accepted by African states to 
be the economic model around which the RECs are to integrate economically. Thus, the 
general idea is to open up markets and let the private sector steer economic development in 
Africa instead of adopting protectionist and isolationist trade policies to create state 
sponsored industries, as was the case during the first wave. 
 
The next sub-???????? ????? ?????????? ??? ????????? ???????????? ???? ????????? ???????????? ??? ???
relates to the T-FTA. It is intended to show that continental and regional projects in its most 
contemporary wave are prescriptive of liberal strategies that have been promoted by the 
spread of economic globalisation and the Bretton Woods institutions. This is different from 
the first wave, because all African states are following economic strategies that are aimed at 
opening the market; thus, they are not divergent in economic orientation as was the case 
during the first wave.  
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3.5.1 Africa’s Continental and Regional Architecture: Defining the African Regional 
Integration Project 
As mentioned before, Africa has a rich tradition of regionalism that has its roots at the outset 
of its independence. The regional configurations within Africa have become increasingly 
denser with every country on the continent belonging to at least one regional arrangement. 
The configuration of integration initiatives is complex, because the AU is politically and 
continentally orientated whereas the RECs have an economic focus and are limited to various 
sub-regions. The AU as a continental political entity provides the structure through which 
regional integration is to occur as well as the policy framework that should guide integration, 
???? ?????? ???????? ???? ???? ???????????? ???? ????????? ???????????? ????????? ???? ????? ???
Africa are conceived of as vehicles to move towards the goals of the AEC, which provides 
the backbone of ARIP in economic terms. The RECs are thus building blocks to continental 
integration in Africa. 
 
In the rest of this section the emphasis will thus be placed on the AU and NEPAD; RECs in 
general; and the AEC as it relates to the broad conceptualisation of recent integration in 
Africa. 
 
3.5.1.1 The African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
The AU is the successor of the OAU and was established in 2002. This change in African 
continental integration architecture was prompted by former South African president, Thabo 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????
ideals of Pan-Africanism (Makinda & Okumu, 2008, p. 31). In many ways the AU represents 
a fresh look at the integration process in Africa that has recognised that the changing 
international environment (i.e. post-Cold War; economic globalisation) requires that the 
continent develop a response that can redefine its prospects globally. Makinda and Okumu 
(2008, p. 31) elaborate on the factors that gave rise to the emergence of the AU. These 
include the: 
? End of the cold war;  
? Recognition of the power of globalisation;  
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? Pre-eminence of neo-liberal economic ideology; and 
? Growing popularity of both liberal democratic principles and human rights.  
 
The AU has been designed to serve as a political body that pursues strategies of governance 
and promotion of democracy in Africa. Africa has recognised that good governance and 
democracy are the pre-cursors for sustainable development. The AU could also be seen as an 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????vis-á-vis 
the OAU has in some areas been redefined and in other areas merely been given a cosmetic 
change to facilitate the above-mentioned ideals.21 According to Gottschalk and Schmidt 
(2004, p. 144), the AU mimics the European Community/ EU structures and its institutional 
structures, like the Assembly for heads of state and government and others, have been 
designed to accommodate the pan-African ideals of transparent governance with an eventual 
supra-national goal. 
 
Since its inception, the AU has made important strides towards garnering some of the 
continental coherence that was lost during the first wave of regional integration. The neo-
liberal transformation of the vision and plans for African regional and continental integration 
was carried out by adopting the NEPAD in 2002 (Keet, 2007, p. 263). By adopting NEPAD 
???? ??? ????????? ?? ?????????????? ????????? ??? ???????? ????????? ???????????? ??? ??????
accepting neo-liberal economic ideology and globalisation as factors that cannot be ignored if 
Africa is to grow economically.  
 
???????? ???????????????????????????????? ???? ?????????????????????????????? ?????????????
are not limited to a list of sectoral policies; prevention and management of conflicts, and 
ascribing to good governance and democracy as well as placing considerable emphasis on 
building continental infrastructure in transport; Information Communication and Technology 
(ICT); energy, and water (Gottschalk & Schmidt, 2004, p. 151). NEPAD has been criticised 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
development. However, the impact that SAPs had on individual African states had basically 
                                                             
21 Key organs of the continental body are the Assembly; Executive Council; Pan-African Parliament; African 
Human Rights Court; Peace and Security Council; Economic, Social and Cultural Council and the AU 
Commission (Makinda and Okumu, 2008, p. 41-49). 
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set them on a developmental path that is characteristically neo-liberal and thus left few 
alternatives for Africa.  
 
The AU is increasingly frustrated, though, by a lack of cooperation in important areas. This 
inability to work effectively together has stalled attempts at achieving meaningful grassroots 
change on the continent. In many ways, the replacement of the OAU with the AU has not 
changed the lack of consensus among member states and the fundamental business of taking 
pragmatic tangible steps that would facilitate African integration. Kuhnhaardt (nd, p. 3) 
??????? ????? ???????? ??? ????? ???? ??? ???? ???? ??? ???? ???? ???????? ????????? ??????????? ????
operational procedures on the one hand and a means of energetic and coherent 
??????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
3.5.1.2 Regional Economic Communities 
The AU Constitutive Act and the Abuja Treaty recognise the importance of RECs for 
????????? ???????????? ???????????? ????????????????? ???-regional integration initiatives (i.e. the 
RECs) are viewed as the building blocks from which economic integration is to occur. In turn 
it is ideally conceived that an economically integrated continent could provide the basis for 
political unity as proposed by pan-Africanism (Uzodike, 2010, p. 99). The Secretary General 
of the ECA, Abdoulah Janneh, recently made the following observation at an AU event:  
??????? ?????? ????? ???? ?????????? ????? ????????? ????????? ????? ??????? ???? ?? ?????????
continent. Ten years later; ten years after NEPAD, the same journal is screaming Africa is 
???????? ?ECA press release, 2012). Thus, the AUs flagship program, that is NEPAD, is 
making inroads into the developmental deficit on the continent. It has placed renewed focus 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????rations 
(Moore, 2004, p. 7-8).22  
 
                                                             
22 NEPAD has instituted an $8billion Short-Term Action Plan for infrastructure that includes 20 priority projects 
designed to jumpstart regional economic integration and lay the foundation for medium to long term investment. 
It has put regional integration at the centre of its infrastructure blue print that includes strengthening 
management and planning capacity within RECs for cross regional infrastructure development (United Nations 
Department of Public Information, 2008, p. 2). This illustrates that NEPAD has become important in 
strengthening regional infrastructure development between RECs. 
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Uzodike (2010, p. 98) notes that the Pan-African institutions of the AU and the RECs are 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
phased or incremental manner. The growth of regional arrangements in Africa reflects a thirst 
for regional integration so much so that the original aspiration of five RECs under the LPA 
have burgeoned into 14 regional arrangements, with 11 major African RECs. The table below 
illustrates the 11 major regional arrangements in Africa at present:  
 
Table 3.1: Table illustrating major RECs, type, areas of cooperation, date of entry and 
objective 
Major RECs Type Areas of 
integration and 
cooperation 
include: 
Date of entry 
into force 
Specified 
Objective 
Arab Maghreb Union 
(UMA) 
FTA Goods, services, 
investment, 
migration 
17 February 
1989 
Full economic 
union 
Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern 
Africa(COMESA 
FTA Goods, services, 
investment, 
migration 
8 December 
1994 
CM 
Community of Sahel-
Saharan States (CEN-SAD) 
FTA Goods, services, 
investment, 
migration 
4 February 1998 FTA and 
integration in 
some sectors 
Economic Community of 
Central African States 
(ECCAS 
FTA Goods, services, 
investment, 
migration 
1 July 2007 Full economic 
union 
Economic Community of 
West African States 
(ECOWAS) 
FTA Goods, services, 
investment, 
migration 
24 July 1993 Full economic 
union 
Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development 
(IGAD) 
FTA Goods, services, 
investment, 
migration 
25 November 
1996 
Full economic 
union 
Southern African FTA Goods, services, 1 September Full economic 
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Development Community 
(SADC) 
investment, 
migration 
2000 union 
Economic and Monetary 
Community of Central 
Africa (CEMAC) 
CU Goods, services, 
investment, 
migration 
24 June 1999 Full economic 
union 
East African Community 
(EAC) 
CU Goods, services, 
investment, 
migration 
7 July 2000 Full economic 
union 
Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU) 
CU Goods, services, 
investment, 
migration 
15 July 2004 Full economic 
union 
West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (UEMOA) 
CU Business law 
harmonised. 
Macro-
economic policy 
convergence in 
place 
10 January 1994 Full economic 
union 
Source: UNCTAD, 2009, p. 10 
 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
is that since the first wave there has been a shift towards an outward orientation (as opposed 
to inward looking). The former has been promoted in the RECs through market integration 
and by extension a neo-liberal development philosophy. In contrast to the earlier regional 
development modalities, current plans for regional integration within the RECs as the 
building blocks for the eventual integration of the whole of Africa are increasingly being 
driven by neo-liberal theories and programmes (Keet, 2007, p. 263). Nine of the 14 regional 
arrangements mentioned in Table 3.1 above have a full economic union as their ultimate 
goal; while one (i.e. COMESA) aims to become a CM; another, namely SACU is a CU and 
aims to stay that way, and the remaining three focus on intra-regional free trade or regional 
cooperation (McCarthy, 2010, p.8 and UNCTAD, 2009, p. 10-12). Keeping the afore-
mentioned in mind, it has been argued that Africa tends to merely follow a trend of regional 
economic integration that is inculcated in integration exercises worldwide (ECA, 2006, p. 5-
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7). This make sense if one takes into account that in many respects Africa has been playing 
catch up with the rest of the world in this regard. 
 
3.5.1.3 The African Economic Community 
The ideal of an African Economic Community (AEC) was envisaged by African states during 
the 1990s and this became a reality with the signing of the Abuja Treaty in 1994 (Mwanza, 
2010, p. 15). As was the case with the LPA, the Abuja Treaty seeks to promote economic 
development through co-operation. Hence, it is viewed as the successor to the LPA and aims 
to ultimately correct the failures of earlier integration attempts. It was also the first to provide 
a comprehensive framework for economic integration that expanded the mandate of a then 
largely politically orientated continental body into an expanded one that increasingly focuses 
on economic issues. 
 
The AEC operates as a separate legal instrument to the AU and is supposed to guide 
economic integration of the eight recognised RECs towards an Africa-wide continental 
economic unit. Trivedi (2005, p. 27) observes that the AEC is the first attempt to provide a 
legal framework for realising the long cherished goal of economic integration across Africa. 
The initial integration agenda of the then OAU was envisaged as a gradual process towards 
continental unity through the building blocks approach within the various sub-regions of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and harmonisation of a confusing array of regional initiatives. Within this context the AEC 
and its goals have now been legally instituted but face challenges as it was only constructed 
in 1991 and enacted in 1994. Some RECs, such as ECOWAS and SACU existed before the 
Treaty of Abuja and hence their goals and objectives are not necessarily conforming to the 
principles of post-Abuja RECs.  
 
The objectives of the Abuja Treaty are to increase economic self-reliance; promote self 
sustained development, and raise the standard of livi??? ??? ???? ????????? ??????? ???????? ??
Thompson, 1995, p. 56). The AEC Treaty (1994, p.8) states that the objectives of the 
Community are to promote economic; cultural, and social development as well as the 
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integration of African economies.23 Additional objectives include, but are not limited to 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
resources; promote cooperation amongst member states as well as to coordinate and 
harmonise policies amongst existing and future sub-regional economic communities.  
 
??? ?????????????????????? ??????? ??????????? ????????? ??? ???? ??????????? ???? ??? ???????????? ????
harmonise policies between existing and future RECs for the gradual attainment of the 
???????????????????????? (AU, 2001, p. 4-5).24 Hence, the AU is in conformity with the goals 
of the Treaty of Abuja and so is its framework for economic integration. African states are 
seeking to create an environment that is conducive to the developmental goals that they aspire 
to and it is clear that economic integration is viewed as one of the major strategies to create 
said environment.  
 
The AEC sets a path towards rationalisation and regional integration, and more specifically; it 
describes six stages for economic integration to occur in Africa. The first stage consists of 
strengthening existing RECs and establishing new ones in regions where there are none. The 
second stage would see RECs stabilise tariff and non-tariff barriers; customs duties and 
internal taxes. The next stage entails each REC to create an FTA to further formalise the 
removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers to promote intra-community trade, whereas the fourth 
stage is to work towards the formation of a CU by adopting a CET. The penultimate stage is 
to establish a CM, while the final stage is full factor mobility as implied under the formation 
of an Economic Union. These stages are accompanied by strict timeframes, namely that the 
goal per stage should be attained within 34 years from enactment (AEC, 1994, p. 10).25 
Further to this all RECs and the T-FTA have included in their founding documents that the 
final goal of their sub-regional configurations is to create the AEC. As a result, its 
prescriptions are viewed as the ARIP and this has recently been strengthened by continental 
initiatives such as NEPAD.  
 
                                                             
23 See Article 4 (1) of the AEC Treaty. 
24 See Article 3 of the AU Constitutive Act. 
25 See Article 6 (1) and (2) of the AEC Treaty. 
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It should be stressed that the RECs have not followed the above-mentioned prescribed stages 
of the AEC. The RECs circumvented the first two stages and moved straight into pursuing 
FTAs and CUs (ECA, 2010, p. 11). The economic aspects of the ARIP as conceptualised in 
the Abuja Treaty has thus not been followed by RECs an??????????????????????????????????????
implementing continental strategies.  
 
3.5.2 Eastern and Southern Africa 
Eastern and Southern Africa have a rich tradition of regional integration with a myriad of 
regional arrangements. Within the region, three dominant RECs have been instituted, namely 
COMESA, EAC and SADC.  
 
These RECs have redefined themselves since their inception and are largely different to their 
predecessors. This is due to varied reasons, the most important of which is that they all have a 
market integration focus. The structure of each REC varies but they all share a common 
objective to reduce trade barriers amongst member states by creating a common, larger 
economic space (ECA, 2006, p. 7). The strategies that they are utilising in this regard are 
however, unique to each REC with different approach; timeframes, and goals (Lee, 2003, p. 
73-95).  
 
Also, three smaller groupings co-exist within the region, namely IGAD; IOC, and SACU. 
SACU is an important regional arrangement within Southern Africa and has a bearing on the 
T-FTA. Therefore, it will be described alongside the three recognised RECs. In the rest of 
this section the RECs and SACU will be discussed in greater detail so as to frame RECs in an 
economic perspective and as such illuminate the regional context of the T-FTA. 
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3.5.2.1 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
 
 
The figure above illustrates the geographical location and spread of the member states of 
COMESA. The PTA for Eastern and Southern Africa was the predecessor of COMESA and 
was enacted in 1981. It was born out of the continental strategy to form sub-regional 
groupings in each region of Africa under the LPA and strengthened further by the collapse of 
the EAC in 1977 (The German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 1989, p. 158). The treaty 
establishing the PTA for Eastern and Southern Africa provided for the transformation of the 
PTA into a progressive CM; and this was made more attainable by establishing COMESA. 
COMESA is the oldest recognised regional institution in Eastern and Southern Africa that has 
moved towards regional integration through economic integration fundamentals since its 
inception. 
 
The COMESA was formed in 1993 and has 18 member states.26 It has the largest 
membership of any REC in the region and always had an explicit economic focus ever since 
its inception. However, it has been viewed as a largely artificial regional body because its 
members have little in common and it was significantly reduced in importance when the 
SADC was enacted in 1992 (SADC , nd). Jakobeit et al, (2005, p. 15-16) highlight that the 
systematic development of COMESA from a PTA to a CM and an Economic Community is 
                                                             
26 Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan and Swaziland (COMESA. 2012).  
Figure 3.1: Geographic representation of COMESA 
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in conformity with the objectives of the Abuja Treaty to form the AEC. As a matter of fact, it 
is a stated objective of the REC. Out of the three RECs in the tri-partite region; COMESA 
presents an opportunity to reflect on a progressive movement towards economic integration 
in Africa that follows classical prescriptions regardless of its artificial nature.  
 
The institutional structures of COMESA consist of the Authority; the Council; the Court of 
Justice; the Committee of Governors of Central Banks; the Intergovernmental Committee; the 
Technical Committees; the Secretariat, and the Consultative Committee (COMESA, 1992, p. 
13).27 Jakobeit et al. (2005, p. 15) note that COMESA has two important principles that set it 
apart from its initial orientation, namely allowing for so-called variable geometry and multi-
speed integration. These allow for a group within the REC to integrate faster than others as 
well as providing for sanctions on member states. The former is also envisioned to facilitate 
the goals of the REC in its quest in moving towards a CM.  
 
????????? ??in objective is to achieve regional economic integration through trade and 
investment. The specific objectives of COMESA are quite broad and encompass issues such 
as trade liberalisation and customs cooperation; transport and communication; industry and 
energy; monetary affairs and finance, and agriculture as well as economic and social 
development (COMESA, 1992, p. 9-11).28 Taking these into account, it is clear why 
COMESA is considered to have a strong economic focus, which then also is its primary 
strategy for regional integration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
27 See Article 7 (1) of the COMESA Treaty. 
28 See Article 4 (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) of the COMESA Treaty. 
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3.5.2.2 East African Community (EAC) 
 
 
Figure 3.2 above illustrates the geographical location and spread of the member states of the 
EAC. Since its establishment in 1967, the EAC operated as a fully-fledged CU that arose in 
response to the solidarity of the newly independent former East African territories of Kenya; 
Tanzania, and Uganda (Hess and Hess, nd, p. 2). Nevertheless, the differences amongst these 
countries were so great and grew to such an extent that they could not prevent the collapse of 
the EAC in 1977 (Trivedi, 2005, p. 35). The fo?????????????????????????????????????????
economic dominance and the related perceived unequal distribution of integration benefits 
amongst the partner states. The situation was worsening due to political; ideological, and 
even personal differences between the respective leaders of the three countries (Jakobeit et al, 
2005, p. 16). Before its demise, the so-called original EAC managed to achieve substantial 
progress in fostering a regional agenda between the three original member states.  
 
The EAC was revitalised in 2000 and now has five member states, including the three 
original members plus Rwanda and Burundi (EAC, 2012). It could be argued that due to its 
??????????? ????????? ??????? ???? ?????? ???? ???? ????? ???????????? ????????? ??? ???? ????????
towards economic integration. The EAC is primarily market driven and it envisages to 
Figure 3.2: Geographic representation of EAC 
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initially establishing a CU, and a CM, an ultimately a monetary union. The ultimate objective 
is to have a political federation in place (EAC, 2000, p. 15-16).29  
 
Trade amongst the EAC members has increased with 95 percent between 2005 and 2009 
???????????????). This rise could be linked to increased value added production and pooling 
investment resources, which in turn has immensely increased business activity in the region. 
Following on all of these, the EAC is rightly so seen as the most advanced REC in terms of 
actual economic integration outcomes. It should be stressed though that even though the EAC 
have launched a fast-track initiative to create a political federation, the speedy realisation of 
such a federation remains doubtful, at least for now (Jakobeit et al, 2005, p. 19). 
 
The EAC organs and institutions consist of the Summit, Council, Coordination Committee, 
Sectoral Committees, East African Court of Justice, East African Legislative Assembly and 
the Secretariat (EAC, 2000, p. 20).30 Cooperation is mainly pursued to:  
? Create an enabling environment for policies in basic infrastructure;  
? Establish an export orientated economy for partner states through the free movement 
of goods; persons; labour; services; capital; information, and technology; and  
? Equitably distributes benefits accruing from the operations of the community (EAC, 
2000, p. 17).31 
 
Article five of the EAC Treaty (2000, p. 15-16) establishes: ????? ??????????? ??? ????
community shall be to develop policies and programmes aimed at widening and deepening 
cooperation among partner states in political, economic, social and cultural fields, research 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????32 The distinguishing feature, 
compared to other similar regional initiatives of the EAC, is that it aspires to a political 
federation through economic integration but has seen greater progress in the economic 
sphere. Thus, despite failing in one of its major aims (i.e. a political federation) it should at 
                                                             
29 See Article 5 (2) of the EAC Treaty. 
30 See Article 9 (1) of the EAC Treaty. 
31 See Article 7 (1) of the EAC Treaty. 
32 See Article 5 (1) of the EAC Treaty. 
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the same time be lauded for its success in other areas, and more specifically economic 
integration. 
 
3.5.2.3 Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
 
 
Figure 3.3 depicts the geographical spread of the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) and its member states. Before turning to a discussion of the current SADC, a brief 
overview of its predecessor, i.e. the Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
(SADCC) is necessary. The SADCC was initiated in 1980 as a political response to the 
increasingly hostile then Apartheid South Africa. The member states, also known as the 
frontline states, were Angola; Botswana; Lesotho; Malawi; Mozambique; Swaziland; 
Tanzania; Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The essential determinants of the regional organisation 
were to mitigate dependency on Apartheid South Africa. As a result, the SADCC was 
initially instilled out of political factors. McCarthy (2010, p. 7) argues that SADCC was not a 
market arrangement as such, but rather had a developmental mandate to encourage the 
economic development and independence from South Africa. Based on this, it is clear that the 
SADCC was not initiated out of a need to form a regional trade agreement, but rather to 
develop the above-mentioned member states independently from South Africa. As such, it did 
not pursue market integration as a path towards regional integration, and this was evident in 
???? ????? ????? ????????????????????? ????????????????? ??tegration fell short if compared to 
other RECs in the region at the time. 
Figure 3.3: Geographic representation of SADC 
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The former SADCC was changed into the SADC in Windhoek, Namibia in 1992. It 
transformed from a coordination conference into a community and by extension elevated 
from a loose arrangement to one based on a legally binding agreement (SADC, 2008b, p. 3). 
This was due to the changing dynamics within the region, and more specifically the end of 
Apartheid in South Africa and Namibia gaining its independence in 1990. Currently, the 
SADC has a membership of 15 member states.33 Although being formally established in 
1990, its efforts at economic integration only started when the SADC revealed its trade 
????????? ??? ?????? ????? ????????? ??????? ???? ??????????? ??? ???? ???????? ??????????? ?????-regional 
trade in goods and services on the basis of fair, mutually equitable and beneficial trade 
????????????????????????????????ablish a FTA in the SADC region?.34 ????????????????????
Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) underlines that the FTA is the initial step 
????? ??? ??????????? ??? ??? ????? ???? ?? ??? ??? ?????? ???? ?????????? ??? ??????? ??????
integration agenda conforms to the objectives of its treaty. The objectives of the REC are to 
harmonise political and socio-economic plans of member states; create appropriate 
mechanisms and institutions for mobilisation of resources as well as to develop policies 
aimed at progressive elimination of obstacles to the free movement of capital and labour; 
goods and services, and of people (SADC, 1992).35  
 
The institutional structures of the SADC consist of the Summit of Heads of State and 
Government; Organ on Politics; Defence and Security Cooperation; Council of Ministers; 
Integrated Committee of Ministers; Standing Committee of Officials; Secretariat, and the 
Tribunal as well as SADC National Committees (SADC, 1992).36 Jakobeit et al. (2005, p. 12) 
observe that the SADC basically re-???????? ?????????????????? ?????????????? ???????????????????
exception of the addition of a Tribunal. For this reason, the trade integration agenda remains 
with the sectoral coordinating units in the governments of member states.  
 
                                                             
33 Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (SADC, 2012). 
34 See Article 2 of the SADC Trade Protocol. 
35 See Article 5 of the SADC Treaty. 
36 See Article 9 of the SADC Treaty. 
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In 2001, the SADC Heads of State and Government met at an extraordinary summit in 
Namibia (SADC, 2012).  In a rigorous attempt to achieve the objectives of the Community, 
??????????????????????? ???? ????????????????? ??????????? ?????tutions. This entailed grouping 
21 sectors into four clusters. These clusters are Trade, Industry, Finance and Investments; 
Food, Agriculture, and Natural Resources; Infrastructure and Services, and Social and Human 
Development and Special Programmes. These clusters are tasked with inculcating closer 
integration amongst member states in all areas. 
 
3.5.2.4 Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 
 
 
Figure 3.4 pictures the geographic representation of the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU). The SACU is the oldest CU in the world and has a long history that dates back to its 
initial establishment in 1910. The member states of the SACU are South Africa; Botswana; 
Lesotho; Namibia, and Swaziland. The SACU Agreement of 2002 came into force on 15 July 
2004, and provides for further harmonisation of policies in a number of areas, including 
customs procedures; standards; technical regulations; sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) 
measures; competition, and unfair trade practices. Nonetheless, alignment in these areas are 
still problematic (WTO, 2009, p. vii). The Preamble of the 2002-Agreement recognises that 
the agreement of 1969 no longer caters to the needs of the CU and indicates that the 1969-
Agreement was hampered by a lack of common policies and institutions (UNCTAD, 2005, p. 
5). 
Figure 3.4: Geographic representation of SACU 
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3.5.3 Problems facing regional integration in Africa 
The problems facing regional integration in Africa are almost applicable to all of the 
recognised RECs. Africa remains a marginal player in the global economy, and in sharp 
contrast to conventional wisdom and expectations, regional integration arrangements have 
not to any reasonable extent increased intra-regional trade (Akinkugbe, 2010, p. 122). 
Amongst the most pressing issues is the lack of pre-requisites for economic integration and a 
non-existent rules based approach to regional integration, coupled with a lack of respect for 
their institutions (RECs). At the formal level, African regional arrangements have rarely 
realised their targets and continue to have little developmental impact (Shaw & Mbabazi, 
2006, p. 361).  
 
Also, there are definite problems facing the assumptions of welfare gains by utilising market 
integration in Africa. This section will identify and analyse the problems facing regional 
integration in Africa generally, and relate these to Eastern and Southern Africa, specifically 
through the overlapping membership issue. Essentially, these problems reside at the national 
and regional levels as well as in the assumptions of economic integration that have been 
pursued in its classical sense by African states. It will be argued that classical regionalism is 
inappropriate within the African context. 
 
The following problems hamper African efforts at regional integration: 
1. Disparities among states: There are great disparities amongst African states, and these 
relates to the levels of development, democracy, social cohesion and conflict within 
individual states. These are further aggravated by a general lack of efficient infrastructure; 
transport, communications and economic development as well as an export orientated 
industrial developmental approach. According to Leshaba (2002, p. 3-5); Lee (2003, p. 2-28), 
and Buthulezi (2006, p. 77-78), these factors are the pre-requisites for effective regional 
integration and a lack of them would make it difficult for developing countries to effectively 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
that have commonly struggled to consolidate statehood since independence. These realities 
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have immensely hampered efforts at regional integration in Africa. This situation is worsened 
by fears by smaller states that larger states will take over their markets, while larger states 
fear that unstable (smaller) states could jeopardise their economic security. Mr. Abdoulie 
Janneh, Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), commented in 
this regard in the following manner:  
 
 ??????????? ????? ?????????? ??????????? ?????? ???? ???????s with respect to 
entering into collective regional agreements, which translate into a state 
ceding its rights to adopt alternative policies or change track as it deems fit. 
He highlighted the fear of being locked into policy regimes that may be 
deemed detrimental to a country's overall interests and the perception that the 
costs of a regional agreement may be larger than the expected benefits - thus, 
the fear of loss of revenue, arising from trade liberalization. There is also a 
concern that more open borders may undermine national security and facilitate 
transnational crime (ECA, Press Release no112, 2011)?. 
 
2. Fear of losing claim to sovereignty: This fear stems from the necessary stability required 
for states to effectively trust each other and spread the gains of integration amongst all 
member states and not just a few. This, however, is difficult if one is cognisant of the vast 
differences, in so many respects, between the states of Africa. Fundamentally, the above 
quote reflects that African states are fearful of surrendering sovereignty because of their low 
levels of development. Opening up markets and relaxing borders pose a threat in that they 
could diminish their ability to control and steer their own development path. 
 
3. Lack of co-ordination: Cross-cutting issues such as a lack of governance, co-ordination 
and institutional capacity are also problems that affect integration in Africa (ADB, 2009, p. 2-
3). Co-ordination and the seemingly haphazard attitudes and approaches towards regional 
integration by member states are particularly relevant to the problems of integration in Africa.  
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???? ???? ??? ?????? ?????? ???? ?????? ??????????? ??????? ???????? ?????????? ?????
introduced numerous initiatives in regional integration without coordinating 
them at the continental level. Integration outcomes clearly show that the 
continental blueprints for integration have served only as loose frameworks, 
not as rules-based points of reference, for the regional integration agenda. 
Coordinating mechanisms with a legal basis, essential in enforcing standards 
and commitments to integration at all levels are lacking. This has led to 
overlapping memberships and ineffective coordinating and harmonisation 
???????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
4. Power deficit of regional institutions: The linkages and mandates of RECs to their member 
states are generally weak in Africa and reflected in the above quotation. This relates to the 
inability of regional bodies to enforce their mandates and protocols. African states hold onto 
their sovereignty and argue that national policy should be the exclusive business of the state, 
creating further complications in aligning regional and national policy frameworks (Nyirabu, 
2004. p. 25). A key challenge to regional integration at the national level is to translate 
commitment into action by ratifying protocols and affording greater attention to regional 
integration in national development plans (ADB, 2009, p. 3-4).This issue has significantly 
stonewalled the co-operation arrangements of member states, and especially in terms of 
economic integration. Regional institutions lack the power to enforce collective decisions and 
protocols made jointly. The lack of centrally co-ordinated mechanisms that can monitor and 
enforce agreed policies and principles is related to the power deficit of regional institutions 
across Africa (Nyirabu, 2004, p. 27). Chingono and Nakara (2009, p. 2) emphasise that 
Eastern and Southern Africa have a limited history of common action and collective policy 
formulation. Nyirabu (2004, p. 26-27) goes on to say that few countries in Southern Africa 
have mechanisms that are responsible for aligning national policy to regional plans through 
constructing separate departments or aligning current ones to the region. Trade driven 
integration may not be beneficial in weak institutional contexts and may further contribute to 
disparities amongst member states (Verdier, 2010, p. 6). This has significantly weakened 
RECs as rules based entities that can enforce compliance and regulate member state 
activities. 
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5. Lack of hard and soft infrastructure: The above-mentioned higher order policy problems 
are reflected in more tangible constraints of regional integration in Africa that fall within the 
ambit of physical integration. The African ?????????????????????????????-2012 Regional 
Integration Strategy document focuses on challenges facing regional integration in Africa, 
and specifically in the domains of hard and soft infrastructure development. It is 
acknowledged that capacity and budgetary constraints as well as governing ownership from a 
variety of stakeholders contribute to the lack of physical integration (ADB, 2009, p. 3). Hard 
infrastructure constraints are perhaps the most practical restriction to economic integration 
and these pertain to surface37 and air,38 as well as energy and information, coupled with 
information communication technology (ICT). These are coupled with soft infrastructure 
constraints such as domestic regulatory regimes that are not harmonised and prescribe to 
national as opposed to regional frameworks. Related to all this is what has been termed as 
???????? ???? ??????? ???????????????????? ???? ?????????????-up of infrastructure, for example, 
have created fragmented systems of administration; few regional or continental networks in 
infrastructure, and general decay in this regard. The soft infrastructure constraints includes 
cumbersome and costly border formalities, an absence of common standards, inconsistent 
(and inconsistently applied) tax policies, countervailing duties, emergency protection to 
address balance of payment problems and discrimination in public procurement (ECA, 2006, 
p. 7). The enablers of integration are increased infrastructure inter-connectivity and more 
homogenous regulatory environments. However, hard and soft infrastructure constraints 
??????? ???????? ???????? ???????????????? ???? ????????? ???????? ????? ???? ????? ?????????? ?????
other regions of the world. 
 
3.5.3.1 Challenges of economic integration in Africa 
Whereas the above outlined problems for regional integration more generally, this section 
focuses more specifically on economic integration.  
 
According to Trivedi (2005, p. 17-21), successful economic integration can only occur if 
certain economic and non-economic preconditions are in place, namely structural stability 
                                                             
37Infrastructure such as roads; railways, and ports. 
38Infrastructure such as airports. 
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(i.e. peace and security), rule of law, good governance and macro-economic and monetary 
stability. In similar vein, Buthulezi (2006, p. 11-12) mentions that key constraints to 
economic integration are differences amongst states that typically encompass income levels, 
development, economic size and infrastructure (i.e. transport; communications, and energy).  
 
Leshaba (2002, p. 4-5) highlights that inappropriate economic policies; inward-looking 
developmental strategies; an emphasis on import substitution behind high barriers to trade; 
lack of political will; local conflicts and civil strife, and insufficient knowledge to implement 
integration measures as well as a lack of private sector involvement manifest the lack of 
increased intra-regional trade within Africa. As noted before, African states are characterised 
by under-development and lack the outlined pre-requisites with regards to economic and non-
economic factors to fully benefit from market integration. In other words, at the outset of 
economic integration, Africa is significantly at a disadvantage and less likely to be able to 
extract any meaningful economic gains given the current economic environment and 
particular individual plight of African states.  
 
The primary motivation for forming RECs and PTAs in Africa is to increase trade between 
member states. When evaluating the outcomes of RECs in Eastern and Southern Africa, intra-
regional trade has not increased substantially since adopting the fundamentals of market 
integration. ???? ????????? ??? ?????? ?????? ????????? ????????? ???? ?????? ???? ?????????? ????
Davies, mentioned that the SADC has significantly lowered tariffs over the last few years. 
Notwithstanding, this has not culminated in an increase in intra-SADC trade. The negligible 
affect that PTAs and by extension RECs had on intra-regional trade indicate that their 
primary rationale has not been met. This can be attributed to, amongst other factors, the fact 
that Africa lacks the supply side industrial base to trade in goods that are subject to the 
lowering tariff barriers.  On average, total exports between African states only accounts for 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
viable if Africa diversifies its economic base to take advantage of the lowering tariff and non-
tariff barriers. 
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African states have been fixated on the static and dynamic benefits of economic integration 
that have done little to improve economic development in Africa. A key approach to 
economic integration in Africa has been to reduce integration to the factors that affect trade in 
goods. The former is a classical way of defining integration. McCarthy (2010, p. 20) notes 
that economic integration agreements in Africa have historically focused on removing tariff 
and non-tariff barriers that ascribe to the classical elements of PTAs. The majority of African 
states are heavily reliant on revenue from tariffs that creates a significant barrier to achieving 
a so-???????????????????????????????? 
 
In addition, McCarthy (2010, p. 20-21) maintains that the classical aspects of integration do 
not necessarily cover trade in services that have been playing a more prominent role in 
supporting trade in goods across various regions. According to UNCTAD (2009, p. 77), a 
remarkable feature of the recent wave of RTAs is the inclusion of provisions in trade in 
services due to amongst others the growth of world goods trade and the emergence of 
international production networks that have highlighted the importance of services and the 
enabling role for telecommunications, finance, logistics and other professional services. None 
of the RECs in Africa have established agreements on trade in services and hence, are falling 
behind other regions of the world in this regard. 
 
The quot?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
??????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
doubts about the approach adopted to addressing factors that inhibit regional 
trade. Barriers to trade that raise the costs of doing business can be classified 
as border or behind-the-border measures, and primarily on tariffs. Tariffs are 
undeniably an important barrier but they may not be the most important one. 
Abundant anecdotal evidence suggests that time-consuming and inefficient 
border procedures may be more important than tariffs in inhibiting intra-
regional trade. Multiple border crossings for goods to reach landlocked 
countries add significantly to the transaction costs of intra-regional tr?????
(WTO World Trade Report, 2011, p. 152). 
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Following from the above quote, it could be deduced that the traditional and strict adherence 
to the linear integration model has not assisted African states in increasing trade amongst 
them. A possible reason for this is that the traditional conception of gains to be acquired by 
entering into PTAs, when viewing the trade creation and diversion effects, focuses on 
finished goods and has been recognised for its limitations in the developing country context 
(Cattaneo, 2008, p. 5). Thus, the traditional analysis has been criticised for its limited 
applicability within the context of developing African countries. Therefore, deeper elements 
of economic integration are required in Africa that would enable much needed trade in the 
goods agenda. Such an approach will assist African states to bridge new generation trade 
issues with the traditional trade in goods agenda. 
 
3.5.3.2 Overlapping Membership 
It has been acknowledged by African leaders that the multi-plicity of overlapping 
memberships in RECs constrain the integration aspirations of the entire region. Overlapping 
membership of RECs is a result of various historic; political, and strategic interests of 
individual states entering into RTAs (Jakobeit et al, 2005, p. 30). The degree of integration of 
the various RECs differs. As a result, as each REC moves deeper into the levels of economic 
integration, it is unfortunately unavoidable that multiple memberships of RECs will become 
legally and technically even harder to maintain. Part of the tensions between the various sub-
regional integration agencies derives from differences in the approach to integration; the 
degree, scope and speed of liberalisation; and the ultimate objective of the integration process 
(Oyejide, 2000, p. 7-16). Some states have sought the benefits of these agreements by 
entering into as many as possible in the region. The corresponding lack of commitment to a 
single REC inherently weakens the integration exercise and places significant constraints on 
all RECs to forward and realise their respective mandates.  
 
Below is an illustration of the overlapping and complex regional arrangements that exist in 
Africa: 
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Figure 3.5: Overlapping membership of regional arrangements in Africa 
 
Source: Keane, Calì and Kennan, 2010, p. 4 
 
The multiplicity of RECs have several drawbacks, namely fragmented economic spaces and 
approaches to regional integration, increased cost of membership in RECs, unhealthy rivalry 
for donor funding, contradictory obligations and loyalties for member states, inconsistent 
objectives and conflicting operational mandates, duplicated efforts and reduced ability for 
RECs to pursue coherent and effective integration programmes (ECA, 2006, p. 7). Member 
states that have overlapping membership make it even harder to facilitate inter-regional trade. 
The reason for this is that a consequence of these overlapping memberships are the adoption 
of different RoO, administrative duplication and fundamentally different trade regimes, 
which ultimately have different costs to doing business (ECA, 2010, p. 4). Viewing 
overlapping membership from this point of departure indicates a lack of a cost benefit 
analysis in entering into regional arrangements and strengthens the view of the ECA (2006) 
that found political reasons to be the major reason for overlapping membership with 
economic factors taking the proverbial back seat. 
 
The three recognised RECs in Eastern and Southern Africa have expressed their willingness 
to move deeper into the levels of economic integration. However, the EAC is already a CU; 
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the SADC has an FTA in place, and COMESA has established a CU in 2009 comprising a 
few commodities. The overlapping membership issue is most complex in Eastern and 
Southern Africa. For example, COMESA has six countries (i.e. the DRC; Madagascar; 
Malawi; Mauritius; Seychelles, and Swaziland) that overlaps with the SADC, and two (i.e. 
Burundi and Kenya) that overlaps with the EAC. Similarly, the SADC has four member 
states (i.e. Botswana; Lesotho; Namibia, and Swaziland) with SACU membership and one 
with EAC membership; while all of these members are also part of a CU. The EAC shares 
three states (i.e. Burundi; Kenya, and Rwanda) with COMESA and one (i.e. Tanzania) with 
SADC. From this it can be viewed that the three RECs are presently in competition with each 
other, presenting opportunities for conflict instead of co-operation. 
 
Within the region there is currently an emerging CU issue. The EAC shares four members 
with COMESA and one with SADC; five SADC members are part of the SACU and also 
shares eight members with COMESA as well as one from the EAC. COMESA shares eight 
members with SADC and one with the EAC. Therefore, 10 members across the SADC, 
COMESA and EAC are part of CUs. All of them are negotiating alternative CUs to the ones 
they currently belong to. COMESA and the SADC have seven members in common that is 
not part of CUs but is preparing ones with SADC and COMESA (COMESA-EAC-SADC, 
2008, p. 2). There is no rationale for member states to be part of two customs unions with 
different external tariffs unless tariff regimes are rationalised (Jakobeit et al, 2005, p. x and 
Buthulezi, 2006, p. 3). It is however important to note that none of the RECs in the region has 
actually progressed to a fully-fledged CU (McCarthy, 2010, p. 8). This situation has, as was 
mentioned in chapter one, culminated into the so-???????????????????????????????????????????????
arrangements, and this is making it hard for individual states to maintain and start programs 
of any of the regional bodies they belong to (Baldwin, 2006, p. 11-34 and Draper, Halleson 
and Alves, 2007, p. 25-29).  
 
Overlapping membership is especially inhibiting to the goal of African economic integration 
and the ARIP. The latter relies heavily on the ability of RECs to cooperate with each other 
and not compete in order to form the AEC. The duplication, competition and lack of a clearly 
defined rationale, which is encapsulated in the overlapping membership issue, illustrate that 
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harmonisation and rationalisation might be the only answer to overcoming multiple trade 
regimes in the COMESA, EAC and SADC. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter provided an overview of regional integration in Africa. An historical account 
was given by exploring the colonial and independence periods which illustrated the 
continents unique developmental circumstances. Those circumstances have influenced the 
way African states view and pursued regional integration since independence. The rationale 
for regional integration has not changed since independence; it is still about overcoming the 
legacies of the past and uniting Africa in political and economic terms. However, the 
strategies employed by African states, especially with regard to regional integration have 
changed. They are now geared towards neo liberal market integration strategy across the 
??????????????????? ???? ???????? ???????????? ???????????? ?????????? ??????? ???????? ?????? ?????
Africa is struggling to reap any benefits from market integration with many challenges to 
consider, including factors that straddle the rationale for market integration, ability for 
African states to extract gains given their particular low levels of development and 
overlapping membership of RECs. The T-FTA is born out of the challenges that Africa face 
by utilising market integration. The next chapter elaborates on the emergence of the T-FTA 
against the backdrop of the challenges mentioned above.  
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Chapter 4: The Tri-partite Free Trade Area  
4.1 Introduction 
The idea of a Tri-partite Free Trade Area (T-FTA) has been pursued by the COMESA, EAC 
and SADC as a response to the growing contradictions that are materialising in Eastern and 
Southern Africa in terms of regional integration. This has been viewed more generally as a 
promising move towards rationalising the integration processes in the region. However, for 
the T-FTA to become a credible initiative, it will need to be more pragmatic about the 
challenges that are facing regional integration in Eastern and Southern Africa.  
 
A key aim of this chapter is to elaborate on what the T-FTA is and vice versa. It is worth 
mentioning at this point that the stance of this study is not to regard the T-FTA as strictly 
about creating an enlarged FTA. Importantly, the tri-partite process offers much more than 
just a narrow quest towards economic integration, which has been the norm of the second 
wave of integration in Africa. Certainly, an economic rationale will be shown to be one of the 
primary factors that have motivated the emergence and conception of the tri-partite initiative. 
Nevertheless, a general contextualisation of the realities; aspirations, and challenges of the T-
FTA will illustrate how the T-FTA draws from, and impact on far more than simply just 
economic factors. 
 
The evolution of the tri-partite initiative since the 2008 Summit will be explored in order to 
assess the key areas and analytical work done leading up to the negotiations. Even though the 
T-FTA is important, there are many other positive developments to consider in terms of 
moving towards a more holistic approach to the problems that are facing regional integration 
in Africa. This is why exploring the progression of the tri-partite process since the 2008 
Summit is imperative to get an overview of all programs of work that are being instituted or 
developed. By exploring all of these, it will become clear that there is a much more holistic 
interpretation of the challenges that are facing the successful implementation of an FTA in all 
the regions concerned. 
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Lastly, The WTO provides the international framework for FTAs and CUs; and as a 
consequence it is important to note the requirements for them at the multi-lateral level. The 
former will provide a firm understanding of what the T-FTA agreement would be reviewed 
against in order to qualify as such at the global level. The majority of tri-partite member 
states are members of the WTO and as such have to give notification of an FTA or CU 
grouping (Erasmus, 2011, p. 86). The chapter aims to give a broad account of the T-FTA and 
its revised draft agreement leading up to the negotiations that are in place at the time of 
writing.  
 
4.2 Contextualising the T-FTA 
The globalised economy and the dominance of neo-liberal development paradigms have led 
to the notion that increasing trade is generally good for economic growth and development in 
states. African policy makers too, have come to view growing trade between African states as 
a way to achieve economic development and growth. The plethora of regional initiatives and 
more specifically RECs are a justification of this viewpoint regarding Africa. The previous 
chapter highlighted the growth of regional integration in Africa and that RECs have utilised 
market integration to forward the agenda of increasing trade amongst them. This section 
elaborates on that discussion, but more specifically turns the focus to the T-FTA. 
 
4.2.1 Why FTAs are important in Africa and the T-FTA 
Africa lacks a good track record with regards to the implementation of FTAs between states 
in the RECs. This is particularly crucial when considering the multiplicity of these RECs in 
Eastern and Southern Africa. The strict adherence to the linear progression of market 
integration in Africa is problematic because the Euro-centric idea of how to move towards 
closer economic unification through market integration is not easily applicable to the African 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
regional trade, or to enhance the global trade performance of African countries, raises 
questions about the appropriateness of the linear model for addressing the real challenges that 
???????? ????????? ????????? ???? ??????? ?????? ????????????? ??????????rg, 2011b, p. 12). 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
must have a purpose, goals or objectives that continue to create such a need; optimism and 
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belief in their benefits? It will be argued here that PTAs are pursued to increase trade as well 
as for reasons of political solidarity to achieve developmental goals. 
 
James Gathii (2011, p. xxix) says the following about the nature of RTAs in Africa: 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
market-led integration. Instead, they are largely designed as forums for a 
variety of initiatives, such as facilitating cooperation around common 
resources... and cross border challenges that include trade, security and 
health... Rather than simply using the expansion of intra-regional trade as a 
framework for industrial growth, product diversification and the improvement 
of the global competitiveness of these products as ways of overcoming small 
domestic markets, African RTAs were and continue to be seen as frameworks 
for development cooperation as well. This approach to integration is therefore 
committed to cooperation at the level of production in the arenas of capital and 
labour, as well as to coordinated programming and infrastructural 
????????????? 
 
The unique African historical context has to a large degree disadvantaged the prospects for 
development that encompass a much wider set of challenges than just strictly economic 
considerations, and they are in many respects challenges that are beyond the scope and/ or 
jurisdiction of individual states. Africa has in this context used RTAs in order to formalise 
and legalise groupings as a strategy to bind them together in a more comprehensive manner. 
From the above quotation it is clear that economic integration, which is fostered by RTAs in 
Africa, have a wider mandate (Gatthi, 2011, p. xxix). For example, creating the T-FTA 
increases the reach of regionalism in Africa, and more so than any individual REC. Member 
states thus have a mechanism that binds them closer together in terms of economic 
integration at the tri-partite level.  
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A key the??? ????????????????? ????????? ?????????????? ????????? ???????????????? ???? ???-partite 
process in particular, is a renewed push to increase intra-regional trade. As will be shown in 
this chapter and the next, the RECs in the regions are for the most part WTO-compliant in 
terms of multi-lateral norms that have been established to facilitate freer trade. This is in line 
with the notion that trading on the multi-lateral level is a primary goal of all states in the 
current international system. However, the emergence of the tri-partite process as well as the 
challenges it presents, indicate that it is primarily focused on improving intra-regional trade 
first. Between 2000 and 2009, intra-REC exports in the SADC stood at 9.5 percent; while it 
was 5.4 and 8 percent in the COMESA and EAC, respectively. For its part, intra-REC 
imports stood at an average of 15 percent. It should be stressed, though that this figure is 
misleading because the imports are only destined for a few countries (Hartzenberg, 2011b, p. 
11-12). According to the ECA (2010, p. 61-69) Africa has to increase intra-regional trade 
given the current global economic consensus, where the logic is that increased trade promotes 
growth. Thus, increased intra-regional trade amongst African states will, following the afore-
mentioned logic, bolster economic growth and development outcomes, which in turn could 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
activities that generate wealth. It should be kept in mind that the basis for forming FTAs 
between partner states is to improve trade and the tri-partite initiative places a high premium 
on this objective.  
 
4.2.2 The tri-partite process and Africa 
The T-FTA should not be solely viewed as an FTA. The tri-partite process has emerged since 
its inaugural political Summit in 2008 as an enlarged framework to promote a key element of 
the AEC, namely co-operation on a wide scale amongst the three RECs. The T-FTA is the 
most ambitious regional integration undertaking Africa has proposed since establishing the 
Treaty of Abuja and politicians see it as one of the building blocks in creating a single 
African economic and monetary area (i.e. with a single currency and central bank, like the 
EU) by 2025 (Bisseker, 2011). The three RECs are building blocks to the formation of the 
AEC and in line with this they are implementing regional integration programmes in trade 
and economic development by establishing FTAs, CUs, MUs and CMs as well as regional 
infrastructure development programmes in ICT, transport and energy as a first step in 
contributing to the establishment of the AEC (COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2008, p. 2). 
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Accordingly, the scope of the tri-partite process on a fundamental level includes a focus on 
overcoming the challenges that limit the ability of African states to move towards forming the 
pan-African ideal of forming the AEC. 
 
The tri-partite process, which was endorsed by African leaders in June 2011, has received 
widespread praise on a continental level and is viewed by the AU as an initiative that can 
assist in reaching the pan-African goals of the continent (Kulabako, 2011).  The AUC (2011, 
p. 11), instituted its Minimum Integration Plan as a guideline to further garner continental 
coherence in the process of regional integration in Africa, and has acknowledged the possible 
value of the T-????? ??? ????? ???????? ???? ????? ??????? ???????????? ???? ?????? ?????????? ???
member states to more than one REC, it is observed that in pursuance of the new approach of 
cooperation and harmonisation of programmes between the RECs, concretised by the 
initiative taken by the three RECs (T-FTA) namely COMESA, EAC and SADC, this problem 
would not be an obstacle to the integration process in Africa if and only if this example is 
crowned with success. This ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the AUC views the T-FTA as a strategy that can mitigate the effects of the overlapping 
membership issue in the Eastern and Southern African regions, as well as provide a workable 
model in achieving effective and comprehensive economic integration viewed against the 
backdrop of pan-African continental economic unity.  
 
The pan-African ideal behind the T-FTA is strengthened by the following: 
??????-FTA is not an ad hoc plan. It is linked to the implementation of an 
African programme on continental integration, while being anchored in 
????????? ????????? ????????????? ??? ??? ????????? ??? ?????? ?????? ?????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????as. There are 
suggestions now to use this COMESA-EAC-SADC FTA as the core building 
block for establishing a continental FTA by 2017 and a ??? ??? ??????
(Erasmus & Hartzenberg, 2012, p. 4). 
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The figure below provides a geographical representation of the contribution that the T-FTA 
could make towards a continental FTA. 
 
 
According to Woolfrey (2011); Erasmus (2011, p. 96), and Hartzenberg (2011b, p. 20), the 
framework around which the T-FTA is to be realised are based on three pillars, namely 
market integration, infrastructure development and industrial development, coupled with a 
developmental approach. Cattaneo (2008, p. 5) notes that a development integration approach 
uses economic integration as a vehicle for regional industrial development by lowering the 
costs of protecting industrial sectors. This is achieved by a larger regional market coupled 
with cooperation in transport and infrastructure development.  
 
4.2.3 The immediate challenges and opportunity 
The immediate challenge of the T-FTA will be to consolidate the wide variations in economic 
development amongst partner states. Chapter two illustrated that for economic integration to 
occur on a sustainable basis there has to be congruence in developmental levels in order to 
foster trust and avoid marginalisation of weaker states. The table below encompass key 
economic and other indicators for the 26 member states that are currently negotiating the T-
FTA. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Geographic representation of the T-FTA 
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Table 4.1: Tri-???????? ????????????????onomies; population size, and other indicators 
Number Country GDP USD % share 
of total 
GDP 
Population % share of 
total 
population 
GDP per 
capita 
1 Angola 75,492,890,278 8.79 18,497,632 3.15 6,187 
2 Botswana 11,822,741,858 1.38 1,949,780 0.33 6,064 
3 Burundi 1,325,009,348 0.15 8,303,330 1.41 160 
4 Comoros 535,336,308 0.06 659,093 0.11 812 
5 DRC 10,575,489,480 1.23 71,712,867 12.21 147 
6 Djibouti  1,049,054,417 0.12 864,202 0.15 1,214 
7 Egypt 188,412,876,658 21.94 82,999,393 14.14 2,270 
8 Eritrea 1,873,235,772 0.22 5,073,279 0.86 369 
9 Ethiopia 28,526,277,751 3.32 82,824,732 14.11 344 
10 Kenya 29,375,775,194 3.42 39,802,015 6.78 738 
11 Lesotho 1,578,614,711 0.18 2,066,919 0.35 764 
12 Libya 62,360,446,571 7.26 6,419,925 1.09 9,714 
13 Madagascar 8,589,541,847 1.00 19,625,030 3.34 438 
14 Malawi 4,727,486,011 0.55 15,263,417 2.60 310 
15 Mauritius 8,588,729,727 1.00 1,275,323 0.22 6,735 
16 Mozambique 9,790,246,565 1.14 22,894,294 3.90 428 
17 Namibia 9,264,803,489 1.08 2,171,137 0.37 4,267 
18 Rwanda 5,215,852,721 0.61 9,997,614 1.70 522 
19 Seychelles 764,296,578 0.09 87,972 0.01 8,688 
20 South Africa 285,365,879,676 33.23 49,320,150 8.40 5,786 
21 Sudan 54,680,784,788 6.37 42,272,435 7.20 1,294 
22 Swaziland 3,000,995,335 0.35 1,184,936 0.20 2,533 
23 Tanzania 21,368,198,751 2.49 43,739,051 7.45 489 
24 Uganda 16,042,841,225 1.87 32,709,865 5.57 490 
25 Zambia 12,805,027,606 1.49 12,935,368 2.20 990 
26 Zimbabwe 5,625,000,000 0.66 12,522,784 2.13 449 
Total  858,757,432,665 100.00 587,172,543 100.00  
Source: Kalenga, 2011a, p. 6 
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The above table highlights that the combined GDP of the 26 countries are $858 billion with a 
population of over 587 million people. This is a significantly larger market than any single 
REC. If and when realised, the T-FTA would only be rivalled by China and India in terms of 
market size and would be ranked 15th in the IMFs list of world economies by nominal GDP 
(van den Bosch, 2010). The tri-partite region would in strict economic terms have a larger 
scope to be able to reap the benefits of economies of scale, industrial diversification and 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
competitiveness in the global economy (Woolfrey, 2011). Africa has since the first wave of 
regional integration explicitly stated that these are the benefits they hope to achieve through 
regional integration. These figures suggest that the T-FTA would provide a sturdy platform to 
achieve these benefits.  
 
The 26 member states that form the tri-partite region are significantly different from each 
other in economic terms. For instance, Angola; Libya, and Sudan account for 22 percent of 
???? ??????? ????????? ????? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ????????? ??? ????? ????????????? ????? ?????
almost no industrial base to speak of. For their part, Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Rwanda, Seychelles, Swaziland and Zimbabwe contribute less than a 
percent individually since they, together, only account for three percent of the GDP in the tri-
partite region. Egypt, Kenya and South Africa are the most diversified economies with a 
relatively large industrial base and account for roughly 60 percent of the total GDP, with 
South Africa being responsible for a third of the total economic value of the tri-partite region.  
 
It is often assumed that the most developed economies in the region stand to gain more from 
the envisaged FTA, while others might be confronted with possible economic polarisation 
(Kalenga, 2011a, p. 7). In fact, it has been debated that an enlarged market (which is a strong 
driver for economic integration) between countries of unequal size or levels of development 
will mainly benefit producers in stronger economies such as South Africa (Cattaneo, 2008, p. 
13). This then also accounts for the most pressing concern regarding the market integration 
aspect of the tri-partite process. 
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Table 4.1 above indicates that the wide variation in the capability of partner states will mean 
that during the negotiations each state will bring different interests to the table. This will 
provide a significant challenge given the difficulties already experienced at REC level to 
reach consensus. This reality is a significant challenge moving forward and will require 
effective dispute settlement mechanisms to resolve the economic conflicts that might emerge 
given the size and heterogeneous make-up of the tri-partite region. It is clear that the T-FTA 
will be difficult to realise, especially within the stipulated timeframes. 
 
4.2.4 Fundamental Challenges 
The multiplicity of regional initiatives and the corresponding overlapping and conflicting 
trade regimes have led to tremendous challenges in removing the barriers to trade within 
Eastern and Southern Africa. In turn, this gave rise to a large body of research that has called 
for member states to choose one regional arrangement or begin a process of harmonisation 
and rationalising of the existing regional configurations. Trade experts warn of potential legal 
issues given that regional trade blocs already exist and could in themselves be barriers to an 
enlarged FTA. Also, RECs have failed to take advantage of FTAs on a smaller scale within 
themselves (Palitza, 2011). The emergence of the tri-partite initiative, though, indicates that 
harmonising and rationalising the existing regional arrangements are the way forward to 
overcome multiple memberships as well as to build a more comprehensive and unified 
regional approach. 
 
The likelihood of a successful T-FTA will depend on the willingness of states to prioritise a 
regional agenda over the narrow nationalistic tendencies in Africa. That said, if certain 
countries attempt to dominate negotiations by pushing for national as opposed to regional 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? inequalities 
in and between the different regions are at risk of being intensified at an even greater scale 
(Palitza, 2011). This could pose a significant challenge in realising an enlarged FTA, because 
national self-interest behaviour will ultimately pit countries against each other based on their 
economic strength, or conversely, there lack thereof (Palitza, 2011). Thus, the tripartite 
process, especially the market integration aspect of it, has the potential to de-generate the 
integration process in the regions. States will have to act in good faith and be willing to 
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compromise in order to pursue goals and objectives that extend beyond their narrow national 
interests. 
 
4.3 Progress of the T-FTA: Preparation for Negotiations 
The tri-partite process has been significantly refined since its official political endorsement 
during the 2008 Summit, and for this reason, it is necessary to describe its evolution since 
then. This is needed in order to clarify what its actual purpose is presently. Such a description 
will be a useful exercise, because it will eliminate any confusion regarding the processes 
envisioned in creating the T-FTA. Also, it will help in clarifying what the tri-partite process 
is and is not, furthering the understanding of what can be expected from the negotiations 
moving forward. Further to this, a key aim of this section is to make clear that the T-FTA 
should not be viewed strictly as an economic exercise. Rather, it has since its official 
establishment in 2008 emerged as an enlarged inter-REC regional forum where key issues 
????? ????? ????? ????????? ??????????? ????? ????????? ????????? ???? ??? ?????????? ?????????????
interesting about the evolution of the tri-partite initiative is that it has already, to be 
elaborated on below, achieved progress in advancing a purposive move towards the 
integration process in Eastern and Southern Africa by conceptualising what such a process 
should ideally encompass.  
 
The intention of the next section is to illustrate the progression of the tri-partite initiative by 
exploring the documents that emanated from the working processes thereof. Providing a 
primary account of what the tri-partite initiative aims to achieve, these documents include; 
the: 
? 2008 Political Summit document; 
? 2011 Progress Report on the 2008 Summit decisions;  
? Memorandum of Understanding (MoU); and  
? Draft Roadmap for negotiations and Negotiating Principles, Processes and 
Institutional Framework.  
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Figure 4.2: Interpretation of the tripartite initiatives primary documents  
 
 
4.3.1 The 2008 Summit  
The purpose of the Summit was to provide a platform for the three RECs to discuss and make 
decisions on areas that enhance integration amongst them (COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2008, p. 
3).39 This is a formalisation of the cooperation that was already in place following the 
agreements and decisions as concluded between the COMESA and SADC secretariats in 
2005. The EAC was co-opted by the COMESA and SADC secretariats, and this led to the 
creation of the Tri-partite Task Force (TTF). The TTF met several times since its inception, 
discussing and cooperating on programmes focusing on harmonisation of programmes that 
are already underway in individual RECs in the areas of trade, customs, free movement of 
people, and infrastructure development.  
 
 ????????????????????????????ummit is to provide strategic and policy direction 
relating to cooperation on trade and economic liberalisation including a 
roadmap for establishing a pan-African regional FTA encompassing the three 
RECs and a joint programme for free movement of persons and infrastructure 
?????????????(COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2008, p. 3).40  
 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-EAC-SADC in the 
???????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
                                                             
39 See paragraph 8 of the First COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit document. 
40 See paragraph 9 of the First COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit document. 
The 2008 political 
summit 
Progress report on 
2008 summit decisions
Memorandum of 
Understanding
Roadmap for 
negotiations
Negotiating principles, 
processes and 
institutional 
framework
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has been mainly informed by the emergent CU issue that seems to be an inevitable outcome 
??? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????
led to the recognition by the three RECs of the need to initiate a process of coordination and 
harmonisation of their regional integration programmes as a way of mitigating the challenge 
??? ???????????? ??????????? (COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2008, p. 3).41 In addition to 
overlapping membership, the following have been highlighted as challenges by the 
COMESA-EAC-SADC (2008, p. 7) for inter-REC integration:42 
 
? ????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
RECs with different trade regimes; 
? Multiplicity of trade regimes and instruments for different trade arrangements which 
have created legal and administrative bottlenecks; 
? Market expansion restriction due to varying tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade 
between RECs; 
? Lack of competitiveness at regional and international levels; 
? Varying trade facilitation instruments between regions which impact on inter regional 
business activity; 
? Unattractive investment environment across the regions; 
? Restrictions in the movement of persons, in particular business persons; 
? Limited capacity development; 
? Underdeveloped regional infrastructure; and 
? Low levels of industrial developments.? 
 
It is clear that the dominant challenges informing the working processes of the tri-partite 
initiative are economic in nature. As a result, the move towards advising on creating a pan-
African FTA between the COMESA-EAC-SADC makes sense. Promising in this regard is 
that the T-FTA is to be based on a process of coordination and harmonisation of existing 
programmes to build on the successes and mitigate the negative aspects that have surfaced in 
the regions. One of the key problems of regional integration is the competition that exists 
                                                             
41 See paragraph 5 of the First COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit document. 
42 See paragraph 26 of the First COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit document. 
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between RECs that had a ripple effect in terms of cooperation between them. The Summit 
formalised a forum for interaction and this serves as an avenue for the RECs to cooperate and 
work together to solve the disagreements amongst them. 
 
The following strategies were highlighted by the COMESA-EAC-SADC (2008, p. 7) for 
inter-REC integration, namely:43 
? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
? Enhancing inter-REC economic cooperation; 
? Facilitating free movement of business persons; 
? Enhancing cooperation with multilateral and bilateral partners; 
? Promoting industrialisation; and 
? Enabling intra-regional investments.? 
 
These strategies indicate the dominant areas that the tri-partite initiative will be based on. 
Topping the agenda is the promotion of trade arrangements amongst the RECs; this is where 
the enlarged FTA emanates from. Enhancing inter-REC economic cooperation deals with the 
issues that relate to an FTA but are not explicit elements of a trade agreement. Typically they 
are deeper elements of economic integration, including the movement of business people. 
Enhancing cooperation with bi-and multi-lateral partners reflect the need in the regions to 
work towards common positions with external actors. This could be facilitated on a multi-
lateral level with the WTO, and on an inter-regional level with, for example, the EU. 
Promoting industrialisation and enabling intra-regional investments point towards a 
realisation of the need to enter into production sharing and fragmented trade, and this will be 
explored later in this chapter. 
 
The COMESA-EAC-SADC (2008, p. 7) notes the objectives of inter-REC trade 
arrangements and are to:44  
? ???????????????????????????region by creating a wider market; 
                                                             
43 See paragraph 25 of the First COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit document. 
44 See paragraph 27 of the First COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit. 
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? Increase inter-REC and extra-REC investment flows; 
? Enhance competitiveness of the region through improved production efficiency and 
value addition; 
? Develop cross-regional infrastructure; 
? Develop inter-REC financial and capital architecture; and 
? ??????????? ???? ????????? ???????????? ?????????? ??? ????????????? ???? ?????????? ??????
?????????????? 
 
The objectives underlined above are expected outcomes in creating an enlarged FTA.45 
Indeed, this has the potential to reap economies of scale. Investment between partner states in 
the RECs is critical for diversification of industry and extra-regional flows are important for 
capturing FDI. Hence, the trade arrangements are envisioned to create an enabling 
environment to facilitate investment both within and from the outside, presumably with 
traditional and if possible new development partners. Developing cross-regional 
??????????????? ??? ??? ???????????? ???????? ??? ???? ??? ???? ?????? ?????????????? ?????????? ????
reflects the need to enhance the physical connectivity of member states in order to facilitate 
smoother movement of goods for trade. The requisite inter-REC financial and capital 
architecture will be needed to create the platform from which payments and investments can 
be made easily accessible. Including negotiating positions in both the bi-and multi-lateral 
contexts are significant, because it could impact on existing trade arrangements as well as 
new ones such as the T-???? ??????????? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ??????? ???? ?????? ??????????????
objectives are aimed at achieving a wide range of goals that if realised could greatly 
strengthen regional integration in Africa. 
 
The document culminating from the 2008-Summit proceeds to stress the following crucial to 
enhancing inter-REC economic cooperation (COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2008, p. 7): 
? Promoting inter-REC investment flows; 
? Co-operation regarding competition policy; 
? Effective financial and payment systems; 
? Co-operation in terms of developing capital markets;  
                                                             
45 Also, see the discussion on the primary drivers for the T-FTA in section 4.2.3 of this study 
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? Development and cooperation with regards to commodity exchanges; and 
? The free movement of business persons; by means of a binding agreement or 
protocol.46 
 
In addition, the areas of co-operation in terms of EPAs and WTO trade negotiations are 
also emphasised (COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2008, p. 10).47 The idea is to create greater 
convergence regionally in relation to third parties (in this case the EU) and eventually 
moving towards common approaches in the context of multi-lateral trade negotiations. It 
should be stressed that issues pertaining promoting industrialisation and enabling intra-
regional investments have no priority areas for co-operation, which suggests that work on 
conceptualisation still needs to be done in these areas. 
 
Keeping the above in mind, the following areas were recommended as programmes of work 
vital to economic cooperation between the RECs (COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2008, p. 10-11): 
? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
years;  
? The three RECs should develop a roadmap within six months for the establishment of 
the proposed FTA taking into account the principle of variable geometry;  
? Direct the secretariats to develop a legal and institutional framework as a constituent 
part of the roadmap; direct member states to facilitate freer movement  of business 
persons across the three RECs in one year;  
? Direct the secretariats of the three RECs to develop joint programmes that enhance 
cooperation and strengthen coordination on competition policy, financial and 
payments systems, capital markets, commodity exchanges and industrial policies; and 
? Direct the three secretariats to coordinate and develop common positions on the EPA 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
                                                             
46 See paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38 and 39 of the First COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit 
document. 
47 See paragraphs 40, 41, 42 and 43 of the First COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit document. 
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The Summit acknowledged that the above-mentioned areas of co-operation in trade 
liberalisation and economic cooperation are not on their own able to facilitate economic 
integration as well as overcoming the wide range of challenges in Eastern and Southern 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? own, cannot have the 
desired effects in terms of promoting economic growth and poverty reduction. Inadequate 
investments in infrastructure, services and utilities coupled with skills deficiency and 
inappropriate reforms of the regulatory regimes among others, have led to depressed socio-
economic development. Enhancing physical interconnectivity therefore, is an important 
factor in speeding up development and facilitating inter-????????? ??????? (COMESA-EAC-
SADC, 2008, p. 11).48  
 
The state of infrastructure was identified as key to the lack of competitiveness and physical 
connectivity between states in the region. Based on this, the Summit recommended that the 
TTF gives attention to the following areas with regards to infrastructure (COMESA-EAC-
SADC, 2008, p. 22):49  
? ??????????????????????????????????????????? 
? Develop a joint programme for the implementation of an accelerated, seamless inter-
regional ICT broadband infrastructure network; 
? Develop a harmonised policy and regulatory framework that will govern ICT and 
infrastructural development in the three RECs; 
? Coordinate and harmonise the Regional Transport Master Plans of the three RECs; 
and 
? Coordinate and harmonise the Regional Energy Priority Investment Plans and the 
Regional Energy Master Plans of the three ?????? 
 
Another important area that the Summit document highlighted is the need to establish a legal 
and institutional framework. The TTF was established at the level of the Secretariats, but this 
is not enough to facilitate the broad agenda of the tri-partite initiative. Accordingly, the 
                                                             
48 See paragraph 45 of the First COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit document. 
49 See paragraph 100 of the First COMESA-EAC SADC Tripartite Summit document. 
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envisioned institutional structure of the tri-partite Framework will consist of the following, 
namely (COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2008, p. 23):50  
? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
? Tripartite Council of Ministers; 
? Tripartite Sectoral Ministerial Committee on Trade, Customs and Economic Matters; 
? Tripartite Sectoral Ministerial Committee on Infrastructure; and 
? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
4.3.2 The 2011 Tri-partite Task Force Progress Report on 2008 Summit Decisions 
The 2011 Tripartite Task Force Progress Report assesses the status of implementation of the 
various decisions made at the 2008-Summit. Broadly contextualised, the document covers 
trade, customs and economic integration; infrastructure and trade facilitation; joint financing 
and implementation for infrastructure development; legal and institutional framework, and 
the merger of COMESA, EAC, and SADC. It illustrates that the tri-partite framework has 
already progressed in a variety of areas.51  
 
4.3.3 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Inter-Regional Cooperation and Integration 
(2011)52 lays out the basis for relations between the three RECs in terms of moving towards 
the broad goals of the tri-partite initiative. It basically formalises the decisions made at the 
2008-Summit and provides the institutional framework around which future tri-partite 
working processes will be conducted. The COMESA-EAC-SADC (2011b, p. 3) mentions 
that cooperation between the parties shall relate but will not be restricted to the following 
areas:53 
 
                                                             
50 See paragraph 103 of the First COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit document. 
51 The purposes of this chapter are only to highlight the technical work that has already been done in moving 
towards the negotiations. The detail of the areas of progress will be reserved for chapter five which deals with 
prospects and challenges of the T-FTA. 
52 From here on the MoU will be cited as COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2011b. 
53 See Article 1 (3) of the MoU on inter regional cooperation and integration. 
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? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ishing an FTA and any 
other deeper form of integration agreed by the RECs; 
? Development of programmes to enhance movement of business persons, labour and 
services across the region; 
? Development of joint infrastructure programmes, financing and implementation; 
? Development of joint programmes for agriculture development and food security; 
? Maintenance of close collaboration in preparation of common regional positions and 
strategies in multilateral and international trade fora; and 
? Other activities of mutual int????????? ??????????????????????????????????? 
 
Thus, the MoU has formalised the resolutions taken at the 2008 Summit.54  
 
The most important element emanating from the MoU is the establishment of a Tri-partite 
Coordination Mechanism, with the following organs (COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2011b, p. 5):55 
? ????? ??????????? ??????? ?????? ????? ????? ??? ?????? ????? ?????? ???? ?????? ???? ??? ????
highest organ of the tripartite arrangement; 
? The Tripartite Council of Ministers meeting at least once every two years; 
? The Tripartite Sectoral Ministerial Committee on Trade, Finance, Customs, Economic 
Matters and Internal Affairs; as well as Tripartite Sectoral Committees on 
Infrastructure and legal affairs that has to meet at least once every year; 
? Any other Ministerial Committees that the Tripartite Council of Ministers may 
establish to meet at least once a year; 
? Tripartite Committees of Senior Officials and of experts which shall meet at least 
once every year; 
? Tripartite Task Force of the Secretariats of the three RECs which will meet at least 
?????????????? 
 
                                                             
54 See Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the MoU on inter regional cooperation and integration. 
55 See Article 6 of the MoU on inter regional cooperation and integration. 
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To further the enmeshment of the tri-partite initiative within the individual RECs, it is 
???????????? ????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????????? ??????? ???? ???????????? ?? ?????????? ????? ???? ????
coordination of the mechanism for the harmonisat???? ??? ???? ??????????? ??????? ????? 
(COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2011b, p. 6).56 Collectively, the three units are known as the Tri-
partite Coordination Secretariat and they will meet every six months to review the 
implementation of the MoU. It is clear that for the tri-partite initiative to achieve 
harmonisation and coordination it will require an institutional presence in each REC. 
 
4.3.4 Roadmap for Negotiations 
The Draft Roadmap for Establishing the T-FTA provides an activity matrix with the 
negotiations designated to transpire over a five year period that is from January 2011 to 
January 2016. The Roadmap puts forward the sequence of events and processes of work that 
has led up to the negotiations as well as the time-frames for the realisation of the phases in 
which the T-FTA will be concluded. The first step according to the Roadmap is the signing of 
the MoU by the REC chairpersons by January 2011, while the Tri-partite Ministerial 
Committee; Council, and Summit were supposed to meet between May and June 2011. In 
addition, the principles; processes, and institutional framework as well as the Draft Roadmap 
for establishing the T-FTA were also to be approved during the afore-mentioned period 
(COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2011c, p. 1). The above-mentioned deadlines were all met on time 
by the relevant people and institutions.  
 
Following from the above, the post-launch pre-negotiations preparations have taken place 
with a time frame of six to twelve months. During this phase, information exchange, 
including applied national tariffs and trade data as well as measures have been circulated. 
Adopting Terms of Reference (TOR) and rules of procedure follows; with adoption of a 
schedule for negotiations; with an applicable monitoring and evaluation mechanism 
established. National negotiating positions will be prepared for core FTA items that will lay 
the foundation for negotiations. The actual negotiations will commence after these processes 
have been finalised. 
                                                             
56 See Article 6 (6) of the MoU on inter regional cooperation and integration. 
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According to the COMESA-EAC-SADC (2011c, p. 1) Phase 1 will last for a period of 
between 24 to 60 months with two separate tracks that will run parallel to each other. The 
tracks consist of trade in goods and movement of business persons. Phase 1 will undergo a 
continuous review by the Ministerial Council with a provision to revise the timeline of the 
roadmap upon review. Phase 2 will only occur once Phase 1 has been concluded implying 
that the deeper elements of PTAs, such as services, Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and 
competition are not a priority at this stage of the T-FTA. 
 
4.3.5 Negotiation Principles, Processes and Institutional Framework 
Thus far, the first political Summit in 2008 was discussed, followed by a brief overview of 
the 2011 progress report of said Summit and its resolutions. These two documents indicate 
that the tri-partite initiative is not solely an economic exercise, and more importantly, that 
progress has been made to get negotiations underway. The MoU was then perused in order to 
show that the foundation for future relations between tri-partite states has been laid. The 
Roadmap for establishing the T-FTA has been conceived and illustrates that a timeline has 
????? ???? ???? ?????????????? ?????????? ?????? ???? ????????????? ???????????? ??????????? ????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????sis for how negotiations should 
proceed. 
 
?????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????57 provides the 
general areas of significance that form part of the T-FTA negotiations. It notes that these 
negotiations will be effected in two phases. On the one hand, the first will cover tariff 
liberalisation, RoO, dispute resolution, customs procedures and simplification of customs 
documentation, transit procedures, non-tariff barriers, trade remedies, technical barriers to 
trade and SPS measures. It should be stressed that the movement of business people are to 
occur during the same phase on a parallel but separate track. On the other hand, the second 
phase will cover trade in services; intellectual property rights; competition policy; trade, and 
development as well as competitiveness.  
                                                             
57 From here on cited as COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2011d. 
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The COMESA-EAC-SADC (2011d, p. 1-2) highlight that negotiations of the T-FTA 
agreement are guided by the following: 
? The negotiations will be member and partner state driven: Being member and partner 
state driven means that the T-FTA agreement negotiations will not be an REC 
negotiation, except where CUs are in effect such as the EAC and SACU countries. 
Thus, the negotiations will largely be an individual state to state interaction that is 
going to attempt bringing 26 member states together and give them space to articulate 
their own interests instead of regional goals. 
? Variable geometry: Variable geometry is an important aspect to include in the 
negotiating context because it allows groupings within economic arrangements to 
move faster ahead with liberalisation than others. For example, the EAC is viewed as 
a fast track of COMESA. In this way, those member states and REC groupings that 
are at a fairly advanced stage of economic integration will be allowed to continue 
doing so. 
? Flexibility and special and differential treatment: Including flexibility, coupled with 
special and differential treatment, indicates that the least developed states in the tri-
partite region will be allowed to receive concessions in terms of opening up their 
markets. This is an important provision to prevent de-industrialisation but can also be 
a double-edged sword as member states could use this provision to slow down 
liberalisation and by extension slow down economic integration.  
? Transparency, including the disclosure of information with respect to the application 
of the tariff arrangements in each REC: A key aspect of negotiations will be 
?????????????? ????? ???????????? ?????? ??????? ??? ???? ???????????? ???????? ???? ????? ???
valuable in terms of information sharing to avoid duplication as well as to be able to 
align the needs of all stakeholders. 
? Building on the acquis of the existing REC FTAs in terms of consolidating tariff 
liberalisation in each REC FTA: Building on the acquis of existing RECs illustrate 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the T-FTA negotiations will build on the current successes and failures of the 
COMESA, EAC and SADC in order to achieve the T-FTA (Kalenga, 2011a, p. 8).  
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? A single undertaking covering phase one on trade in goods: This principle is the most 
ambitious as all trade in goods agenda factors will be dealt with in one phase. 
Traditionally, it has been hard to reconcile all the trade in goods agenda aspects 
within RECs. 
? Substantial liberalisation: Including substantial liberalisation implies that the T-FTA 
will attempt rapid opening up of markets. Not all tri-partite states can afford to 
substantially liberalise their economies but those who can; will be expected to commit 
themselves to regional liberalisation. 
? MFN treatment: The MFN principle will be discussed later in this chapter but 
basically implies subscribing to the multi-lateral norm of MFN. The MFN rule applies 
??? ???? ???????? ?????????? ????? ??? ??????? ??????? ???? ????????????? ?????????????? ???? ?????
applies to all internal taxes and regulations for goods and services (Mathis & Breaton, 
2011, p. 25). By doing this, tri-partite states that are members of the WTO would be 
acting in accordance with established trade rules. 
? National treatment: This principle means that member states commit to treating 
foreigners as equal to their locals.  
? Reciprocity: Reciprocity implies that tri-partite states are going to equally open up 
markets. This means that whereas special and differential treatment is not the goal of 
this FTA, equal liberalisation across the expanded economic space indeed is. 
? Decisions will be taken by consensus: Decisions made at the negotiations will be done 
by reaching a consensus. As mentioned before, the tri-partite region consists of 26 
countries with different development levels all having to reach agreement on various 
issues. Coupled to this is the fact that each member state brings their own interests to 
the negotiating table. In this regard, it will be interesting to see how the negotiations 
will progress as African states have historically voted according to consensus and 
have at the same time struggled to reach agreement at REC level. 
 
The negotiation rules articulated above are largely similar to those that are standard in 
African regional integration negotiations.  
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The institutional framework of the negotiations will be as follows with the TTF providing the 
technical and administrative support for the negotiations: 
? Summit of the Heads of State and Government;  
? Tripartite Council of Ministers; 
? Tripartite Sectoral Ministerial Committees; 
? Tripartite Committee of Senior Officials; and 
? Tripartite Trade Negotiation Forum (TTNF). 
 
In line with the institutional framework the Tripartite Sectoral Ministerial Committee will be 
responsible for the overall monitoring; supervision, and provision of leadership during the 
negotiation process. The chairperson of the TNNF will monitor the negotiations through 
quarterly reports compiled by the Tripartite Sectoral Ministerial Committee responsible for 
trade. 
 
4.3.6 Declaration Launching the Negotiations for the Tri-partite Free Trade Area 
The Declaration Launching the Negotiations for the T-FTA was presented on 11 May 2011 in 
Johannesburg, South Africa. It formalises the processes that have been underway since the 
2008-Summit. The most important element of the Declaration is that it reconfirmed the 
commitment of the Heads of State and Government towards establishing a T-FTA spanning 
the three RECs. This T-FTA aims to ultimately adopt a developmental approach built on 
three pillars, namely industrial development; infrastructure, and market integration. 
Negotiations will be member and partner state driven spanning two phases. On the one hand, 
phase 1 will deal with trade in goods with movement of persons being negotiated during this 
phase on a separate track. Phase 2, on the other hand, will cover trade-related areas, and 
reflecting the deeper elements of economic integration. 
 
The Declaration signals the political intent of African heads of state to begin a process of 
harmonisation and rationalisation of the COMESA, EAC and SADC trade regimes in the first 
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phase of negotiations. This is an important milestone and marks the formal start of 
negotiations that are envisioned to conclude in 2016. 
 
4.3.7 The Second Summit  
The Second Summit was held on 12 June 2011 in Johannesburg, South Africa. The following 
milestones were achieved at this event: 
? The declaration launching the negotiations for the establishment of the T-FTA was 
both signed and launched; 
?  A Roadmap for establishing the T-FTA was adopted; 
? In addition, the Negotiating Principles; Processes, and Institutional Framework for the 
establishment of the T-FTA were adopted; 
? It was determined that a program of work and roadmap be developed for the 
industrialisation pillar;  
? Infrastructure development was noted and international donors pledged donations for 
projects within the North-South corridor; and 
? The chairpersons of the COMESA-EAC-SADC signed the MoU on Inter-Regional 
Cooperation and Integration. 58 
 
4.4 Fitting the T-FTA into the international trade regime 
The WTO commonly sets the rules for international trade and as a result it has to be notified 
of the formation of FTAs before these could be operationalised. According to Hoekman 
(2002, p. 41-42), the main function of the WTO is to serve as a forum for international co-
operation on trade-related policies through the creation of codes of conduct for governments 
globally. He goes on to say that the basic principles of the WTO framework are:  
? Non-discrimination; 
? Reciprocity; 
? Binding and enforceable commitments; 
? Transparency; and  
                                                             
58 This will be explained in chapter 5. 
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? Safety valves.  
 
These above-mentioned principles are mostly applicable to multi-lateral negotiations in order 
to create an environment of fairness (i.e. reciprocity); enforcement of decisions (i.e. binding 
and enforceable commitments); access to information (i.e. transparency), and a means to 
restrict trade (i.e. safety valves).59 T-FTA member states that are a part of the WTO have to 
abide by these principles in order to forward the ideal of a rules based multi-lateral trade 
system as well as follow best practices. In return, membership provides them recourse in 
cases of unfair trade practices, and the opportunities to accrue the possible benefits of foreign 
markets.  
 
The formation of FTAs and CUs are an exception to the most fundamental principle of the 
WTO, which is non-discrimination. The MFN rule is enacted by Article I of the GATT and 
determines that a product manufactured in one member country should be treated no less 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????country. Similarly, the 
national treatment principle basically promotes the same agenda but in the domestic 
regulatory environment, such as taxation. When a group of states decide to form an FTA or 
CU they are treating each other more favourably than other WTO members. Thus, this 
qualifies as an exception to non-discrimination within the WTO framework and therefore the 
WTO has to be notified. There are two avenues for notification of FTAs and CUs that could 
be selected, namely under article XXIV of the GATT or through the enabling clause that 
accommodates the particular realities of developing countries. An important question to be 
asked here is which notification criteria will be appropriate for the T-FTA.  
 
4.4.1 GATT Article XXIV 
The GATT highlights what FTAs and CUs are vis-á-vis the WTO. According to the GATT 
(1994, p. 41??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
                                                             
59 The means to restrict trade refers to the anti-dumping and trade remedies provisions in the multi-lateral trade 
regime. Developing states are particularly vulnerable at the multi-lateral level to the relative economic strength 
of more powerful states. For example, economically powerful states can flood local developing markets with 
cheaper goods, making it extremely difficult for these states to sell their own manufactured goods within their 
own territory. 
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which separate tariffs or other regulations of commerce are maintained for a substantial part 
of the trade of such territory with other territories?.60 This is an important conceptualisation 
because it allows for a CU to be considered as a customs territory due to their common trade 
policy through the CET. In other words, FTAs are recognised to have individual member 
states that form autonomous trade policy. Hence, they are also viewed as a customs territory 
within this provision. This basically recognises that an FTA and CU are larger economic 
spaces, but their different economic characteristics are accounted for within this provision.61 
This is important for the T-FTA if one keeps in mind that two CUs (i.e. the EAC and SACU) 
and two FTAs (i.e. the COMESA and SADC) are currently functioning, and there is a need 
for them to be distinguished as different economic entities with different economic 
characters. 
 
In terms of the GATT (1994, p. 42), the FTA or CU parties are not allowed to raise barriers 
with third party countries. This is also referred to as external trade requirements. Other 
provisions important to note in relation to the formation of either an FTA or CU include the 
following; that with respect to:62 
? A CU (or interim agreement leading to the formation of one), that the duties or other 
regulations of commerce with contracting parties will not be on the whole higher or 
more restrictive than those in place before the establishment of one; and 
? An FTA (or an interim agreement leading to the formation of one), that the duties and 
other regulations of commerce with contracting parties will not be higher or more 
restrictive than those in place within constituent territories before the establishment of 
the FTA.  
 
This provision ensures that those members party to such an agreement do not raise their 
barriers to trade as a bloc in the case of a CU, or individually in the case of the formation 
of an FTA. 
 
                                                             
60 See paragraph 2 of Article XXIV. 
61 An FTA allows member states to determine their own trade policy whereas a CU has a CET. The provision 
acknowledges this difference in character. 
62 See paragraph 5 (a) and (b) of Article XXIV. 
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The GATT (1994, p. 43) also determines that it is the supposed duty of an FTA or CU to 
diminish any possible barriers to (fair) trade.63 The former is referred to as coverage 
requirements. Accordingly, within a CU or FTA duties and other restrictive regulations of 
commerce must be eliminated on Substantially All Trade (SAT).64 According to Hudec, 
James and Southwick (1999, p. 50-51) this provision suggests that for RTA members to 
qualify under article XXIV they have to deviate from the non-discrimination principle, i.e. 
they must in fact discriminate to a substantial degree. This paragraph has been subject to 
problems of interpretation and application as the language used in this provision is 
ambiguous.  
 
It should be noted that it is often left to contracting parties to decide what SAT actually 
entails in terms of trade liberalisation. For example, there exist two contrasting viewpoints 
about the SAT principle relating to whether it refers to the quantity or quality of the trade 
being liberalised. There are two different ways to interpret quantity, that is either through a 
percentage test where 90 percent of total trade between member states is at zero tariff duty 
(i.e. volume of trade), or the percentage of tariff duty lines (i.e. not volume of trade) that have 
been reduced to zero (Mathis & Breaton, 2011, p. 35). The quality aspect refers to which 
sectors are actually being liberalised for tariff duty elimination. According to Mathis and 
Breaton (2011, p. 35), this is particularly important if the remaining 10 percent of either the 
volume of trade or tariff duty lines constitute the major traded sectors between member 
???????? ????? ????? ???? ????? ???????? ??????????? ???? ????? ??????????? ??? ??????????????? ???
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to the cancellation of FTAs or CUs by the WTO oversight committees whom are notified of 
the agreements (Erasmus, 2011, p. 99). In this way, protectionism is still a common 
occurrence and actually built into the global economy, and this is highly evident within the 
agricultural sector.65 
 
                                                             
63 See paragraph 8 of Article XXIV. 
64 See paragraph 8 (a) and (b) of Article XXIV. 
65 The problem with protectionism for developing countries is that they are expected to reciprocate trade 
preferences. Developing countries and Africa in particular are most competitive in the agricultural sector, thus, 
it is an important area where they can make economic gains. However, developed nations such as the EU and 
USA continue to subsidise their farmers with no inclination to stop this protectionist policy, while insisting that 
the developing world open up markets and avoid protectionism. 
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4.4.2 The Enabling Clause 
The enabling clause was enacted by WTO members in 1979 and is titled Differential and 
More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries. 
This provision was made for developing countries and through its detail implies a much 
weaker instance of trade liberalisation and legal commitments within the bloc (than the 
GATT Article XXIV). This is reflective of the particular realities of the developing world, 
??????????? ?????? ????????????????? ???? ?????????? ??? ???????? ?? ??? ???? ???????? ???????????
contracting parties may accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing 
countries, witho??? ?????????? ????? ?????????? ??? ?????? ???????????? ????????? ?WTO, 1979, p. 
191).66 This is applicable to preferential tariff treatment to products originating in developing 
countries as well as differential and more favourable treatment concerning non-tariff 
measures governed by the multilateral instruments of the GATT (WTO, 1979, p. 191).67 This 
allows developing countries to maintain a preferential arrangement with each other by 
utilising the basic instruments of trade policy measures, tariff and non-tariff barriers.  
 
The enabling clause is driven ???????????????????????????????egional or global arrangements 
entered into amongst less-developed contracting parties for the mutual reduction or 
elimination of tariffs, in accordance with criteria or conditions which may be prescribed by 
the contracting parties, for the mutual reduction or elimination of non-tariff measures, in 
????????? ????????? ????????? ?????????68 This illustrates that with regards to the criteria for 
coverage, there are no obligations to contracting parties to eliminate SAT. Therefore, unlike 
article XXIV, the preferences that are exchanged need not entirely eliminate duties or any 
other barriers to trade in respect to SAT under the enabling clause (Mathis & Breaton, 2011, 
p. 45). From this it can be argued that states party to such an agreement are allowed 
considerable leeway in terms of which measures will be included. The only obligation is to be 
consistent with the multi-???????? ????????????????????????? ??????? ???? ????????? ?????????? ???
the least developed among the developing countries in the context of any general or specific 
measures in favour of developing countries? (WTO, 1979, p. 191).69 In effect, even further 
                                                             
66 See paragraph 1 of the Enabling Clause. 
67 See paragraph 2 (a) and (b) of the Enabling Clause. 
68 See paragraph 1 (c) of the Enabling Clause. 
69 See paragraph 1 (d) of the Enabling Clause. 
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preferences can be granted to those developing countries which are at the bottom of the 
economic spectrum (variable geometry). 
 
4.4.3 Possible options for the T-FTA notification 
It is difficult to determine which measure will be selected to notify the WTO of the T-FTA. 
The COMESA and EAC have enacted their trade regimes under the enabling clause, while 
the SADC has notified theirs according to Article XXIV (Mathis & Breaton, 2011, p. 52). 
Given that more than two thirds of the tri-partite member states are LDCs, this could lead 
towards choosing to notify under the enabling clause, given its weak commitment 
obligations. However, as explained in the preceding sections it is clear that the T-FTA seeks 
to liberalise substantially in order to reap the benefits of a wider market. Thus, Article XXIV 
of the GATT, with its quite detailed requirements, will provide a considerable technical and 
legal framework to work from. Although, for this to become a reality in theory it will have to 
consolidate the fact that some states would struggle to be able to meet the obligations, given 
that their economies are so small. These are important matters to consider, because ultimately 
they will determine whether multi-lateral trade standards (if Africa is to participate 
meaningfully in the global trade regime) are what the tri-partite region hopes to move 
towards in the future and with haste. 
 
The negotiations will have to create a thorough plan and schedule for trade liberalisation if 
the T-FTA will notify under Article XXIV. The understanding is that under Article XXIV 
forming an FTA has to be done within a ?????????????????????????????GATT, 1994, p. 42).70 
???? ???????????? ??????? ??? ?????? ?????????? ??????? ???? ??????? ??? ??????? ???? ????? ??? ?????
??????????????? ????????????? ??????? ????????? ??????71 However, notification in terms of the 
enabling clause has no time period assigned to it.  
 
 
 
                                                             
70 See paragraph 5 (c) of Article XXIV 
71 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
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4.5 The negotiating context and Draft Tripartite-FTA 
Hartzenberg (2011a, p. i) comments on the emergence of the T-FTA as follow: 
 
????? ?????? ??? ?????? ???? ??????????? ??? ???? ??? ??????? ??????? ??? ????
COMESA, EAC and SADC agreed in October 2008 to establish a grand FTA 
which is now referred to as the T-FTA. This integration initiative has in the 
(almost) three years since this political decision, followed a course rather 
different from other regional integration initiatives in Africa. Since October 
2008 various task teams of technical experts have been engaged in analytical 
work and prepared a Draft Agreement and 14 Annexes, dealing with issues, in 
addition to tariff liberalisation, ranging from RoO to the Movement of 
Business Persons and Dispute Resolution. The most recent iteration of this 
technical process has produced drafts of these instruments, dated November 
2010... Negotiations, however, were only officially launched at a summit, held 
in SA, in June 2011.It is, therefore, very important to recognise that the T-
FTA does not exist yet and substantive negotiations have not yet begun. The 
Draft Agreement and the 14 Annexes lack official status, yet it is a useful 
????????????????????????? 
 
In accordance with the already noted Roadmap, the negotiations are now in effect and are 
expected to be concluded by 2016. The context wherein these negotiations are to transpire is 
important since it could afford opportunities for tentative conclusions concerning the likely 
success of the entire process. Kalenga (2011a, p. 1-2) asserts that the negotiations are not 
about the merger of the three RECs (at least for now); rather it is concerned with merging 
existing FTAs in the COMESA-EAC-SADC into a single wider FTA (i.e. intra-regional 
liberalisation). Hence, it is not about establishing a CU as per the initial inclination. Also, the 
negotiations are not an REC negotiation process but member state driven, and based on 
consensus, except where CUs already exist in the EAC and SACU that are presumed to 
negotiate as a bloc.  
 
 
 
 
 
137 
 
4.5.1 The Draft T-FTA 
Perusing the revised Draft T-FTA agreement72 is useful in determining if the enlarged FTA 
seeks to achieve anything new within the existing trade regimes of the COMESA-EAC-
SADC. Kalenga (2011b) emphasises that the conceptual framework used in the creation of 
the T-FTA by the REC technocrats suggests a shift from the conventional FTA design in 
Africa. According to COMESA-EAC-SADC (2010), the specific objectives thereof are to:73  
? Eliminate all tariffs and nontariff barriers;  
? Liberalise trade in services; 
? Facilitate cross-border investment and movement of business people;  
? Harmonise customs procedures and trade facilitation measures;  
? Enhance co-operation in infrastructure development; and  
? Promote cooperation in all trade related areas amongst partner states and others.  
 
The above approach to what the T-FTA agreement should feature in scope and coverage are 
significantly more expansive than existing FTAs in the regions by virtue of explicit reference 
to trade facilitation and infrastructure. The intended aim appears to be to reconcile the 
??????????? ??????? ????????? ????? ??? ????????? ?? ???????? ???? ????? ????? ??????? ????? ??? ????
individual RECs. However, the T-FTA should be weary of being too ambitious in its 
endeavours. 
 
As mentioned before, the starting point of the T-FTA is to reconcile the traditional trade in 
goods agenda. Furthermore, in its attempts to harmonise the existing trade arrangements in 
the COMESA, EAC and SADC, it makes provision for the:  
? Elimination of import duties; 
? Prohibition of export duties;  
? Elimination of NTBs; and 
Elimination of quantitative restrictions and RoO (COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2010).74  
 
                                                             
72 From here on cited as COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2010. 
73 See Article 4 of the Draft T-FTA. 
74 See Articles 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the Draft T-FTA. 
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However, in line with the idea that the T-FTA could be a paradigm shift in FTA strategy, 
there seems to be acknowledgement that the agreement seeks to delve into deeper integration. 
Part 4 of the agreement deals solely with co-operation and trade facilitation efforts and 
emphasises the following: 
? Simplification and harmonisation of customs legislation and procedures; 
? Trade and customs documentation and information; 
? Trade facilitation; 
? Re-exports; and  
? Transit trade and transit facilities (COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2010).75  
 
For its part, Part 6 of the agreement deals exclusively with the factors associated with 
deeper integration. These areas include:  
? Competition; 
? Cross border investment; 
? Standardisation; metrology; conformity assessment, and accreditation (SMCA); 
? Sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures; 
? Intellectual property rights; 
? Infrastructure development; 
? Movement of business persons; and  
? Trade in services (COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2010).76 
 
For the T-FTA to realise any form of deeper integration it would require predictability; 
????????????? ???? ? ????????????? ??? ???? ???????????? ???????????? ????????????????? ????
agreement makes provision for the establishment of the tri-partite committee on trade and 
customs. This committee is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the T-FTA with 
functions that include regular reviews; policy analysis; reception and consideration of reports, 
as well as to implement and monitor measures taken by the tri-partite process.77  
                                                             
75 See Articles 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the Draft T-FTA. 
76 See Article 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the Draft T-FTA. 
77 See Article 37 of the Draft T-FTA. 
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The agreement also provides for a dispute settlement mechanism78 vis-á-vis trade remedies. 79 
This is crucial in resolving disputes associated with international trade and include anti-
dumping and countervailing measures and others (Viljoen, 2011, p. 109). Finally, the 
agreement pursues an enhanced sense of a continental community.80 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
The T-FTA has been hailed as an important step towards rationalising the contradictions 
between the RECs in Eastern and Southern Africa. The tripartite initiative, in both rationale 
and structure, is geared towards an economic agenda; and has progressed speedily since its 
political endorsement in 2008. A comprehensive plan has emerged that covers market 
integration, infrastructure development and industrial development as the pillars of the T-
FTA. The tripartite initiative is thus ambitious and innovative by including infrastructure 
development (to solve physical integration constraints) as well as industrialisation (to resolve 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????The T-FTA is grounded in 
a developmental approach and has already created tripartite structures to facilitate the wide 
ranging goals that have emerged. Exploring the state of play at REC level under each pillar 
will elucidate what lays ahead in implementation and likelihood thereof. The following 
chapter gives a broad sweep of the three pillars including aspects that underlie successful 
tripartite integration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
78 See Article 38 of the Draft T-FTA. 
79 See Articles 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the Draft T-FTA. 
80 See Articles 36 and 39 of the Draft T-FTA. 
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Chapter: 5 Prospects and Challenges under the Tripartite Framework 
5.1 Introduction 
The emergence of the T-FTA has been viewed as a promising move towards attempting to 
rationalise the regional integration process in Eastern and Southern Africa and is grounded in 
a larger African integration agenda. However, realising the goals and objectives of the tri-
partite framework will not be an easy task. Thus, the broad purpose of this chapter is to 
scrutinise the tri-partite process, i.e. the three pillars and factors related to realising the T-
FTA as well as underlying issues vis- á-vis the current realities in the regions. This will 
require investigation of a broad array of areas, such as those related to the economic arena, 
physical integration, multi-lateral trade agreements and legal standpoints as well as emerging 
issues that have a bearing on the prospects and challenges of the T-FTA. 
 
The Draft T-FTA explicitly states that it will build on the milestones already achieved by the 
RECs in the regions. Given this, the prospects and challenges for increased harmonisation 
and coordination depend on the strengths and weaknesses of the RECs in terms of their treaty 
and protocol specifications, as well as the realities of implementation at grassroots level, 
where applicable. This chapter will be structured around the three pillars that the tri-partite 
process is based upon, namely market integration; infrastructure development, and industrial 
development. Also, a normative approach will be utilised in evaluating what is the ideal 
outcome of the T-FTA and outlining the tasks necessary to realise the successful 
implementation of the T-FTA.  
 
This will be followed by aspects which are not explicit elements of the tripartite process but 
nonetheless has an impact in varied ways that will be explained as the chapter progresses. 
The chapter will thus proceed as follows. It will start by outlining the importance of a rule 
based integration process as well as a look into the important case of the SADC Tribunal. 
Then, the EPAs will be discussed in relation to the deadlines of EPA and T-FTA 
negotiations. Finally, underlying issues which are relevant to the tripartite process will be 
discussed, namely political will, economic polarisation and stability of individual states 
within the tripartite region in an effort to outline the areas which are relevant to the realisation 
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of the tripartite. From this it will enable a determination of prospects and challenges moving 
forward, in terms of the negotiations, implementation and beyond. 
 
5.2 The market integration pillar 
A number of sub-areas are relevant to the realisation of an enlarged FTA with regards to the 
market integration pillar. Trade facilitation has become an important component to assist in 
removing the barriers to trade and is envisioned to assist in creating a competitive business 
environment in the region. Trade in services are amongst the most important new generation 
issues within PTAs and could greatly assist the regions in economic development. The 
current status of trade liberalisation, RoO, trade facilitation and trade in services in the 
respective RECs will be juxtaposed with the envisioned situation when the T-FTA becomes 
operational.  
 
5.2.1 Trade liberalisation 
Trade liberalisation in the regions has progressed quite steadily since the notification of the 
????? ??? ???? ????????????????? ??? ???????? ?? ??????? ??? ?????? ???????? ??????????? ???? ??? ??????
fosters a largely classical process of economic integration. The trade in goods agenda 
primarily focuses on tariff reductions including excise duties and quotas. Optimism to 
achieve harmonisation and coordination of trade liberalisation is the most promising aspect of 
the market integration pillar under the T-FTA, where consensus can be reached and 
harmonisation quickly achieved.  
 
Within the COMESA, FTA trade liberalisation covers trade in goods only. According to the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
2000, in accordance with the program adopted by the PTA Authority, customs duties and 
other charges of equivalent effect imposed on or in connection with the importation of goods 
?????? ???? ????????? ???? ??????? ??????? ???????????81 Hence, the COMESA FTA is 
comprehensive and has no sensitive products, exclusions or exceptions in its founding 
                                                             
81 See Article 46 (1) of the COMESA Treaty. 
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provisions. However, Kalenga (2011a, p. 10) notes that there are a few cases where this has 
not been wholly implemented in the REC. For instance: Kenya has been allowed to restrict 
trade in wheat; flour, and cane sugar by means of applying a tariff rate quota; whereas the 
Seychelles has excluded a limited number of products from duty free treatment; and 
Swaziland, for its part, does not have to reciprocate trade preferences in COMESA because of 
their membership to SACU. Likewise, Eritrea, and Uganda as well as Ethiopia are not part of 
the COMESA FTA yet, but are preferentially trading in the REC with close to 80 percent of 
intra-COMESA trade (Kalenga, 2011a, p. 11). COMESA has a long history of regional 
integration with a progressive movement since 1980 towards establishing an FTA. Therefore, 
given its size and geographic coverage, it could provide meaningful lessons for the T-FTA. 
 
The EAC has moved the fastest with regards to trade liberalisation in the tri-partite region. 
From January 2005, the EAC countries started trading on duty and quota free terms. 
According to the EAC CU protocol (2005, p. 14) goods to and from Uganda to Tanzania, as 
well as goods from Uganda and Tanzania into Kenya, are to be duty free.82 This however, 
was not immediately implemented, because exports to Uganda and Tanzania from the 
strongest economic power in the configuration, Kenya, charged duties on a progressively 
reducing basis for five years, only ending in 2009 (EAC CU Protocol, 2005, p. 14).83   
 
The trade liberalisation efforts in the SADC substantially deviate from those of both the 
COMESA and EAC. Instead of implementing an across the board elimination of tariffs and 
duties as is the case in the COMESA and EAC, SADC has adopted the principle of 
asymmetry to trade liberalisation with different categories or tariff lines that have different 
time-frames in order to reduce applicable tariffs (SADC, 1996).84 Also, unlike the COMESA 
and EAC with their across the board liberalisation in goods, the SADC upheld exclusions 
regarding its tariff liberalisation commitments (Ndlovu, 2011a, p. 4-6). 
 
 
                                                             
82 See Article 11 (2) of the EAC CU Protocol. 
83 See Article 11 (3) of the EAC CU Protocol. 
84 See Article 3 of the SADC Trade Protocol. 
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5.2.2 Rules of Origin 
The purpose of RoO within an FTA is to ensure that the goods being traded is not redirected 
from the lowest external tariff of a member state into the preferential market. The idea behind 
it is to ensure that the trade that is given preferential treatment is confined to those states who 
are party to an FTA. However, in practice, these can be used as an effective tool to restrict 
trade and protect domestic industries of national importance against members of a trade bloc. 
RoO are a considerable challenge in the respective regions as they have been viewed as a tool 
to reproduce mercantilist and protectionist trade strategies to protect domestic industries in 
Africa (Hartzenberg, 2011b, p. 6-7; Kalenga, 2011a, p. 15 and Naumann, 2011, p. 257-266). 
This contradicts the fundamental aim of an FTA, which is to assist in promoting trade 
through the opening up of markets and not restricting it between member states. Given the 
history of tough negotiations pertaining RoO within the RECs in the region, this will be the 
hardest and immediate challenge within the first phase of negotiations to address. 
 
Generally, there are two ways to determine th????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????? ??? ???? ???????? ??? ??????? ??? ?????????????????????? ???? ??????????? ??? ?? ?????? ???????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
origin and as such no complexities regarding the produce arise. Amongst the most common 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
products harvested in the beneficiary country; live animals born and raised in the country; 
products obtained by hunting or fishing, and goods produced exclusively from the afore-
mentioned products (Kalaba, 2009, p. 5 and Naumann, 2011, p. 259). This list is not the only 
one to consider and some modifications may be applicable. 
 
The complexity of RoO is most common regarding so-??????? ??????????????????????????????
since there is no universal prescription in determining the origin of produce. Kalaba (2009, p. 
5) and Naumann (2011, p. 259) mention three tests or rules that could be utilised to determine 
??????? ????? ???????? ??? ???? ?????????????? ???????? ?????????????? ????????? ?????? ???????? ????
minimum value added (VA) rule that prescribes a minimum value addition locally; the 
Change of Tariff Heading (CTH) rule that determines whether the products have been 
substantially transformed to justify a different tariff heading than the imported inputs used, 
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and the specific process (SP) rule that prescribes a specific process that has to be undertaken 
to produce a particular good in the country claiming preferential treatment.  
 
5.2.2.1 RoO in the COMESA-EAC-SADC 
The RoO in the COMESA and EAC are largely the same with only a few exceptions. 
COMESA (2002, p 8), in its Protocol on RoO, prescribes the following independent criteria 
to determine the origin of produce:  
1. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
2. Cost, insurance, and freight (c.i.f) value rule of 60 percent ex factory cost of imported 
materials.   
3. A general value added rule of 35 percent for local content, or 25 percent if the 
Council of Ministers designates goods as having particular economic importance. 
 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
not have a 25 percent exception to the 35 percent value added rule (Kalenga, 2011, p. 16).85 If 
they meet any of the criteria mentioned above they are considered to be originating within the 
bloc. COMESA and EACs RoO are thus relatively simple in terms of determining origin. 
Therefore, COMESA and EAC have set a good platform to align their RoO.  
 
The RoO of the SADC are much more complicated as opposed to that of both the COMESA 
and EAC and determine that goods will be accepted as originating in a member state and 
receiving preferential ????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????? or 
????????????????????????????????????????????-a).86 It could be argued that the SADC follows 
a line by line approach regarding its approach to RoO by determining origin at the product or 
sector level, rather than a single rule for all products (Naumann, 2011, p. 260).  
 
                                                             
85 See Rule 4 of the EAC CU (RoO). 
86 See Rule 2 of the SADC Amendment to Annex I concerning the RoO for products to be traded between 
member states of SADC. 
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The table below illustrates the RoO of the COMESA, EAC and SADC vis-á-vis the proposed 
T-FTA RoO. 
Table 5.1: RoO in the COMESA, EAC and SADC vis-á-vis T-FTA 
RoO COMESA and EAC SADC Tripartite Draft 
Basis for determining 
origin 
Wholly obtained or 
substantial 
transformation 
Same Same 
Tests for substantial 
transformation 
Non-originating 
?????????? ?? ??????????
on total cost of 
materials. 
Or Value-????????????
ex-factory cost. 
Product-specific rules 
based on maximum 
non-originating 
content, CTH, SP 
Methodologies (or in 
combination) 
Non-originating 
???????????????????????
on ex-works price of 
product. 
Or value of originating 
???????????????????????
on ex-works price of 
product. 
 CTH 
(EAC: If included in 
special list, and subject 
to conditions) 
n/a Special rules (CTH or 
SP) if included in 
Appendix 1. 
 Value-????????????? ???
designated as 
??????????????
??????????? ?????
applicable to EAC 
RoO).  
n/a n/a 
Source: Naumann (2011, p. 271) 
 
The above table highlights three possible problems:  
? Non-originating materials in the T-FTA is required as such based on a 70 percent ex-
works87 price of product, whereas in the COMESA and EAC the ex-works price is 60 
                                                             
87 Ex-works is a method of calculating business charges. It is commonly associated as a British term and only 
focuses on the cost of products that originate from the producer?s premises, all charges from there on, such as 
delivery, distribution and commissions, are borne by the buyer (BusinessDictionary.com, 2012). 
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percent and SADC on a product specific basis with flexibility in the methodology to 
be adopted;  
? The value added basis in the T-FTA is 30 percent whereas in COMESA and EAC it is 
35 percent and SADC product specific; and  
? The CTH and special rules tests still require some clear definitions, and need to be 
dealt with in greater detail in negotiations.  
 
Keeping the above in mind, it is clear that the RoO of the T-FTA differ from those 
applicable to the individual COMESA, EAC and SADC ones. This could be problematic 
given that RoO have historically been the hardest part to consolidate within the trade in 
goods agenda of the RECs. Significant work will be required to reach consensus on the 
RoO issue because they will as a matter of urgency need to be less restrictive than it is 
currently within individual RECs. 
 
5.2.3 Trade facilitation 
Defining trade facilitation is not an easy task since there is no universal prescription as to 
what trade facilitation should entail. Trade facilitation refers to the simplification and 
harmonisation of international trade procedures covering the activities, practices and 
formalities involved in collecting, presenting, communicating and processing data required 
for the movement of goods in international trade (WTO, 2012). It attempts to achieve a more 
predictable, secure and cost-efficient trading environment through simplification; 
standardisation, and harmonisation of trade and transport procedures; documents, and 
information associated with cross-border trade (UNCTAD, 2009, p. 79). The rationale for 
trade facilitation is to ensure that cross border trade is simple; transparent, and more 
predictable.  
 
The figure below illustrates the factors that accounts as trade facilitation measures. 
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Figure 5.1: The extended spectrum of Trade Facilitation measures. 
 
Source: Brenton and Isik, 2012, p. 75 
 
The idea behind trade facilitation is to promote those aspects affecting trade that do not fall 
within the ambit of traditional trade liberalisation areas. The latter include tariffs; quotas; 
excise duties, and RoO. In other words, trade facilitation deals with issues that are not explicit 
barriers to trade. Studies have shown that although tariff barriers are important in trade 
liberalisation they may not be the most important issue (ECA, 2004, p. 155-158). The reason 
why trade facilitation has become so important is that the dynamics of the global economy 
have resulted in goods and services crossing borders in larger volumes than before. This 
means that impediments such as non tariff barriers to cross border trade affect 
competitiveness more so than tariff barriers (ECA, 2004, p. 156). UNCTAD (2009, p. 79) has 
found that key determinants such as non tariff barriers and other cross-border procedures give 
rise to unsuccessful attempts to market access. In fact, these factors continue to impede intra-
regional trade in Africa. 
 
Businesses are becoming increasingly frustrated by high trade transaction costs. For example, 
processing times at the border and unnecessary waiting times often add up to 15 percent the 
total transaction cost of doing trade (ECA, 2010, p. 196). In Southern Africa, the operating 
costs are not excessively higher if compared to Europe. For instance, in 2008 it was similar 
(i.e. $0.08 per ton kilometre). However, queues at border posts and restrictions to the market 
increase rates on international routes, making it between 10 to 30 percent higher (Foster & 
Briceno-Garmendia, 2008, p. 206). For these reasons, it remains more onerous; costly, and 
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time-consuming to export and import goods and services in and to Africa (Hartzenberg, 
2011b, p. 16). Thus, resolving and harmonising the issues at the border, as well as eliminating 
unnecessary non tariff barriers, are important for trade to thrive amongst states. The dormant 
effect of successful trade facilitation measures is an increase in competitiveness that has the 
potential to increase efficiency and specialisation of African industry by reaping the benefits 
of economies of scale. Also, the regions will become attractive venues for FDI through the 
proper implementation of trade facilitation programmes.   
 
It is clear that appropriate trade facilitation programmes will boost competitiveness in trade 
related areas, and this could hold direct and/ or indirect economic benefits for the tri-partite 
region. Trade facilitation holds numerous advantages for developing countries because it 
could lead to efficient border procedures; harmonised standards, and technological 
modernisation to facilitate and enhance cross border trade. Xinhua (2011) underlines that if 
non tariff barriers could be reduced, trade amongst African states could rise as much as 22 
percent over the next 10 years. 
 
The COMESA, EAC and SADC have all made provisions for resolving non tariff barriers in 
their respective founding treaties. On the one hand, the SADC (1996) stresses that states must 
adopt policies and implement measures to eliminate all existing forms of non tariff barriers 
and refrain from imposing any new ones.88 The EAC (2000, p. 57-58), on the other hand, also 
explicitly provides for the elimination of non tariff barriers.89 On its part, the COMESA 
(1992, p. 27) urges that its member states undertake to eliminate all the existing non tariff 
barriers vis-á-vis member states with an exception for imposing new ones for protection of 
new industries.90 Accordingly, it is clear that a regional framework does exist to eliminate 
non tariff barriers, coupled with a realisation that their existence seriously impedes trade 
amongst member states. 
 
                                                             
88 See Article 6 of the SADC Trade Protocol. 
89 See Article 75 (c) of the EAC Treaty. 
90 See Article 49 of the COMESA Treaty. 
 
 
 
 
149 
 
The T-FTA provides for an excellent opportunity to implement measures that would open up 
the regional market, given its expanded geographic coverage. According to Pearson (2011) 
within the regions, reducing non tariff barriers, border and customs procedures, immigration 
procedures, and transport procedures; and establishing a joint competition authority linked to 
air transport liberalisation are the core areas of trade facilitation which the tripartite has 
identified. Some of these areas are interrelated with the infrastructure constraints faced in 
Africa generally and the regions specifically. When considering transport procedures and air 
transport for example, only a partial picture exists and has to be viewed in conjunction with 
the infrastructure pillar. Also, the challenges which exist in immigration procedures link up 
with the movement of business persons. 
 
5.2.3.1 Comprehensive Tri-partite Trade and Transport Facilitation Programme 
(CTTTFP) 
The tripartite region has developed the Comprehensive Tripartite Trade and Transport 
Facilitation Programme (CTTTFP) to address the core areas as identified in the above section 
(COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2011a, p. 9). The CTTTFP targets the following:  
? Customs procedures;  
? Integrated border management systems;  
? Regional customs bonds;  
? Simplification and harmonisation of transit cross-border procedures and regulatory 
requirements for commercial vehicles; 
? A regional third party motor vehicle insurance scheme; 
? Vehicle overload control system; 
? Harmonisation of vehicle dimensions and standards; 
? Road user charges; 
? A self-regulating regional road transport management system; and  
? Establishing corridor initiatives (COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2011a, p. 9).  
 
It is clear from the above that the CTTTFP has a broad mandate in terms of trade 
facilitation. The same is applicable considering its responsibility to resolve the aspects 
that will create a more conducive trading environment. The CTTTFP will fulfil its 
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mandate if it succeeds in, for example, resolving the so-called behind-the-border and 
border constraints. 
 
By 2006, the tri-partite process already started to create trade facilitation programmes in the 
three regions. One of the projects that were conducted by the joint task force in that year was 
to create one-stop border posts. This initiative aims at creating a common control zone 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
duplication (Bisseker, 2011). The Chirundu border crossing between Zambia and Zimbabwe 
is the first crossing to implement this initiative. It has more than 15 agencies from both 
governments, each enforcing different legislation (Foster & Briceno-Garmendia, 2008, p. 
159). Based on this, it is evident that co-ordination and harmonisation is definitely required to 
streamline border crossings for business at Chirundu. This project is viewed as one of the first 
successes under the auspices of the T-FTA (Bisseker, 2011). 
 
Resolving the prevalence of non tariff barriers has grown in importance within the regions 
and the tri-partite initiative has already seen some progress in this regard. The TTF, together 
with member states, has established a framework and web-based mechanism for identifying; 
monitoring, and eliminating non tariff barriers in a transparent and structured manner. The 
mechanism enables governments; traders; organised business, and service providers involved 
in trade facilitation to report non tariff barriers when encountered by them (COMESA-EAC-
SADC, 2011a, p. 4). This is an important development because it includes not only 
????????????? ???? ????? ???? ???????? ???????? ??????????? ????? ???? ????????? ????? ??? ????????? ??? ???
acknowledged as important within the context of regional integration. The table below 
illustrates how, by May 2011 the mechanism succeeded in addressing non-tariff barriers by 
resolving two thirds (i.e. 221 out of 331). 91  
 
 
 
                                                             
91 For a more detailed account of the NTBs which have been resolved through this mechanism it is possible to 
view them at the NTB website (www.tradebarriers.org). 
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Table 5.2: Progress of the Tri-partite non tariff barrier mechanism 
Category Total 
number 
reported 
Number 
resolved 
Number 
unresolved 
Proportion 
resolved 
Proportion 
unresolved 
Government 
participation in 
restrictive practices 
tolerated by 
governments 
 
56 
 
34 
 
22 
 
60.7% 
 
39.3% 
Customs and 
Administrative entry 
procedures 
 
56 
 
34 
 
22 
 
60.7% 
 
39.3% 
Technical barriers to 
trade 
30 22 8 73.3% 26.7% 
Sanitary and 
phytosanitary 
measures 
23 18 5 78.3% 21.7% 
Specific limitations 97 64 33 66.0% 34.0% 
Charges on imports 60 48 12 80.0% 20.0% 
Procedural problems 8 1 7 12.5% 87.5% 
Other 1 0 1 0.0% 100.0% 
Total 331 221 110 66.8% 33.2% 
Source: COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2011a, p. 4 
 
5.2.4 Trade in services 
The importance of services in the economies of states has grown substantially and is one of 
the characteristics of globalisation. In 2004, global trade in services was estimated to be 
$1025 billion, representing a quarter of global merchandise trade, and approximately 20 
percent of world trade as well as 60 percent of FDI flows (Hildegunn, 2011). Hildegunn 
(2011) observes that 75 percent of this trade is in intermediate outputs and these could lead to 
new economic activities being added into an economy in the form of new markets with 
higher profit margins.  
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???? ????? ??????????? ???? ?????????? ????? and covers a number of areas that do not directly 
relate to economies. Examples of these include, but are not limited to business; 
communications; construction; and engineering as well as transport (Ministry of East African 
Community Affairs, nd, p. 4). The communication; transport, and financial sectors are key in 
services trade (Stern, Truen & Ramkolowan, 2011, p. 18). Also, a lack of certain services 
?????? ??????????? ??????? ??? ???? ??????? ??? ?? ?????????? ?????????????? ?????????????? ??? ?????
could affect the potential for trading in goods.  
 
Services trade also has a bearing on the viability of infrastructure projects, especially those 
that are regionally and continentally aligned. To illustrate: One could build the best road from 
the Cape to Cairo, but if officials do not negotiate and make provision for service sectors that 
are required maintain it, then the viability of the whole project is in jeopardy. Related to the 
former is that fact that the physical integration of infrastructure networks will only be 
effective if countries have harmonised regulatory frameworks as well as administrative 
procedures that allow for the free flow of services across national borders (Foster & Briceno-
Garmendia, 2008, p. 144). Enabling infrastructure such as roads needs the services sector to 
ensure that these projects are economically viable and to prevent them from being reduced to 
being white elephants.92 For these reasons, services liberalisation is imperative and manifests 
itself in such a multi-faceted and complex manner that one often finds it hard to quantify.  
 
Regional integration in Africa has followed a trade in goods agenda with no comprehensive 
implementation of agreements that include services within the COMESA-EAC-SADC. In 
terms of the progression of economic integration a trade in services agenda is only relevant 
when a CM is formed. None of the RECs in Africa are at that stage of economic integration 
that could explain why they have not as yet comprehensively adopted a trade in services 
agenda, keeping in mind that they seem to be following a strict adherence to the linear model 
of economic integration.  
 
                                                             
92 Trudi Hartzenberg, Executive Director of the Trade and Law Research Centre for Southern Africa, noted as 
much in a presentation held at the University of the Western Cape focusing on the T-FTA. Roughly a month 
later (August 2012) at an informal meeting at the Tralac office in Stellenbosch she articulated the same example 
regarding infrastructure and services within the tripartite context. 
 
 
 
 
153 
 
In its World Trade Report, the WTO (2011, p. 103) emphasises that the crucial difference 
between liberalising trade in goods and liberalising trade in services are that the latter 
requires changes to domestic regulations and removal of restrictions on the movement of 
foreign investment. This is the reason why trade in services are considered to be part of a 
deeper economic integration agenda and more importantly requires more from partner states 
in terms of surrendering some sovereignty than if goods were liberalised, which only requires 
tariff reductions. Liberalising trade in services by default requires a movement towards 
homogeneity in national policies vis-á-vis either the multi-lateral or regional level. This has 
not been an easy task globally due to the economic importance of services to individual 
states, which in the developed country economy context exceeds manufacturing by far.   
 
5.2.4.1 The General Agreement on Trade in Services: Multi-lateral context 
??????????????????????????????? ???????????? ???????????????? ???? ?????????? ?????????? ????
liberalising services at the multi-lateral level. This is the framework in which the RECs in the 
regions have experienced the process of liberalising services, and for the most part it accounts 
as the only exposure to liberalising services (Kruger, 2011, p. 151-155). According to Adlung 
et al (2002, p. 259), the GATS applies to four modes of supply through which services could 
be traded. These are:  
? Mode 1: Cross-border supply not requiring the physical movement of supplier or 
consumer;  
? Mode 2: Movement of the consumer to the country of the supplier;  
? Mode 3: Services sold in the territory of a member by foreign entities that have 
established a commercial presence; and  
? Mode 4: Provision of services requiring the temporary movement of natural persons.  
 
Regarding services, the GATS provides an avenue for economic integration agreements 
Furthermore, the GATS maintains that trade in services has two main elements, namely 
substantial sectoral coverage and the elimination of substantially all discrimination in this 
regard (Ajumbo, 2009, p. 5).93 Even though the GATS covers the issue of liberalisation of 
                                                             
93 See Article V of the GATS. 
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goods, there are no tariffs or flow of goods to measure, creating serious data constraints and 
leeway for individual GATS members to interpret and contend with economic agreements 
that include services (UNCTAD, 2008, p. 6-7). In other words there is not as yet a multi-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
Kruger (2011, p. 148) mentions that the liberalisation of services are not as yet at a sufficient 
level of implementation across the three RECs in the regions and as such cannot be easily 
compared. The table below refers to the scheduled commitments that the 20 WTO member 
states in the tri-partite regions have committed themselves to in order to liberalise services in 
????????????????????????????? ?????lti-lateral context. 
 
Table5.3: Multilateral services liberalisation of tripartite states who belong to the WTO  
Countries Sectors 
Committed 
(out of 12) 
Sub-
sectors 
Committed 
(out of 
160) 
Commitments 
Negotiated 
(out of 1280) 
Partial 
Commitments 
made 
Full 
Commitments 
without 
restrictions 
Percentage 
Liberalised 
Commitments 
Angola 3 9 72 13 52 5.08% 
Botswana 3 20 160 74 54 10.00% 
Burundi 5 28 224 62 162 17.5% 
DRC 6 12 96 24 72 7.50% 
Djibouti 3 30 240 53 63 9.06% 
Egypt 4 29 232 28 99 9.92% 
Kenya 5 59 472 195 203 31.09% 
Lesotho 10 78 624 165 326 38.36% 
Madagascar 1 4 32 4 12 1.25% 
Malawi 5 29 232 58 174 18.13% 
Mauritius 3 28 224 113 110 17.42% 
Mozambique 1 13 104 26 78 8.13% 
Namibia 2 3 24 0 24 1.88% 
Rwanda 4 10 80 4 76 6.25% 
South Africa 9 91 736 239 345 45.63% 
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Swaziland 3 9 72 0 56 4.38% 
Tanzania 1 1 8 2 4 0.47% 
Uganda 2 11 88 42 46 6.88% 
Zambia 4 16 128 32 96 10.00% 
Zimbabwe 3 19 152 51 101 11.88% 
Average 3.85 25 200 59.25 107.65 13.04% 
Source: Kruger (2011, p. 151) 
 
The table above makes it clear that on average, tri-partite states have only committed around 
13.04 percent of their total services sectors to be liberalised. This implies that these states fall 
short from the requirement in terms of substantial sectoral coverage and this could hamper 
their attempts to notify the T-FTA as a valid economic integration agreement. The above-
mentioned percentage of 13.04 is also too low for the SAT principle applicable for 
liberalising services.  
 
Nevertheless, there will be more scope for member states to negotiate a larger amount of 
services sectors to be liberalised at the regional level and cross regionally in the T-FTA given 
the hesitance of especially developing countries to commit themselves at the multi-lateral 
level. UNCTAD (2008, p. 7) notes that RTAs can in principle target deeper integration 
amongst members as opposed to an agreement at the multi-lateral level. The UNCTAD 
proceed to assert that if substantial liberalisation of services is the objective then it would be 
politically feasible to move towards liberalising regionally. Once the T-FTA is fully 
operational it would be of value to gauge whether services liberalisation gains prominence on 
the regional level in Africa and if the T-FTA could create any urgency towards realising this 
goal. 
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5.2.4.2 Progress of services trade in the COMESA, EAC and SADC 
The three RECs have provisions in their founding documents to provide for a trade in 
services agenda.94 It is crucial to explore the progress of the COMESA, EAC and SADC in 
terms of their progression towards a regional approach to services trade. This is done to 
illustrate that the RECs are at significantly different stages in moving towards regional 
services. Thus, the likelihood of moving towards a tri-partite trade in services will be difficult 
to achieve. 
 
The SADC has created a revised protocol on services in 2009 that provides an opportunity to 
gauge what priority sectors are envisioned as well as the vision for this agenda. According to 
the SADC (2009, p. 11-12), there are six priority services sectors to liberalise, namely 
communication, construction, energy-related, financial, tourism and transport services.95 The 
preamble of the services protocol mentions that the REC seeks to achieve coherence in the 
????????? ?????-regional, inter-regional and multi-lateral commitments and negotiations on 
trade in services. This implies that the SADC will proceed incrementally in this regard in 
order to consolidate the services agenda within the REC, outside the region in relation to, say, 
the EPAs and in the tri-partite context, as well as on the multi-lateral level (Kruger, 2011, p. 
156). The SADC lags the farthest behind in the regions in terms of garnering trade in 
services, as the scheduling of commitments ahead of negotiations is at this point undefined 
and the revised protocol is still in the process of being approved (Kruger, 2011, p. 157). In 
fact, services liberalisation has not yet been a subject of negotiations, because more energy 
was required in the protracted trade in goods negotiations, especially around sensitive 
products (Negasi, 2009, p. 20-21). 
 
The COMESA has started the process of moving towards a trade in services agenda within 
the trade liberalisation plan of the REC. The member states in COMESA agreed to adopt 
necessary measures to progressively achieve the free movement of persons, labour and 
services (COMESA, 1992, p. 87).96 The member states agreed to, in accordance with a 
                                                             
94 See Article 23 (1) and (2) of the SADC Trade Protocol; Article 76 (1) of the EAC Treaty, and Article 6 (e) of 
the COMESA Treaty. 
95 See Article 16 (2) of the SADC?s revised Protocol on Services. 
96 See Article 164 of the COMESA Treaty. 
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programme to be adopted by the Council, remove restrictions on the freedom to provide 
services by the year 2004 (COMESA, 1998).97 However, it was only in 2009 that the 
programme actually got underway with the Council of Ministers adopting the Regulations on 
Trade in Services as drafted by legal and trade experts between 2007-2009 (COMESA 
Services Program, 2010, p. 2 and Kruger, 2011, p. 158). According to the COMESA Services 
Program (2010, p. 3), a committee on trade in services was established under the protocol and 
adopted Rules of Procedure, Guidelines for Services Negotiations and a roadmap for 
negotiations. Also, seven priority sectors was highlighted for liberalisation, namely business, 
communications, transport, finance, tourism and travel, energy and construction (COMESA 
Services Program, 2010, p. 3). Consequently, the second meeting of the Committee on Trade 
in Services adopted in May 2010 four priority sectors of communication, finance, transport 
and tourism for the first round of negotiations with no limitations imposed for future 
inclusions (Kruger, 2011, p. 159). Thus, COMESA seems to have at least reached the level of 
starting negotiations on services. 
 
The EAC has progressed the farthest with regards to moving towards a regional trade in 
services agenda. The depth of EAC integration has been strengthened by a recent movement 
towards Article (76, (1)), which makes provision for establishing a CM. According to 
Weggoro (2010, p. 7), the EAC CM was negotiated in 2009 and entered into force on 1 July 
2010. This represents a second stage of deeper cooperation between member states. However, 
the CM is still a work in progress with various deadlines being established for the period 
spanning 2010 to 2015 (Kruger, 2011, p. 160). EAC states have their own set of 
commitments with respect to trade in services, which are contained within Annex V to the 
Protocol (Ministry of East African Community Affairs, nd, p. 8 and Kruger, 2011, p. 160). 
The initial round of services negotiations has focused on several core sectors, namely 
business, communication, distribution, educational, financial, tourism and travel related, as 
well as transport services (Ministry of East African Community Affairs, nd, p. 8 and Kruger, 
2011, p. 160). Taking the above into account, it is expected that some (further) liberalisation 
will occur between the time of writing, and deadline of 2015 with regards to services 
liberalisation.  
                                                             
97 See Article 10 of the COMESA Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Labour, Services, Right of 
Establishment and Residence. 
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????????? ?????? ??? ???? ??? ???? ????? ???????????? ?????? ??????? vis-á-vis African economic 
integration. From the above it can be observed that only the EAC is in a position to begin the 
process of regional services trade.98 COMESA is making slow progress, but has laid the 
foundation to begin negotiations on trade in services. SADC will be the biggest stumbling 
block towards tri-partite services trade negotiations as they have not yet signed the revised 
protocol on services meaning that SADC member states do not have anything to bring to the 
negotiating table except the priority sectors listed in the services protocol. According to the 
COMESA-EAC-SADC (2011c), the key output expected from the negotiations is to reach an 
agreement on trade in goods and movement of persons in phase I of negotiations. Only once 
phase I has been concluded will the second phase begin, and includes the tri-partite trade in 
services. Thus, given the reality of non-existent REC regional service trade and the pre-
requisite of completing phase I of the negotiations in the tri-partite context, it seems unlikely 
that services trade will be realised in the COMESA-EAC-SADC region in the short to 
medium term.  
 
5.2.5 Movement of business people 
The movement of business people; labour, and natural persons have always been a 
contentious element of trade liberalisation. Among the most pressing concerns are that 
foreign nationals who enter countries to seek employment, often become permanent residents 
of these countries and hence, put increased strain on public authorities and resources (Cronje, 
2011, p. 193). Due to this, a distinction is required between natural persons and business 
people or labour. Natural persons refer to the movement of people from a home country to 
another in order to seek employment or live there; whereas the movement of business people 
and labour refers to the movement for the purpose of conducting an economic activity, thus 
not indefinite settlement. Thus, the movement of people reflect a social character when 
referring to natural persons or economic character in relation to the movement of business 
people and labour. 
 
                                                             
98 ???? ???? ???? ??? ??????? ??? ?? ????????? ?????? ???????? ???? ????? ???????? ???? ?? significantly smaller 
geographically, with only five states to negotiate the terms of services trade. Services trade is made easier when 
there are fewer members at the negotiating table.  
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The movement of business people are partially covered in the multi-lateral framework of the 
GATS for services under Mode 4. However, Mode 4 only covers the suppliers of services and 
movement of natural persons from one member state to another and as a result does not cover 
all the areas when movement of business persons are to be considered, especially in the 
regional context. For example, under the GATS, the movement of persons are only applicable 
for temporary movement vis-á-vis trading in service, but it is silent with regards to instances 
where more permanent residence is required in order to pursue more longer term and/ or even 
permanent services trade. This implies that although there is a multi-lateral standard for 
movement of persons, it is by no means used by states as a standard to facilitate this type of 
liberalisation. It is worth mentioning that in many respects movement of people is closely 
associated to a broader trade in services agenda. Therefore, a causal relationship is evident.  
 
It is thus clear that Mode 4 of the GATS in terms of how services could be traded is lacking 
explicit provisions for specifically business people. For instance, Rubia (2011, p. 47-48) 
claim rightfully that Mode 4 does not cover:   
 
? Self-employed persons supplying a service to a host country, company or individual, 
referred to as Independent Professionals;  
? Employees of a foreign services company without commercial presence in a host 
country, who enter the territory of another WTO member to supply a service based on 
a contract between their employer and the host country that is using the service. This 
is known as Contractual Service Suppliers;  
? Employees of a foreign services company with a commercial presence in the host 
country who are transferred to the establishment, known as Intra-corporate 
Transferees; and 
? Foreign national persons seeking entry into anot???? ????????? ?????????? ???? ????
purpose of setting up a commercial presence or negotiating a sale of a service on 
behalf of a services company to facilitate future transactions, known as Business 
Visitors and Services Sales Persons.  
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In the tri-partite context, the free movement of business people targets people engaged in 
cross border trade and investment and aims to enhance their mobility by relaxing visa 
requirements for business people and other professionals (Rubia, 2011, p. 46). However, 
within the regional integration programmes of the COMESA, EAC and SADC, attempts have 
been made to enhance the temporary movement of people not just for the purpose of trade but 
also for other general purposes such as social, recreational and educational, with varying 
levels of success (Rubia, 2011, p. 49). Thus, when viewing the progress of the RECs in 
question requires a degree of flexibility, in that the COMESA, EAC and SADC have not 
solely focused on the economic aspect of movement of people. 
 
According to Chanda (2002, p. 304-305), the major impediments to the movement of natural 
persons and labour are:  
? Immigration related regulations governing entry and stay of service providers;  
? Regulations concerning recognition of qualifications, work experience and training;  
? Differential treatment of domestic and foreign services personnel; and  
? Regulations on other modes of supply, particularly on commercial presence.  
 
In order to facilitate the movement of people, national policies have to be harmonised and 
adapted to regional aspirations. This has not been an easy task globally, especially when 
considering how sensitive the issue of movement of persons is to the national interest of 
respective states. In fact, remittances by labourers in the diaspora have been adversely 
affected by the global financial crisis with even more restrictions to be expected in this regard 
(Arieff, Weiss and Jones, 2009, p. 7). However, in Africa, there has been a tradition of 
regionally based initiatives that have demonstrated the idea of freer or ultimately free 
movement of people (Oucho and Crush, 2001, p. 140).  
 
5.2.5.1 Progress of movement of people in the COMESA, EAC and SADC 
The SADC has made little progress regarding the process of regional movement of people. 
Nevertheless, since its establishment it has created a number of protocols and provisions to 
support the movement of people. These have been created to conform to the existing multi-
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lateral commitments that member states made under the GATS (Makochekanwa & 
Maringwa, 2009, p. 10). The process of moving towards a regional approach in the SADC 
have two main documents at its centre, namely the 1995 Draft Protocol on the Free 
Movement of Persons and its most recent iteration, i.e. the 2005 Protocol on the Facilitation 
of the Movement of Persons within SADC. 
 
The EAC has the most ambitious and progressive process of facilitating the movement of 
persons. This has been driven by the Treaty Establishing EAC that provides for the free 
movement of persons, labour, services, right of establishment and residency (EAC, 2000, p. 
87-88).99 The CM Protocol (2009a, p. 10-15) makes explicit provision for the free movement 
of persons and labour, and this is coupled with a move towards a standard identification 
system, travel documents, harmonisation and mutual recognition of academic and personal 
qualifications, as well as harmonisation of labour policies, law and programmes.100 The EAC 
has definitely made significant progress towards a regional movement of people by not just 
focusing on the labour dynamics of movement of people.  This has been strengthened 
considerably since the CM was enacted in 2010. 
 
COMESA has created a number of programmes as an illustration of its willingness to create 
an environment that is conducive to the regional movement of people. The Treaty 
establishing COMESA (1992, p. 87) stipulates that the REC would create measures to 
gradually facilitate the free movement of persons, labour, services and to move towards the 
right of establishment and residency.101 This was strengthened by the Protocol on the Free 
Movement of Persons, Labour, Services, and Right of Establishment and Residency; as well 
as the Protocol on the Gradual Relaxation and Eventual Elimination of Visa Requirements 
(Rubia, 2011, p. 51 and Cronje, 2011, p. 207-208). This indicates that the COMESA plans to 
create a more general environment for the movement of people and not just those involved in 
economic activities. However, according to Rubia (2011, p. 51), to date only four of 
????????? ?????????? ??????? ??????? ???? ????????????? ???????????????? ??????? ??????????
overlap with the EAC, while Zimbabwe overlaps with the SADC.  
                                                             
99 See Article 104 of the EAC Treaty. 
100 See Articles 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the EAC CM Protocol. 
101 See Article 164 of the COMESA Treaty. 
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The prospects of moving towards the tri-partite movement of people within the context 
outlined above do not look promising. To date, no concrete strategy has been created by the 
tri-partite initiative to facilitate or move towards the free movement of people, except that it 
will be dealt with on a separate track during the first phase of negotiations. Thus, given that 
the T-???? ????? ??????? ??? ???? acquis?? ??? ?????? ??? ???? ??? ???????? ????? ?????????? ????
movement of people, that not much is expected other than what is currently in progress at the 
REC level. 
 
5.3 Infrastructure Development 
Chapter three highlighted that Africa expects greater economic growth in the future and as a 
result there will be an increased demand for adequate infrastructure to facilitate the expected 
growth, coupled with ensuring that this growth is sustainable. In other words, infrastructure is 
important, because a symbiosis exists between it and economic growth, due to the fact that it 
is foundational in establishing the costs of trade; global competitiveness of individual 
countries, and the prospects of development as a result. Within the same breath, a lack of 
sound infrastructure would decrease the mobility of the means of production (i.e. labour; 
goods, and finance) (ECA, 2010, p. 295). Infrastructure should accordingly be regarded 
within both a demand and supply dynamic that bears interrelated implications that could 
impact economic growth.  
 
The deficiencies in infrastructure across Africa, and not just the tri-partite region, are well 
documented. These have been commonly associated with the lack of competitiveness as well 
as physical connectivity of the regions. No meaningful regional integration will take place in 
Africa until an effort is made to address the hindrances of infrastructure backlogs (Rathumbu, 
2008, p. 172). According to the ECA (2004, p. 10), in order to deepen trade in Africa a 
comprehensive and well-coordinated approach in improving infrastructure must be adopted, 
and efficient and competitive roads, railways, ports, ICT and energy must be provided. The 
most pressing areas pertaining the infrastructure pillar are surface transport, ICT and energy. 
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Despite the surge in regional infrastructure projects and initiatives in Africa, it must be noted 
that they are considered in many respects to remain public goods. The primary role player in 
delivering infrastructure for the public good is individual governments. Thus, individual 
states are tasked with implementing and delivering infrastructure whether it is for national or 
regional plans. However, the small scale of many sub-Saharan country economies means that 
they cannot adequately fund the fixed costs in infrastructure development (Foster & Briceno-
Garmendia, 2008, p. 144).  
 
Due to the public good element of infrastructure, it has the potential to positively impact 
across borders. This means that states can share and make provision for joint projects that 
increases the scale of construction; operation, and maintenance (Foster & Briceno-
Garmendia, 2008, p. 144). It could be argued that African states are increasingly realising the 
value of proper infrastructure and for this reason, have placed a growing emphasis and scope 
on regional approaches to build adequate infrastructure necessary for the development of the 
continent and its people.  
  
Therefore, outlining the configuration of infrastructure projects in the areas mentioned above 
in the three regions under examination is relevant in the tri-partite context. The T-FTA as 
noted in chapter four is proposed to build on the initiatives currently underway within the 
RECs and AU framework. Strengthening regional approaches already underway can most 
likely bring about positive outcomes vis-á-vis regional integration in the short to medium 
term through increased coordination and harmonisation. 
 
On the continental level the AU has created the Programme for Infrastructure Development 
???????? ???? ??????? ????? ?????????? ??? ??? ??????????????? ???????? ??? ????????????? ?? ??????????
framework for creating regional and continental infrastructure based on establishing strategic 
objectives, sector policies and programmes and priorities (ECA, 2010, p. 301). In line with 
this vision, the Tri-partite Task Force has already geared towards creating a joint programme 
on ICT, regional infrastructure coordination, energy and power interconnectors as well as the 
North-South Corridor initiative (COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2011a, p. 7-10). Thus, glancing at 
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????? ????? ?? ??????? ???-view, the tri-partite process is assisting in realising the goals and 
objectives of the PIDA, and in turn contributing to pan-African aspirations. 
 
5.3.1 Surface Transport 
Surface transport in Africa is considerably less developed if compared to other regions of the 
world. Within the ambit of surface transport roads, railways, ports and harbours as well as air 
transport are relevant. Infrastructure in a regional context provides for the physical 
connectivity between states. Thus, within the broad generalisation of surface transport, it is 
perhaps the most tangible aspect of physically connecting infrastructure that would 
strengthen regional integration. This section will briefly highlight these areas.  
 
5.3.1.1 Roads 
The road networks in many African countries are underdeveloped and as a result they remain 
poorly connected. According to ECA (2010, p. 296), this is especially important when you 
consider that in Africa, transportation by means of roads, accounts for more than 90 percent 
of passenger and freight transport compared with 50 percent for freight in Europe. 
Additionally, Africa has seen an increased diversion of rail freight to road transport, and this 
puts pressure on existing roads (Mutambara, 2008, p. 35). A worrying figure is that of 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? to roads compared with 50 percent in 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in the future also need to utilise roads (ECA, 2010, p. 296). Thus, Africa and the COMESA-
EAC-SADC countries are highly dependent on road infrastructure to facilitate the movement 
of goods and people.  
 
Clearly, there is considerable demand for well-connected and effectively maintained road 
systems across African borders for economic and social purposes. Africa has since the 1970s 
worked towards creating the Trans-African Highway (TAH), which in conception has nine 
????????? ??? ???????? ????????? ????????? ???? ????????? ???????? ?????? ?????? ??? ???-303). 
????????? ????? ???????? ??? ?????????? ??? ??? ???? ???????? ??????????? ?????? ??? ?????? ?nly 20 
percent is paved (Mutambara, 2008, p. 35 and ECA, 2010, p. 303). The continental road 
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network is poorly developed, badly maintained and have not been updated to accommodate 
larger vehicles (ECA, 2004, p. 158). As a result, despite their regional character, transit 
transport systems have continued to operate as fragmented national systems rather than 
integrated regional systems in Africa (UNCTAD, 2001, p. 21). The poor standard that exists 
between African states in terms of the road network impacts on the cost of trade considerably, 
given the volume of traffic on them. This affects the competitiveness of the regions and 
Africa as a whole.  
 
Roads are the primary means of transporting goods and as trade between African states 
increase, so will the size of the vehicles and the range of products that they carry. Effective 
planning, provision, maintenance, monitoring and enforcement of standards will be required 
across the regions to improve intra-regional linkages (physical integration) and ensure a 
workable lifespan of road networks. The COMESA-EAC-SADC (2008, p. 16) maintains that 
a key issue in the harmonisation of the road infrastructure in the regions was to agree on axle 
load limits for freight vehicles, for example single, tandem and triple axles (with varying 
numbers of tyres) as well as combination rigs. 
 
The tri-partite region is working towards applying these standards to freight transport in the 
???????? ??? ???????? ???? ???????????? ???????????????? ????? ???? ?????????? ??? ???? ???????? ??????
these axle loading limits so the load weight on a freight vehicle is limited to the load which is 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-EAC-SADC, 
2008, p. 16). Another problem associated with axle loads are that vehicles are often 
overloaded, adding evens more to the pressure on road infrastructure. This points to a lack of 
enforcement on roads and in general a lack of harmonisation when viewing the axle load 
issue. Accordingly, if roads are the dominant channel of transport, especially in Africa, then 
certainty in terms of road life, the conditions of these roads will become of paramount 
importance in future. 
 
It is clear that transport infrastructure is of paramount importance to general development and 
more specifically facilitating trade. The first Tri-partite Summit instructed the three RECs to 
create regional transport master plans. Presently, COMESA and EAC have completed theirs, 
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whereas the SADC is completing an infrastructure master plan and is also in the process of 
preparing a comprehensive transport master plan (COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2011a, p. 9). The 
tri-partite master plan will consolidate the COMESA-EAC-SADC master plans and feed into 
the PIDA (COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2011a, p. 9). Presumably, this would feed into the 
maintenance and development of the TAH network as well.  
 
5.3.1.2 Railways 
????????? ???????? ???????? ???? ????????? ????????????? ?????? ???? ???????????? ??? ???? ???????? ???
increased liberalisation of national economies, resulting in better access and provision of 
roads that has created strong intermodal competition (Foster & Briceno-Garmendia, 2008, p. 
229). The network represents a density of only 2.5 km per 1,000 square metres. This 
compares badly with the 40 km per 1,000 square metres in Europe (ECA, 2010, p. 306). 
Industrialised nations have sophisticated rail networks that link various economic centres and 
this allows large amounts of cargo to be transported efficiently.  
 
The importance of railway networks to connect states and economic centres has the potential 
to increase intra-regional trade considerably in Africa. Also, the current lack of 
competitiveness between road and rail transport in the regions can be overcome through a 
well-functioning rail system that is aligned towards a regional goal. A key challenge in this 
regard is the incentive to increase the rail network given its deteriorating applicability in the 
current economic and trade links between states in Africa. Trade between African countries 
(other than to and from South Africa) has always been minimal, largely due to the similarity 
in products exported, which suggests that inter-regional rail links would not be utilised 
comprehensively, even if they existed (Foster & Briceno-Garmendia, 2008, p. 230). Thus, 
economic diversification would actually be the strongest driver for new rail systems.  
 
The national rail networks in sub-Saharan Africa are predominantly independent of each 
other, except the Eastern and Southern Africa rail systems, which are interconnected (ECA, 
2010, p. 306). However, within the regions, the railways are mostly built according to the 
Cape gauge of 1,067 mm between the rails, with the exception of the Tanzania Railways 
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Corporation (TRC) system in Tanzania, the Kenyan ? Ugandan, and the Ethiopia ? Djibouti 
systems that have a 1,000 mm gauge. As a result, there is almost no railway connectivity 
between Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2008, p. 14). Based on this, it 
will be a considerable challenge to harmonise the railway network within the tri-partite 
region. However, if this could be resolved it has the potential to greatly increase trade and 
link landlocked states in the tri-partite region to ports and economic centres that would assist 
them to overcome their particular reliance on coastal states with weak transit infrastructure. 
 
No initiatives have been directed specifically at overcoming the challenge of railway 
connectivity in the COMESA, EAC and SADC. It is likely that this aspect of transport 
infrastructure is awaiting the completion and culmination of the above-mentioned transport 
master plans of the RECs. Once there is a bigger picture of what the regions will aspire to in 
terms of their regional transport plans, clarity in terms of how rail fits into the overall 
transport picture will be available. 
 
5.3.1.3 Ports and harbour 
The significance of port and harbour infrastructure to international trade is immense. Besides 
air transport, ports and harbours are the primary infrastructure that connects states for 
overseas trade. Maritime ports play a vital role in developing world trade and commerce, 
since more than 90 percent of Afric?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
p. 309). Thus, if African states want to engage in international trade they need sufficient and 
capable access to ports and harbours.  
 
This is particularly important for landlocked countries (LLCs) that rely on their neighbours 
with coastlines and sufficient ports to connect them with international trade. East Africa has 
three LLCs (i.e. Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda) with two transit countries (i.e. Kenya and 
Tanzania) (UNCTAD, 2003, p. 4). For its part, Southern Africa has six LLCs (i.e. Botswana, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe) with four transit countries (i.e. Angola, 
Mozambique, Namibia and SA) (UNCTAD, 2003, p. 4-5).The main transhipment points for 
regional traffic are Abidjan in the Ivory Coast; Dar es Salaam in Tanzania; Djibouti in 
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Djibouti; Durban in South Africa; and Mombasa in Kenya (Foster & Briceno-Garmendia, 
2008, p. 250-257).  
 
From the above it is clear that within the Eastern and Southern African regions, there are only 
a few ports that can facilitate international trading opportunities. These ports will need to be 
able to handle the larger volumes of shipment cargo and vessels that travel between ports in a 
global economy as well. Presently, many ports are poorly equipped and inefficiently operated 
with container handling standards that fall well below international norms. The port charges 
associated with both containers and general cargo are substantially higher than in other 
regions of the international system (Foster & Briceno-Garmendia, 2008, p. 249). The higher 
?????? ????????????????????????? ?????? ???? ?? ??????? ??????????? ?????????? ??????????? ??? ???????
high port tariffs that discourage traffic and increase cost (Africa Infrastructure Knowledge 
Program, 2011b?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????vis-á-vis the 
ones in other regions of the world. 
 
There is no explicit reference made to strengthening the ports and harbours within the tri-
partite context. Like rail infrastructure, it is likely that strengthening ports and harbours 
within the tri-partite context will only be possible once there is a bigger picture of how 
transport infrastructure will look like. 
 
5.3.1.4 Air Transport 
Air transport has been growing in importance in Africa since the implementation of 
liberalised air transport policies within the framework of the Yamoussoukro Declaration 
(YD) and improved competition regulations (COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2008, p. 17).102 
However, ????????? ?????? ??? ??????? ???? ?????????? ???????? ??????? ??? ?????? ???? ???????? ???
passenger traffic and approximately 3.6 percent of freight traffic in 2004 (ECA, 2010, p. 
??????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????th 
aggregated figures showing growth in all types of scheduled air travel, including 
                                                             
102 The YD is an arrangement for the gradual liberalisation of scheduled and non-scheduled intra Africa air 
transport services (YD, 1999). 
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intercontinental and international traffic within Africa (ECA, 2010, p. 313). Intercontinental 
traffic in sub-Saharan Africa depends on three major hubs, namely Johannesburg, Nairobi 
and Addis Ababa (ECA, 2010, p. 314).These hubs account for the strong growth in Eastern 
and Southern Africa air traffic (Africa Infrastructure Knowledge Program, 2011d).  
 
There are no real backlogs or major constraints in terms of airport infrastructure over the 
short to medium term in Africa. At present, 280 airports receive regularly scheduled services, 
and this number is stable with enough runways to handle traffic in the near future. Similarly, 
runway capacity is not a limiting factor (ECA, 2010, p. 315). However, this does not 
highlight the general and/ or important constraints with regards to air transport as experienced 
in Africa. These are as follows: 
 
??????????????? ?????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????
problem. Landing charges are high owing to the absence of support from 
concessions enjoyed across the world. Operating costs have soared with fuel 
prices, choking off air connections in many countries. Air traffic control 
requires major upgrades to improve the continents baleful safety record. 
Policy challenges include strengthening regulatory oversight and achieving 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Program, 2011d). 
 
From the above it is clear that significant work is still required in bringing air transport in 
Africa in par with internationally competitive standards and pricing, and the latter could be 
improved through regional and continental initiatives. Achieving full liberalisation will be 
conditioned on the ability of air transport to be competitive and open up new routes intra and 
inter regionally as well as continentally. 
 
A commitment was made at the 2008-Summit to strengthen the YD by forming a Joint 
Competition Authority (JCA) on air trade liberalisation within the tri-partite framework 
(COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2011, p. 6). The JCA is in the process of being operationalised and 
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has seven members, including two members each from the COMESA, EAC and SADC plus a 
chairperson on a rotational basis (COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2011, p. 6). The aim is to create a 
single seamless upper air space in the tri-partite context. 
 
5.3.2 Information and Communications Technology (ICT) 
The prevalence of globalisation has been spurred on by technological revolutions that have 
drastically impacted the global economy. States, regions and continents that have grown their 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(primarily through internet access). Gilpin (2000 and 2001) views this as the most recent 
economic revolution similar to that of the industrial revolution. In the context of this section, 
ICT refers to fixed-line telephones, mobile cellular telephones and Internet services. 
 
If Africa wants to develop and grow their economies they will have to increase their ICT 
infrastructure and general access to it. It is not a precursor to growth, but it is hard to see how 
countries can develop and grow in a global economy that relies on information sharing, 
communicating and using technology to increase efficiency and competitiveness. For 
example, electronic data interchange and electronic commerce are replacing the more tedious 
and somewhat outdated paper trail (UNCTAD, 2003, p. 1). The use of ICT globally is 
standard, and as such Africa has to reach that standard in order to be competitive in both 
regional and world markets. 
 
Yet, as of March 2011, Internet users in Africa represented only 5.7 percent of global users, 
while Internet penetration is only 11. 4 percent compared with the world average of 30.2 
percent (Internet World Stats, 2012). An E1 2 mbps broadband access point costs on average 
$4000 in Africa compared to $100-$250 in India and $10-$20 in developed countries (Katiti, 
2010). Thus, bridging the digital divide in Africa is a particularly important objective within 
the broader infrastructure goals of the continent as well as regionally. This will require the 
development of infrastructure and services that support fixed-line, mobile telephones and 
broadband access to and for Internet services. 
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Africa has been steadily increasing its access to ICT through reforms that have occurred in 
the past two decades in the sector. These reforms have led to a shift from fixed line users, to 
mobile and wireless services in Africa (COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2008, p. 18). This is 
indicative of a lack of fixed-??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
vast land mass that has made it difficult to roll out fixed-line networks, and consequently 
almost 90 percent of telephone subscribers are also mobile users (Internet World Stats, 2012). 
In fact, fixed-line services are limited and unreliable, with high call charges, especially for 
calls abroad (COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2008, p. 18). The reason why this is so important in 
Africa is that call charges are routed via Europe and the USA, making it more expensive, and 
this results in a foreign exchange drain in the sub-regions by more than $150 million annually 
in transit charges (COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2008, p. 18-19). Therefore, a key objective is to 
minimise such outflows in Africa and the COMESA-EAC-SADC region in particular, since 
this could only have a positive impact for consumers and business. 
 
As one of its main infrastructure goals, NEPAD envisages to rationalise and develop the 
broadband ICT network in Africa. The key features of this initiative in the three regions are 
to establish a submarine cable for East Africa that would complete the fibre optic ring around 
the African coastline in conjunction with other submarine cables; and to connect countries in 
Eastern and Southern Africa to their neighbours, ensuring that landlocked countries have 
access to at least two cable landing stations (NEPAD, nd, p. 1). Within the tri-partite context, 
the backbone ICT infrastructure that is being developed is based on existing networks and 
?????????? ??????? ???? ??????? ????????? ??????????????? ??????????? ??????103, COMESA 
Telecommunications Company (COMTEL)104 and EAC Broadband ICT Infrastructure 
Network (EAC-BIN),105 which interconnects landlocked countries to undersea cables. This 
stresses the priority that has been given to linking continental terrestrial networks to the 
global ICT network through undersea cables (COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2011a, p. 7).  
 
 
                                                             
103 The SADC has established the Southern African Telecommunications Association (SATA) that deals with 
issues of technical standards, tariffs and the SRII concerning ICT (Adam, 2005, p. 20). 
104 COMESA undertook a study in 1998 that led to the establishment of COMTEL, a regional 
telecommunications network (Adam, 2005, p. 19). 
105 The EAC have created the EAC-BIN network to strengthen regional ICT in the REC. 
 
 
 
 
172 
 
5.3.3 Energy 
Energy is the cornerstone of all economies. Without it, no economic development can occur. 
According to the International Energy Agency, sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest 
electrification rate of any major region in the world. In terms of world energy electricity 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?he total global output 
(ECA, 2004, p. 117). The entire installed generation capacity of African countries is 125 
gigawatts, with sub-???????? ??????? ??????? ??? ??????????? ?????? ??? ??? ????? ????? ????????
generation capacity. In addition, approximately one-quarter of the afore-mentioned capacity 
is in fact unavailable due to aging plants and poor maintenance (Foster & Briceno-
Garmendia, 2008, p. 182 and Fakir, 2012, p. 5). This is especially worrying when the 
following is taken into consideration: 
 
??????????????awatts installed generation capacity, some 44.3 gigawatts need 
to be refurbished. An additional 7000 megawatts of new generation capacity 
need to be built each year to meet suppressed demand, keep pace with 
projected economic growth, and provide additional capacity to support the 
rollout of electrification. Compare that with expansion of less than 1000 
megawatts a year over the period 1990-2005. The bulk of this new generation 
capacity will be needed to meet non-???????????????????????????????????????-
Garmendia, 2008, p. 185). 
 
????????? ?????? ??????? ??? ?????????????? ??? ?????? ????????? ????? ????? ?????-quarters of the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????p. 
36-37). In fact, in 2008, out of the 68 gigawatts installed capacity in sub-Saharan Africa, if 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
be 28 gigawatts (Foster & Briceno-Garmendia, 2008, p. 185). According to Fakier (2012, p. 
5) sub-Saharan Africa is the only region in the world where per capita consumption of 
electricity for ordinary citizens are falling compared to other developing countries. If current 
trends continue, fewer than 40 percent of African countries will have universal access by 
2050. Thus, on average Africa has relatively small and concentrated power generation 
capacity and supply. 
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Moreover, Africa has vast amounts of resources to produce energy but they are largely 
?????????? ???? ?????? ?????????????? ??? ????????? ??? ????????? ???????????? ??? ??oduced using 
thermal energy because of the large coal fired stations in South Africa, and oil fired 
generation units in North Africa (ECA, 2010, p. 325-326). This need not be the case because 
Africa is well endowed with cost-effective energy resources on a large scale, and mainly in 
hydropower. However, these resources are located far from major demand centres with many 
of the countries where it is found, lacking the means to be able to develop them (Africa 
Infrastructure Knowledge Program, 2011d). ?????????????? ??? ???????? ??? ???? ?????????
hydropower potential is located in just two countries, namely the DRC and Ethiopia (Foster 
& Briceno-Garmendia, 2008, p. 185-187). Regional trade in energy is seen to be the solution 
in Africa as it would make harnessing these sources of energy more attractive and 
economically viable through savings of as much as $2 billion annually (Africa Infrastructure 
Knowledge Program, 2011d).  
 
Within Eastern and Southern Africa, there is a rich tradition of cooperation and electricity 
sharing between states. Cooperation in the electricity sector is not a new phenomenon in the 
Southern African region either; it has taken place at policy, planning and operational levels 
and involved governments, power utilities and financial agencies over a period of several 
decades (Southern African Power Pool, nd). Thus, under the auspices of the SADC, states in 
the region formalised this interaction through the creation of the Southern African Power 
Pool (SAPP). Similarly, recognising the potential benefit from developing a regional power 
pool, seven East African energy ministers from Burundi, DRC, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Rwanda and Sudan signed an inter-governmental MoU for establishing the Eastern Africa 
Power Pool (EAPP) in 2005, followed by an inter-utility MoU by nine power utilities that 
heralded the formal launching of the EAPP (Eastern Africa Power Pool, 2011). However, 
making regional power trade work is a considerable economic and political challenge, in part 
because of the many missing links in the continental power-transmission network (Africa 
Infrastructure Knowledge Program, 2011).  
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The tri-partite process is fast-tracking the implementation of electric power interconnection 
projects, including the Zambia-Tanzania-Kenya interconnector, which will link the SAPP and 
EAPP, and in turn enhancing power trade within the sector (COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2011a, 
p. 10). This is an exciting development and can link the power pools in the regions on a 
tripartite level. 
 
5.3.4 North South Development corridor 
The prevalence of development corridor projects is common across the COMESA-EAC-
SADC. They are micro-regionalism initiatives usually instituted bi-laterally between member 
states in order to facilitate specific objectives such as connecting economic centres, ports and 
transport systems. The tri-partite process has strengthened the North-South Corridor 
initiative, which is a combination of two traditional corridors, namely the Durban and Dar es 
Salaam corridors (COMESA-EAC-SADC Press Release, 2009, p. 1-2). In terms of 
development corridors, the North-South initiative has by far the largest geographic reach and 
likelihood of having a developmental impact in the tri-partite region. 
  
5.4 Industrialisation 
Although the industrialisation pillar has been earmarked to undergo a programme of work, no 
proposals have been set forth as yet and it will be the most contentious and difficult pillar to 
realise under the T-FTA framework. It should be highlighted that since the first wave of 
regional integ??????? ?????????????????? ???? ??????????? ????? ????????? ??? ????????? ?????????
agreements (Hartzenberg, 2011a, p. ii). A key determinant of including industrialisation 
within the tri-partite framework is the realisation of supply side constraints to intra-African 
trade. This means that many African states lack the industrial capacity for diversified 
manufactured goods to support trade (Hartzenberg, 2011b, p. 9).  
 
Enhanced market access, without the capacity to produce goods and services to benefit from 
those opportunities, will fail to produce higher economic growth. It could be argued that the 
real problem facing African economies is not market access (such as border constraints) but 
rather the capacity to produce tradable goods (WTO World Trade Report, 2011, p. 152). This 
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is a primary motivation for the inclusion of industrialisation in the tri-partite framework and 
as such makes perfect sense amongst the pillars of market integration and infrastructure 
development. 
 
The African continent significantly lacks industrial capacity to produce the manufactured 
goods needed for value-added trade. The continent is currently the least industrialised region 
in the world, while the share of sub-Saharan Africa in global manufacturing value-added 
trade actually declining between 1990 and 2000 (Marti & Ssenkubuge, 2009, p. 1). Emerging 
economies that are experiencing growth and development from economic globalisation are 
increasing their capacity and ability to produce goods, which are of an intermediary and 
finished goods nature. This means that if Africa is to increase its development in general, and 
economic growth in particular, it needs to follow this route. By utilising market integration, 
coupled with reaping the benefits of economies of scale by enlarging the market, a regional 
approach to industrialisation stands to benefit from and could extract positive outcomes 
through regional value chains and fragmented trade.  
 
Chapter three elaborated on the first wave of regional integration in Africa and stressed that 
the initial impulse of regional integration was to promote industrialisation. This was 
encapsulated continentally through the LPA that promoted the idea of industrialisation 
through ISI. The ECA (2007, p. 134) maintains that industrialisation to a large measure 
requires diversification through investment, but this is not likely in an environment where the 
public-private policy mix is skewed towards fiscal policy rather than monetary policy. By 
virtue of the fact that most African states are faced with negative balance sheets, they are 
often forced to rather focus on fiscal responsibility and by extension had to overlook 
diversification in order to survive. For this reason, it is unclear how African states will at a 
fundamental level be able to finance industrialisation.  
 
The first COMESA-EAC-SADC TTF on industrialisation met in February 2012. A work plan 
on industrial development was created. This plan focuses on a situational analysis of 
industrial trends and potential. It also proposes the facilitation of a high level stakeholder 
workshop. Furthermore, the plan advocates for a regional value chain analysis focusing on 
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agro-industry and chemicals and related products as well as mineral processing (Erasmus & 
Hartzenberg, 2012, p. 3). 
 
5.5 Inter-REC Co-operation in the EPAs 
In April 1976, the first Lomé Agreement came into force. It involved the developing African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, and was re-negotiated thrice before expiring in 2000 
(Venter & Neuland, 2007, p. 88). The institutionalisation of the WTO and the then European 
Community (EC) progressing towards the formation of the European Union (EU) has 
influenced negotiating new cooperation agreements between the ACP countries and Europe. 
These new cooperation arrangements are called the Cotonou Partnership Agreements, more 
commonly referred to as Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). The EPAs are meant to 
address the weaknesses of the Lomé conventions by radically reforming the ACP-EU trade 
relationship (Bilal & Braun-Munzinger, 2008, p.3). 
 
Africa is particularly reliant on foreign relations with the developed world for growth and 
development. Until the renewed interest of China and other emerging economies in Africa, 
there was a trend where Africa experienced marginalisation in the global economy. This was 
due largely to the prevalence of unstable states; chronic underdevelopment, and small, 
underdeveloped markets on the continent. The EU is still an important trading, investment 
and aid partner in and for Africa and continuously embarks on initiatives towards fostering a 
lucrative developmental relationship with the continent (Venter & Neuland, 2007).  
 
Nevertheless, the EU has been criticised for its renewed efforts to fast track EPAs with Africa 
across the RECs that are in existence on the continent (Yao, 2010). Jakobeit et al (2005, p. 
20) note that in Eastern and Southern Africa there are two dominant EPA negotiations taking 
place, namely the SADC EPA and Eastern and Southern African EPA. Some African states 
have not entered into them according to their REC configurations, in effect aligning 
themselves to new groupings. This has been criticised as unsustainable for the development 
goals as set by African states, because the process effectively redefines current RECs (Yao, 
2010). The implications of the EPAs for regional and continental economic integration in 
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Africa are perceived as negative and do not bode well for African states uniting under a 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
issue of EPAs exposes a lack of coherence in the rationale for regional bodies in Africa. 
Various member states of African RECs have failed to identify the long term threats by 
entering into negotiations with the EU structured in a way that is not consistent with the 
current configuration of RECs. 
 
According to the COMESA-EAC-SADC (2011a, p. 5), slow progress has been made in 
reaching convergence on the EPAs since the first summit in 2008. There has been a lack of 
consensus between member and partner countries within the three RECs vis-á-vis the EPAs. 
On the one hand, some countries are convinced and/ or encouraged by what they perceived as 
the possible benefits that will accrue from signing an EPA with the EU. On the other hand, 
others, and especially the LDCs are convinced that it will not be beneficial to their economic 
development in the short and long term, while other countries remain ambivalent regarding 
the issue at hand. This current so-called mixed stance on EPAs by African states mirrors the 
same situation as was evident under the first wave of regional integration in Africa where 
those states with stronger economies wanted to participate more in global trade as opposed to 
the economically weaker ones opting to rather develop through ISI. Thus, just as in the first 
wave, divergence can be observed from and amongst member states.  
 
The interim SACU EPA exists among the two dominant EPA negotiations in Eastern and 
Southern Africa. The T-FTA explicitly deals with the COMESA, EAC and SADC; thus, their 
EPA negotiations will have the greatest bearing on realising the T-FTA. At the time of 
writing, both the EPAs and T-FTA have not been concluded and as such it is difficult to 
determine what the outcome will be.  
 
The EU announced that African states that fail to sign or ratified EPAs by 1 January 2014 
will lose duty free access to European markets (Atta & Gemma, 2011). This is a heavy 
handed approach by the EU to ensure that African states commit to their EPA configurations. 
However, the SADC-EU EPA has been shelved with no fixed date as to when negotiations 
will continue with both parties indicating that they will shift focus to domestic concerns. In 
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the case of the SADC, that shift is towards the T-FTA (Agritrade, 2011). As mentioned 
before, the T-FTA negotiation deadline according to the Draft Roadmap for T-FTA 
negotiations is 2016. Thus, it will be interesting to track possible convergence or divergence 
with the T-FTA if some member states opt for the EPA configurations. 
 
5.6 A rules based integration process 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????? ???????????????????
is the need to strengthen a rules based process of integration. Hartzenberg (2011b, p. 18) 
emphasises that an importan??????????? ??????? ????????????????????????????? ?????????? ??????
member states as rules based dispensations. In other words, do they respect legal agreements 
at the regional level and are they willing to abide by regional court decisions? Adherence to 
the rule of law is vital for regional integration in order to ensure that members act on the basis 
of rules. Ultimately, without rules, integration is impossible (Scholtz, 2011). States will not 
easily cooperate without a respect for rules that is encapsulated in law. This is due to a 
resultant lack of predictability in state behaviour and the consequent behaviour of RECs that 
weakens the integration process considerably. Hartzenberg (2011b, p. 18) elaborates as 
follows on the state of play in the progress towards a rules based dispensation in Africa: 
 
???????? ???????? ??? ?????? ??? ???? ???????????? ??? ???? ??????????? ?????? ??? ????
linear regional integration model are common among RIAs. Delays in the 
ratification and domestic incorporation of regional legal instruments by 
member states are common across RIAs, as is the failure to implement specific 
provisions of the agreements such as negotiated tariff reductions. Sanctions for 
lack of implementation or the application of sanctions if they do exist, in 
Africa RIAs is no????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
institutions established to contribute to the implementation of these 
agreements, do not play a robust role as external anchor or agency to ensure 
national compliance and domestic policy, legal and institutional development 
???????????????????????????????? 
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At the REC level, regional courts play the pivotal role of upholding the rule of law and 
ideally should be able to make decisions that are binding on member states. This is by no 
means standard in Africa, with few mechanisms being in place to enforce decisions (Nyirabu, 
2004, p. 25). However, a feature of African RTA judiciaries is that their decisions are bold 
vis-á-vis member states, even though they operate in a context where adherence to national 
sovereignty is strong (Gathii, 2011, p. 264).106  
 
The COMESA, EAC and SADC all have regional courts to facilitate the rule of law at the 
regional level. The Treaty establishing the COMESA established the COMESA Court of 
Justice to ensure the adherence to law in the interpretation and application of the Treaty. 
Provisions are also made to ensure that the judgments of this Court are final and conclusive 
and not subjected to appeal (COMESA, 1992, p. 20).107 
 
In similar vein, the Treaty establishing the EAC established the East African Court of Justice. 
As with the case with the COMESA Treaty and Court, the EAC Court is in similar fashion 
tasked with ensuring adherence to law in the interpretation and applicati??? ??? ???? ??????
Treaty. The Court enjoys jurisdiction over interpreting and applying Treaty obligations, as 
well as determining that its decisions are final, binding and conclusive and not subjected to 
appeal (EAC, 2000, p. 30).108 From this it is clear that the Courts as established by the 
Treaties of both the COMESA and EAC share similar duties and authority.  
 
The Treaty establishing the SADC created the SADC Tribunal and it is tasked with ensuring 
adherence to and proper interpretation of the provisions o?? ???? ??????? ?????? (SADC, 
1992).109 The Tribunal is only consulted once partner states have exhausted all other amicable 
routes, and its decisions are final and binding on those concerned. Keeping this all in mind, it 
is clear that the relevant RECs do indeed have provisions that foster the principle of the rule 
of law at the regional level.  
                                                             
106 Regional courts often make rulings on human rights issues. Their judgements are considered to be bold since 
individual me????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????? 
107 See Articles 19 and 31 (1) of the COMESA Treaty. 
108 See Articles 23 (1), 27 and 35 (1) of the EAC Treaty. 
109 See Articles 1 (g), 16 (1) and (2) and 32 of the SADC Treaty. 
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The tri-partite context of the rule of law principle is twofold. Firstly, the T-FTA deals with 
international trade and as a result it should ideally be able to have effective dispute settlement 
measures as well as remedies to resolve possible conflicts in place (Erasmus, 2011, p. 86). 
This is particularly important when considering that the tri-?????????? ??????????? ??????????
entails 26 countries with different and diverse development levels. If and when the T-FTA is 
realised, disagreement is to be expected. Secondly, there is the question whether the 
judgements in terms of disputes will be respected and regarded as serious and binding by 
member states. The importance of these two factors within a rules based dispensation will be 
crucial. If present, it could create a well-functioning T-FTA that acts and operates on the 
basis of rules, which in turn could encourage predictability, coupled with creating an 
environment for regional integration that flourishes on mutual trust.  
 
Therefore, a key factor associated with a rules based dispensation is the respect for the rule of 
law at the regional level, and acknowledgement of the importance of it to strengthen regional 
integration. The problem is that Africa states often fear that they could lose their claim to 
sovereignty and this is based on their claim that Africa lacks the required technical capacity 
and expertise to implement rules based trade arrangements (Erasmus & Hartzenberg, 2012, p. 
4). This fear is qualified by the Campbell case involving a Zimbabwean national before the 
SADC Tribunal. Campbell claimed that his basic human rights had been violated due to the 
expropriation of his private property without compensation (Ndlovu, 2011b, p. 64-65 and 
Erasmus, 2012, p. 1). Upon deliberations, the Tribunal found that Zimbabwe was in breach of 
Article 6 of the SADC Treaty. Nonetheless, Zimbabwe expressed its dissatisfaction with this 
decision. Subsequently, at the August 2010 Summit, the SADC Tribunal was suspended 
(Afadameh-Adayemi & Kalula, 2011, p. 16). This decision raised serious concerns about the 
rule of law in the SADC and the (in) ability of its regional judiciary to ensure the protection 
of rights (Erasmus, 2012, p. 1).The consequent suspension of the SADC Tribunal is 
indicative of the strong solidarity between African countries and how they are unwilling to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
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5.7 Gaps in the Tripartite Framework 
The tri-partite framework certainly brings to the table elements of co-operation between the 
three RECs that are needed in order to rationalise and harmonise the integration process. 
However, the framework is silent on at least three critical issues. These include issues of 
political will; economic polarisation, and stability in individual states. In attempt to avoid a 
situation where the T-FTA fades into obscurity, it is paramount that the afore-mentioned 
issues are dealt with by both the existing negotiations and programmes of work underway. 
 
5.7.1 Political Will 
The tri-partite framework has not provided any concrete mechanisms to ensure that member 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
integration that is not backed up by implementation of agreements collectively agreed upon. 
More importantly, this highlights that African states still place their sovereignty as an 
overriding factor that guides the various national interests that they pursue. Thus, African 
states are still caught up in a Westphalian type of decision making. The post-Westphalian 
order that globalisation has created requires much more flexibility from states in terms of 
surrendering some sovereignty in order to forward their national goals. The success of the 
proposed T-FTA will, in addition to a realistic conceptual foundation, depend on the political 
will and commitment of member states to make it work (Erasmus, 2011, p. 86). 
 
5.7.2 Economic Polarisation 
One of the most important questions to ask in the context of the T-FTA is who stands to 
benefit economically. Chapter four highlighted the unequal levels of economic development 
between tri-partite states and this will be an important issue in the negotiations. LDCs and 
more developed ones are going to encounter difficulties in reaching consensus on a wide 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the consequent business environments in mind, it is not surprising that the fear of de-
industrialisation and economic polarisation are real threats in the tri-partite context.  
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Kenya; South Africa, and Egypt, by virtue of their relative economic strengths, offer the most 
immediate threat of economic polarisation in their respective regions.110 South Africa has a 
major role to play if the T-FTA is to be realised, not just in terms of trade, but also in terms of 
???????? ??? ??? ???????? ??? ?????? ???? ?????? ???? ???? ??????????? ?????? ??????????? ????? ?????????
integration. It is generally accepted that the EU would not exist today if its strongest 
economic powers (i.e. France and Germany), did not fulfil leading roles in terms of financing 
the integration process. For its part, South Africa should be steadfast on fulfilling the role of a 
leader rather than a follower, especially in those areas where it is prepared to expend 
resources for the regional agenda (Rathumbu, 2008, p. 172).  
 
Negotiations have only just started and therefore, it is unclear whether South Africa will 
indeed take up this role in the tri-partite region. Its actions within the SADC and Africa in 
general have often bear the characteristics of an ambivalent player that still considers national 
interest to be an overriding factor in foreign policy decision-making.111 Therefore, the threat 
of SA polarising the region in terms of its industrial strength is a factor that could hamper the 
regional integration process (Kritzinger-van Niekerk, nd. p. 10-12). For example, current 
trade flows in the COMESA-EAC-SADC heavily favour South Africa as the strongest 
economic power in Africa. It recorded a trade surplus of $4.7 billion with the SADC; $5.9 
billion with the COMESA, and exports to the EAC worth $1.4 billion (Naumann, 2011, p. 
263-264). According to Bisseker (2011) South Africa and Mozambique stand to gain R8.8 
billion and R381million, respectively if the T-FTA was to be realised through increased 
market access. Most other tri-partite members would only grow marginally due to their 
overlapping FTAs. From this it can be ???????? ?????????? ?????????????????????? ???????????
will help the T-FTA, it is a double-edged sword in that its economic strength may skew the 
benefits predominantly towards South Africa. Another problem that could arise is the matter 
?????????????????????dership role being shunned by other members that could feel intimidated 
by its economic might. 
 
                                                             
110 SA will be the focus of this section as it remains the most important player in the tripartite context. Egypt and 
to a lesser extent Kenya have recently both experienced politically instability and as a result their impact is not 
certain, whereas SA is politically stable and have made in-roads into Africa for business purposes.  
111 ???????????????????????(2011) dissertation entitled South Africa’s Foreign Policy, 1994 – 2010: Partner or 
Hegemon for an excellent account of South A??????s ambivalent position in Africa. 
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5.7.3 Stability in individual states 
In recent years the prevalence of instability in Africa has declined. However, instability and 
conflict still exist though and have an important influence on the ability of governments to 
implement any sort of development strategies. Instability is also still common in the tri-partite 
region. For instance, at the time of writing, ten tri-partite partner states experience some form 
of political instability; of that number five are characterised as areas with active conflict or 
severe tensions while the other five are subject to political instability or sporadic internal 
confrontations. Therefore, almost a third of the tri-partite region is in some way unstable, 
making it hard for those states to implement the strategies and achieve the goals and 
objectives of the tri-partite initiative by virtue of their struggle to consolidate statehood and 
democratic transitions. 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
The tripartite initiative aspires to achieve a wide range of objectives. Under the market 
integration pillar it was found that significant challenges lay ahead in reaching consensus on 
RoO, and little or no concrete action towards the deeper aspects of economic integration. The 
tripartite initiative has already seen progress in trade facilitation efforts and seeks to bolster 
continental infrastructure initiatives. These are positive steps in the right direction if realised. 
The EPA issue looms amidst the negotiations currently underway for the T-FTA and will be 
an interesting dynamic if some member states opt for EPAs during negotiations. The role of 
regional courts will prove to be the linchpin that will hold the entire tripartite initiative 
together however; they are not respected in the regions as custodians of regional integration. 
Economic polarisation, lack of political will and stability in member states are issues that 
have not been included in the tripartite conceptualisation. This suggests that the fundamental 
???????????????????????? ???????? ???????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????
the tripartite initiative is ambitious and will be hard to realise given the realities of the 
regions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
184 
 
Chapter 6 Conclusion  
6.1 Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to answer the following research question: How does the T-
FTA propose to contribute to the ARIP, given the challenges that regional integration face in 
Africa? It was envisioned that the following sub questions would assist in answering the 
central question: 
 
? Why do states pursue regional integration, and how has this changed over time? 
? What are the challenges to regional integration in Africa? 
? What are the challenges which exist specifically in EAC, SADC and COMESA in 
terms of regional economic integration? 
? How may the challenges facing the three RECs impact on the proposed T-FTA? 
? What are the goals of the T-FTA and are they attainable in terms of the challenges 
that the three RECs currently face?  
? Is the T-FTA a suitable alternative for the overlapping membership problem in the 
Eastern and Southern African region? 
? Will the T-FTA as it is currently envisioned contribute to the ARIP? 
 
In order to answer the overarching research question, four areas were identified as central to 
the study. Broadly speaking, they include the fundamental aspects of why and how states 
integrate, bearing in mind that they have changed in relevance as well as prevalence in the 
current international system. Africa has an extensive history of regional integration, which is 
linked to its colonial past and as a result has also changed in relevance and prevalence in the 
continent. Moving towards the regional level is a challenging process. Within the African 
context, these challenges span the fundamental, tangible and new generation issues pertaining 
to regional integration. As a result, the emergence of the T-FTA is viewed with these factors 
in mind and assumed to exist in order to overcome them.  
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Chapter two addressed the issue of regional integration and how it is to be viewed within the 
context of this study. The starting point for this was to define regional integration. This led to 
exploring why states pursue regional integration and how states integrate through loose co-
operative arrangements (i.e. functional) or more binding agreements (i.e. market integration) 
or a combination of the two. By providing a narrative of the evolution of the international 
system it became clear that the understandings of both why and how states integrate has 
????????? ??????????????????? ???????????? ??? ????????????????????????????????? ????????????
pursued economic integration presently is conditioned on the gains to be made in an 
increasingly globalised international economy.  
 
Chapter three then explored regional integration in Africa by providing a brief account of 
????????? ????????????? ???????? ???? ???????????? ??? ????????? ???????? ??? ?????? ?????? ????????????
gained into the specific historical context that has culminat??? ????? ???? ????????? ?????????
???????????? ???? ???? ???????????? ??????????? ?????????????? ??????????? ?????? ???? ???????????
????????? ????????? ???????????? ???? ????? ???????? ??????????? ????? ??????????? ???? ???????????
legacies of the past that are in many ways beyond the scope and jurisdiction of individual 
states, given that the colonial borders fundamentally still exist. 
 
Exploring the first and second waves of regional integration in Africa assisted in identifying 
what the primary motivations were/ are for the pursuit of integration. It was found that in the 
first wave, regional integration was subordinate to the national interest of states, reflecting the 
old regionalism dynamic. The factors that culminated in the failure of the first wave were also 
outlined. The second wave of regional integration in Africa appears to be much more fluid, 
with a move towards regional goals being realised as an imperative for development in 
?????????????????????? ???????????????????????? ?????????????????????????? ???????????????????
as a strategy to overcome the challenges of a globalised world. The aspirations of the ARIP 
have not changed considerably since the first wave; overall the goal is still to unite Africa in 
economic and political terms. However, the processes and strategies to reach these ends have 
definitely changed. Africa faces various challenges if it is to realise sustainable and effective 
regional integration. These challenges include a lack of economic development; stability, and 
?????????? ?????? ??? ?????????? ????????? ??gional integration efforts are also impeded by more 
tangible constraints such as hard and soft infrastructure as well as the economic activities of 
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African states that constrain a trade in goods agenda. These challenges contribute to the 
particular realities of just how difficult it is to inculcate a culture of regional integration in 
Africa. This is further illustrated and exacerbated by the incidences of African states entering 
into multiple agreements that give rise to overlapping membership. The latter extremely 
inhibits any rigorous attempt at African regional integration because these states are 
ultimately faced with the dilemma of having to adhere to different sets of rules in terms of, 
for example trade, since they are often members of more than one regional integration 
initiative. 
 
The primary goal of chapter four was to highlight what the T-FTA is and vice versa. This was 
in an attempt to determine whether the T-FTA is a response to the growing contradictions 
that regional integration currently experiences within the regions. In order to do this, an 
exploration into the broadly conceptualised realities; challenges, and aspirations of the T-
FTA is important. Both positive and negative factors were considered although the general 
consensus is that the emergence of the T-FTA is a promising move towards rationalising and 
harmonising the integration process in the COMESA-EAC-SADC region, especially when 
considering the multiplicity of trade arrangements (FTAs). Since the first official political 
Summit in 2008, the tri-partite initiative has seen a significant amount of technical work 
being conducted that has been comprehensive in its conceptualisation of the problems that 
face economic integration, and more specifically, trade integration and related factors. 
However, this has been a highly technical process thus far, indicating that nothing substantive 
have yet been agreed upon. The political leaders of the states in the tri-partite region still have 
to come to reach an agreement on a wide variety of areas that have historically been difficult 
to reconcile at the individual REC level. 
 
The Draft Agreement of the T-FTA that is currently under negotiation, provides clues 
towards elucidating a tentative conclusion with respect to what the T-FTA envisions for 
i???????????? ???? ???????????????? ?????????????????????? ???????? ??? ????????? ?????????? there 
appears to be considerable emphasis on bridging a trade in services agenda into a market 
integration process; focusing on non tariff barriers; transport, and trade facilitation, while also 
seeking to address hard and soft infrastructure constraints (COMESA-EAC-SADC, 2010 and 
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Kalenga, 2011b).112 This is promising as other developing regions such as the ASEAN have 
achieved impressive economic gains by including similar so-called deeper aspects of 
economic integration. 
 
Chapter five aimed to investigate a number of issues that could influence the prospects and 
challenges of realising a successful T-FTA, bearing in mind that market integration is but one 
of three pillars to be achieved and therefore warrants a more holistic interpretation of where 
the tri-partite initiative can make positive contributions to the ARIP. Determining the 
prospects and challenges required investigation of several themes, most notably strategies of 
market integration; infrastructure development, and industrialisation as well as the lack of a 
rules based integration process in Africa. Other strategies also include the EPAs that might 
lead to divergence or convergence with regards to the tri-partite initiative, and finally factors 
that will have an impact on the successful conclusion and implementation of the proposed T-
FTA, such as political will; economic polarisation, and stability in individual states.  
 
The outcomes of this exercise were mixed. The tri-partite initiative, when evaluating the 
market integration pillar for example, certainly has tremendous challenges moving forward. 
Long standing issues in the regional integration process such as conventional trade 
liberalisation and RoO are yet to be fully reconciled in the COMESA, EAC and SADC, and 
this raises questions about whether the T-FTA can overcome them. Also, there is not much 
optimism to resolve new generation trade issues, such as services and the movement of 
persons to support trade. 
 
Promising though is the inclusion of trade facilitation, which effectively supports the trade in 
goods agenda through increasing competitiveness. It was shown how the non tariff barrier 
monitoring mechanism and one-stop border post initiative have already reaped some benefits. 
Coupled with the promising aspects of the infrastructure pillar, these areas constitute the 
greatest contribution that the tri-partite initiative makes to the ARIP. To highlight just two 
successes of the infrastructure pillar: 
                                                             
112 See Article 4 of the Draft T-FTA. 
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? Infrastructure master plans within the respective RECs to feed into the enlarged 
regional space were concluded; and 
? Significant progress with regards to other African initiatives such as the PIDA. 
 
This further illustrates a much more pragmatic approach to the challenges that regional 
integration faces in Africa. Considerable alignment towards tri-partite aspirations is required 
by member states who have already agreed upon an institutional framework to give structure 
to the workings of the initiative. 
 
If any of the tri-partite programmes are to be realised in a meaningful way it will require the 
existence of a rules based integration process. This would strengthen predictability and foster 
trust, but more importantly, requires the recognition of member states in the role that regional 
courts play in the process of regional integration as key anchors or custodians of the 
integration process. Consensus and good faith (which are historically lacking) will be the 
cornerstone of tri-partite integration. Without respect for the rule of law uncertainty will 
prevail. This uncertainty is propounded by the EPAs and the fact that the deadlines for EPA 
interim agreements and T-FTA negotiations overlap with each other. Member states have not 
reached consensus on the EPA issue within the tri-partite framework and as such some are 
indicating their willingness to go ahead with them while others are not. The outcome of the 
EPA negotiations will illustrate convergence towards the T-FTA goal or divergence towards 
the EPAs. 
 
The following reflections on the central research question of how the T-FTA seeks to 
contribute to the ARIP, given the challenges that regional integration faces in Africa can be 
made. The tri-partite initiative seeks to simultaneously deal with a number of factors that are 
relevant to realising effective integration. The most immediate contribution would be to 
rationalise and harmonise the existing trade arrangements in the COMESA-EAC-SADC 
region. If this was to be achieved successfully then the overlapping membership issue would 
be resolved, because the trade arrangements would then be largely similar in nature. Also, the 
enlarged FTA is progressive, indicating a realisation of the current trends in trade agreements 
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globally and thus, at least in its draft form, it adds important areas that have been neglected in 
the African regional integration experience. A more pragmatic initiative is evident by taking a 
developmental approach, thereby acknowledging the inherent weaknesses of member states. 
In many ways, the core idea of the first tri-partite Summit in 2008 of harmonisation and 
rationalising of the integration process is the primary contribution to the ARIP. 
 
The tri-partite initiative as a whole provides the three regions with promising prospects for 
development, which in turn could contribute to the ARIP. This is especially clear when one 
takes in to account the contribution to be made under the infrastructure pillar. In this respect, 
programmes already under way, such as the regional transport master plans, are aimed at 
feeding into the PIDA. The same can be observed with regards to the ICT and energy sector 
strategies that are aimed at strengthening and connecting infrastructure for more competitive 
outcomes. Similarly, the YD is envisioned to be strengthened within the tri-partite framework 
as a core element in liberalising air travel.  
 
However, amid all the positive moves in the right direction, there are outstanding issues that 
need to be considered. The likelihood of success or failure within a comprehensive tri-partite 
undertaking that would ultimately have considerable developmental impact is conditioned on 
resolving these outstanding issues. Whether the strategy is concerned with market integration; 
infrastructure development; industrialisation or other relevant factors that relate to regional 
integration, it will only be effective and sustainable if the manner in which business is 
conducted in Africa is transformed for the better. Africa is well known for grand plans with 
impressive policy to back it up, but at this juncture, the T-FTA does not add anything new to 
the fundamental challenges that regional integration faces. Gottschalk and Schmidt (2004, p. 
155-158) argue that Africa has a plethora of strong institutions for weak states. The 
implication is that these states can only achieve so much with the resources and political will 
they are presented with. It is clear that the AU still has an enormous task ahead to achieve the 
aspirations of a united Africa in political and economic terms. Low development levels and 
the wide disparities amongst states, unstable political environments, constant emphasis on the 
primacy of sovereignty and the ambivalence of the regional powerhouse (i.e. South Africa) 
are all factors that warrant a cautious take on the prospects and challenges of the T-FTA. 
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6.2 Future Research 
This study has set an appropriate platform upon which future research may be conducted. As 
noted, the T-FTA is being negotiated and is not as yet in effect. Thus, a future research 
question would be to explore what the T-FTA has achieved in terms of its stated objectives 
when negotiations are over. The new generation trade issues which the T-FTA has brought 
into the tripartite initiative is in itself an interesting question to explore, does the T-FTA 
indicate a paradigm shift in regional integration in Africa? Lastly, in which ways can the T-
FTA be contrasted to the integration process in the ASEAN? 
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